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ABSTRACT 
THE TRANSFORMATIVE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION: 
AN ALLIANCE'S OUT-OF-AREA POLICY AND JOURNEY TO AFGAHNISTAN 
Laura Kash 
University of New Hampshire, May, 2009 
NATO was formed in 1949 to safeguard and promote stability for its members 
throughout the North Atlantic. Since its formation its members have sought to uphold its 
mission and objectives while expanding its agenda and engaging in a broad range of 
activities. These activities have included engagements that lay outside the traditional 
European boundaries of the Alliance. Historically, the member nations were unable to 
carry out an out-of-area policy due to disagreements between interests, ideologies, and 
viewpoints. The end of the Cold War signaled a shift in member nations' attitudes and 
policy regarding out-of-area operations. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the 
Alliance engaged in several missions and participated in its first out-of-area mission in 
Afghanistan. Through a dialogical analysis of NATO's policy building upon rule-
orientated constructivism, this thesis will explore NATO member nations' shift in out-of-
area policy and understand why NATO became involved in Afghanistan in 2001. 
x 
INTRODUCTION 
After many years of misery and suffering through the Great Depression and 
World War II, prosperity was no longer a glimmer in the horizon for the citizens of the 
United States and Europe. The year of 1949 represented a time of hope, success, and 
change. The year was marked by a growth in car sales and television sets. It was also a 
year in which the People's Republic of China had established the first Asian Communist 
state under Mao Zedong and the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear bomb. Amidst the 
trends and the rising tensions between the East and the West, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) was established. 
The Alliance was formed in order to "safeguard the freedom, common heritage 
and civilization of their people" while trying to "promote stability and well-being in the 
North Atlantic area."1 According to NATO's first Secretary General, Lord Ismay, the 
formation of the Alliance was seen as a way to keep "the Russians out, the American in, 
and the Germans down."2 For the next sixty years, NATO's objectives would be sought 
after and achieved through both political and military means. 
1
 "The North Atlantic Treaty," available from http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm; Internet, 
accessed 21 October 2008. 
2
 "NATO in the 21st Century, Speech by the Secretary General to the Millennium Year Lord Mayor's 
Lecture," available from http://www.nato.int/docu/speech72000/s000720a.htm; Internet, accessed 16 
February 2009. 
1 
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From 1949 with the formation of NATO, until 1989 with the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, the member states of the Alliance3 have continuously sought to uphold its mission 
and objectives. As the Cold War came to an end and the security threat against the 
member countries diminished, NATO sought new measures to uphold its mission within 
the global security environment. 
Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has moved beyond its European 
boundaries and has carried out its missions and operations in a different way by 
expanding its agenda and engaging in a broader range of activities. Despite the shift 
occurring in the global security environment, NATO has remained a crucial element in 
preserving the safety and security of its member countries and their citizens. As NATO 
members continue to expand the role and agenda of the Alliance, their efforts are 
designed with one basic premise in mind - "to address proactively the security challenges 
which could, or already do, affect the safety or the interests of its members and their 
populations."4 As a result, NATO has carried out its mission and objectives in the 21st 
f 
century. 
Entering into the 21st century, NATO has continued to embark on its mission to> 
preserve the safety and security of its members. In doing so, the member nations have 
sought to build a different relationship with the East, expand the membership of the 
Alliance, and increase the involvement and activities of the Organization beyond the 
traditional European boundaries. After the end of the Cold War, the members of NATO 
built a different relationship between the West and Russia. By building an organic, 
3
 NATO is an alliance made up of member states; thus NATO can be referred to as an Alliance. 
Throughout this thesis NATO may also be referred to as an Organization. 
4
 NATO in the 21st Century. 
~ : 2 . 
permanent relationship between Russia and the Alliance, the member nations have 
developed an effective and efficient way to solve security issues. These issues include 
crisis management and proliferation problem-solving. Additionally, the enlargement of 
its membership has allowed NATO to "preclude major conflicts in Europe, because the 
very prospect of NATO membership serves as an incentive for aspirants to get their own 
houses in order."5 However the most significant development within NATO is its 
continued involvement in selective missions and operations, particularly those reside out-
of-area.6 
From the time since the end of the Cold War, NATO and its members have 
dedicated a large amount of time in developing relationships and becoming involved in 
issues with the new democracies of central, eastern and southern Europe. These new 
partnerships have influenced NATO's out-of-area policy and have influenced the 
Alliance's involvement in Bosnia and Kosovo. These changes reflect a shift regarding 
the Alliance's out-of-area policy. These adaptations have allowed the member nations to 
maintain the mission of NATO while combating threats through a combination of 
political, diplomatic, and military efforts. 
Following the attacks of September 11th, the United States began its fight against 
terrorism. In its war on terrorism, the United States called upon the help of several 
NATO member nations to invade and topple the al-Qaeda regime that resided in 
5
 NATO in the 21st Century. 
6
 According to the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 6, the NATO area, the area which NATO would defend is 
"the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on 
the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north 
of the Tropic of Cancer." NATO is defined by these areas, thus any mission or operation which takes place 
outside of these regions is known as "out-of-area." Furthermore, "out-of-area" is military term used in 
NATO's military structure and forces,'which means any mission or operations which takes place outside of 
the traditional European theater. 
3 
Afghanistan. NATO, upholding its mission and its resilient bonds of its member 
countries, responded by stating: 
It underscores the urgency of intensifying the battle against terrorism, a battle that 
the NATO countries - indeed all civilized nations - must win. All Allies stand 
united in their determination to combat this scourge. 
At this critical moment, the United States can rely on its 18 Allies in North 
America and Europe for assistance and support. NATO solidarity remains the 
essence of our Alliance. Our message to the people of the United States is that we 
are with you. Our message to those who perpetrated these unspeakable crimes is 
equally clear: you willnot get away with it.7 
NATO's involvement in Afghanistan proved to be a test of the Alliance's determination, 
principles, and military abilities. Afghanistan would be known as to be NATO's first 
out-of-area mission. 
NATO's- efforts in Afghanistan represent the Alliance's first mission beyond the 
traditional boundaries of Europe. Although NATO has historically participated in several 
missions, the operations in Afghanistan were special. NATO's involvement in 
Afghanistan was a historical turning point because it was the first effort undertaken by 
NATO which involved both military and political efforts outside of the European theater. 
For over fifty years NATO and its members have sought to safeguard the 
freedom, common heritage and civilizations of their people and promote stability and 
well-being in the North Atlantic area.8 Throughout its existence, the member nations of 
the Alliance have changed and expanded the mission. As such, the Alliance has 
expanded its involvement from the central European theater to selective out-of-area 
operations. In 2001, NATO once again expanded its involvement by being a part of 
operations in Afghanistan. In its present day, NATO remains a cornerstone in the 
7
 "September 11th, 2001: Statement by the North Atlantic Council," available from 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-122e.htm; Internet, accessed 16 February 2009. 
8
 The North Atlantic Treaty. 
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operations in Afghanistan. The member nations will continue to expand the role of the 
Alliance and be involved in selective out-of-area missions in order to uphold its mission 
of stability and safety. 
Although NATO has been involved in various missions previously, why did it 
specifically become involved in Afghanistan? This thesis questions: why NATO become 
involved in Afghanistan. Specifically, are NATO member nations holding fast to 
collective security rules while gradually adhering to institutionalism or simply are the 
actions of the Alliance ad hoc? This analysis will critically analyze NATO member 
states attitudes and out-of-area policy. The analysis of NATO's out-of-area mission in 
Afghanistan will help to shed light on NATO's policy development and attitudes 
regarding out-of-area and explain what led to NATO involvement in Afghanistan in 
2001. 
5 
Overview of Thesis 
The thesis consists of five chapters: Background, Toward an Analytical 
Framework, Methodology, Case-Study, and Conclusions. A brief overview of each of 
these chapters is as follows. 
Chapter One, Background, will discuss relevant background information of this 
study. The chapter will briefly trace the development of the NATO and its mission since 
its establishment in 1949 to 2009. This discussion will lead to the question of the thesis: 
why did NATO become involved in Afghanistan, specifically was its due to the use of 
collective security rules and gradual adherence to institutionalism or ad hoc tendencies? 
The final section of the chapter will introduce the reader to the case study of NATO 
policy development which culminated in the Alliance's involvement in Afghanistan. The 
purpose of this information is to provide a clear understanding to the reader for it is 
essential for the study at hand. 
Chapter Two, Toward an Analytical Framework, is divided into two main 
sections. The first section will provide an overview of the literature and discuss related 
alternative theories. I will argue which theory is substantial and applicable to this thesis -
constructivism. The section will then elaborate on the theory of constructivism. The 
second section, will discuss a critical piece of literature written on constructing post-Cold 
War collective security: Brian Frederking's Constructing Post-Cold War Collective 
Security. Frederking's theory of rule-oriented constructivism will be the basis of this 
thesis. The section will conclude with an outline of the strengths and weakness of 
Frederking's work and then build upon these lessons learned and apply them throughout 
the thesis. 
6 
Chapter Three, Methodology, will provide the methodologieal framework for this 
study. The chapter will first identify the research question of the thesis, distinguish the 
hypotheses to be tested, define the unit and level of analysis and key variables. It will 
also outline the data and measurements of the variables. Finally, the chapter will 
intimately discuss the methodology of the study - dialogical analysis. 
Chapter Four, Case Study, will comprise of the actual case study and present its 
finding. First the chapter will outline the purpose, mission, and structure of NATO. Next 
the chapter will provide a brief overview of NATO's policy regarding out-of-area. This 
will be dovetailed by a historical summary of Afghanistan and NATO's recent 
involvement in the Afghanistan 2001 invasion. The chapter will then interpret NATO's 
policy between 1996 and 2003. Using NATO's communiques and dialogical analysis, 
the chapter will outline the necessary background needed in order to test the research at 
hand. Then the speech acts, found in the communiques, will be identified and explained. 
These speech acts will then be analyzed according to both pragmatic and argument 
methodologies. This chapter will conclude with a presentation of the findings. 
Finally, Chapter Five, Conclusion, summarizes the findings of the thesis, briefly 
j 
highlight NATO and its policy development regarding out-of-area. The chapter finalizes 




For nearly sixty years, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been a 
fundamental cornerstone in the global security environment. The Alliance was 
established based upon democratic values, individual freedoms, and the rule of law. As 
outlined in the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, the Alliance's mission is to "safeguard the 
freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples" and "seek to promote 
stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area."9 Each of these objectives would be 
achieved through political and military means. 
This chapter will discuss relevant background information of this study. The 
chapter will briefly trace the development of NATO from 1949 to 2009. The chapter will 
then highlight the history of NATO's operation and missions. Building upon the 
historical developments of the Alliance, the chapter will briefly discuss NATO's new 
mission of the 21st century. The chapter will end with a brief discussion on NATO's 
involvement in Afghanistan. The chapter will establish the question of this thesis: why 
did NATO become involved in Afghanistan? Specifically, are NATO member countries 
adhering to institutionalism or is it because of ad hoc tendencies? 
9
 The North Atlantic Treaty. 
8 
The End of the Cold War 
In 1989, the long standing divide - the Berlin Wall - between the hostile camps of 
\ . - ' 
the Eastern and Western Europe met its fate. This was a significant turn in the security of 
the Euro-Atlantic and the mission and objectives of NATO. The collapse of the Berlin 
Wall signaled the first of multiple dominoes to fall and finalized in the end of the Cold 
War. The security policy which had dominated Western policy since post-World War II 
had finally come to a closure. The fall of the Berlin Wall lead to a sudden shift in the 
balance of power. The materialization of a new world order signaled the beginning of a 
new chapter in the security of the transatlantic and the mission of NATO. 
Since the end Cold War, the mission of NATO became refocused in manner that 
could have never been classified during the U.S.-Soviet dual. In essence the end of the 
Cold War removed the foremost threat to NATO and signaled the emergence new 
transnational threats. These new threats have jeopardized and challenged the peace and 
stability of NATO and its members. In this new environment, war was no longer 
considered the only threat which nations faced. Threats to the Alliance and its members 
would emerge outside of NATO's traditional mission area in the forms of terrorism, 
states who have access to weapons of mass destruction, civil wars, natural disasters, 
clashes over natural resources, and the "the impact of new technologies and reductions to 
national defense spending."10 As a result, NATO member nations have responded to the 
global security environment by developing "new roles, new missions, and accepting new 
members."" 
10
 Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler, (1999) "NATO Burden Sharing: Past and Future," Journal of Peace 
Research 36:6:665. 
"Ibid. ; > • 
9 
NATO in the Post-Cold War Environment 
The post-Gold War environment has inspired the emergence of a new integrated 
European^Atlantic global security environment. Within this new environment, NATO 
continued its central role of upholding its mission by establishing new methods for 
cooperation and promoting a- shared understanding across the transatlantic region. As 
NATO continues to engage the global security environment, it will continuously be 
confronted with multiple challenges and threats. Albeit the challenges and threats, 
NATO will continue to strive to survive while transforming and adapting to reflect the 
changes of the global security environment. 
In the post-Cold War environment, NATO's existence has been challenged and its 
objectives have altered. It was apparent from the end of the Cold War that the existing 
security structure of the Alliance could not be used effectively in a crisis management. 
Additionally, the security structures would not be capable of dealing with either "intra-
state or regional conflicts, ethnic tensions, or aggressive separatism in the areas, which 
are most frequently outside of NATO's direct geographic reach."12 The fundamental 
question arose whether the Alliance would be able to exist in this new global security 
environment and whether it could handle the nature of the security challenges while 
being able to effectively adapt and maintain to confront the threats and challenges. 
In 1991, NATO Heads of State agreed on the need to transform13 the Atlantic 
Alliance to reflect the new, more promising, era in the global security environment. The 
1991 Strategic Concept helped to reaffirm the original principles of the Alliance as well 
: :
 ; ' ( 
12
 Manuka Metreveli, (2003) "Legal Aspects of NATO's Involvement in Out-of-Area Peace Support 
Operations," NATO-EAPSC Research Fellowship (Brussels, BE: North Atlantic Treaty Organization). 
13
 Transform in this thesis will mean a marked change, as in Composition, appearance, character, and 
condition. 
10 
as clarify NATO's role in the post-Cold War environment. The member nations agreed 
that in order to achieve its central purpose, the Strategy would center around four 
fundamental tasks: 
•1. To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment 
in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the 
peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate 
or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of 
force. 
2. To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a 
transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital 
interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, 
1
 and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern. 
3. To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any 
NATO member state; and 
4. To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.14 
By fulfilling these fundamental security objectives, the member states were able to 
continue upholding security and seeking peaceful resolutions to disputes. However, 
within a decade this policy was in desperate need of transformation, renovation, and 
repairs. 
From 1991 to 1999, NATO and its member states have been able to successfully 
maintain its objectives as outlined in the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 and the Strategic 
Concept of 1991 while adapting to the post-Cold War security environment. Over this 
14
 "The Alliance's Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council," available from http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b911108a.htm; 
Internet, accessed 20 October 2008. 
11 
period of time NATO member nations made internal alterations and played an expansive 
role in supporting and maintaining objectives and missions. With the NATO members 
engaging new roles and activities it became necessary to refine the Alliance's vision and 
strategies for the future. In 1999, at the Washington Summit, the members of the 
Alliance adopted the Strategic Concept for the 21st Century. 
In April 1999, NATO Heads of State approved the Alliance's new Strategic 
Concept. The new concept "emphasized that while collective security remains the core 
purpose of NATO, Alliance security interests could be affected by other risks of a wider 
nature and therefore must also take account of the global context."15 These included 
"uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of 
regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance" which could take the form of a "ethnic 
and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the 
abuse of human rights and the dissolution of states" that could lead to "crises affecting 
Euro-Atlantic stability."16 More importantly the Strategic Concept formally adopted to 
support (on a case-by-case basis in accordance with its own procedures) "operations 
under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), including by making available Alliance 
resources and expertise."17 For the first time in NATO's history, the Alliance 
documented and endorsed missions and operations. Even though the member nations did 
not clearly define specification for area missions, the adoption of the Strategic Concept 
13
 "The Alliance's Strategic Concept," available from http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm; 







solidified NATO's engagement in missions and opened the door for missions outside of 
the European scope. 
NATO's Missions and Operations 
The Cold War 
When NATO was first established in 1949, one of its fundamental roles was to 
deter any military aggressions. In this role, NATO's success was a reflection of the 
Alliance's lack of involvement in any military engagement. For much of the latter half of 
the 20th century, NATO remained vigilant and prepared. Thus, throughout the Cold War 
NATO relied upon a non-policy on missions who resided outside the boundaries of the 
European continent. 
The fundamental reason NATO did not endorse or implement an out-of-area 
policy was based upon different interests perceived by each member nation beyond the 
North Atlantic area. For example, "the United States had global interests; some NATO 
members, including major ones as France and the United Kingdom, had regional 
interests; and other NATO members only had local interests." Another reason was the 
different viewpoints regarding threat. "While NATO members recognized the constant, 
albeit varying, Soviet threat to the North Atlantic area; there was no such consensus on 
the Soviet threat to other parts of the world."19 A third and final reason was the variation 
in ideologies. During the first half of the Cold War, various NATO members were in 
• • • \ 
9ft possession of colonies while other countries held a position of anti-colonialism. In the 
18
 Frode Liland, (1999) Keeping NATO Out of Trouble: NATO's Non-Policy on Out-of-Area Issues During 






later years of the Cold War, many of the NATO member countries found themselves 
engulfed by "American projection of power all oyer the world, in the name of 
containment of communism" and this was morally difficult for each country to grasp.21 
Despite the difference in interests, ideologies, and perceptions toward threat, the end of 
the Cold War led to a shift in area policy. This shift led member countries to reconsider 
the security borders of the Alliance and NATO's role beyond Europe. The possibility of 
geographic widening of the Alliance, lead to alarm amongst members for it could 
jeopardize the cooperation of the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty. Despite fears and 
anxieties, NATO member nations shifted attitudes and the Alliance's out-of-area policy. 
This shift set the stage for NATO's involvement in new missions and operations 
including several selective 6ut-of-area operations. 
Post-Cold War 
At the conclusion of the Cold War, the attitudes of the member states, NATO's 
policies and procedures changed and began to reflect the current global security 
environment. In the post-Cold War environment, the member states committed the 
Alliance to missions and operations which resided beyond the traditional realm of 
Europe. 
The development of NATO's missions and operations after the Cold War can be 
classified into three stages. In the first stage, from 1990 to 1992, NATO's "traditional 
reluctance to engage in out^of-area conflicts came under pressure, but remained largely 
unchanged."22 In 1991, the member nations realized that its forty year old threat and 
objectives had dissolved along with the Soviet Union. NATO and its members were 
21
 Frode (2009), 173. 
22
 Metreveli (2003), 34. 
14 
faced with the choice to make dramatic changes. These changes resulted in the adoption 
of the Strategic Concept of 1991 and for the first time the member nations could envision 
playing in out-of-area roles. However, this Strategic Concept was soon outdated with the 
outbreak of war in Yugoslavia. 
The second stage, from 1992 to 1995, was marked by NATO's involvement in the 
war in Bosnia. In July 1992, NATO ships belonging to the Alliance's Standing Naval 
Force, assisted by NATO Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), began monitoring operations 
in the Adriatic. These operations, were undertaken in support of the UN arms embargo 
against all republics of the former Yugoslavia, UN Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) 713 and sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia outlined in 
UNSCR 757.23 In October 1992, NATO's Airborne Warning and Control System 
(AWACS) aircraft began to observe the no-fly zone over Bosnia and were to report any 
movements under UNSCR 781.24 Although these small actions by NATO were not 
cataclysmic, the success of the narrow mission led to further calls on NATO aircraft at 
later stages. In December 1992, NATO foreign ministers first stated that NATO was 
prepared to support operations acting under the authority of the UN Security Council. 
Initially, NATO's role was to help to support the UN's operations. However, 
throughout the operations NATO's role in the joint operations changed from launching a 
naval mission in the Adriatic Sea in 1992 to a large-scale air campaign against the Bosnia 
Serbs in 1995. These actions proved significant both in encouraging NATO authorities 
23
 "Chapter 5: The Alliance's Operation Role in Peacekeeping - The Process of Bringing Peace to the 
Former Yugoslavia," available from http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb050102.htm; Internet, 






and in making it clear that NATO had vast superiority in air power and was fully 
committed to missions who threatened the peace and security of the member nations. 
NATO's involvement in the war of Bosnia-Herzegovina marked a significant 
change in the relationship between NATO and the UN, as the Alliance transformed from 
peacekeepers to peace enforcers. From 1992 to 1995, NATO began to act independently 
and its operations changed from those of peacekeeping26 to peace enforcement27 as it 
intervened in the Bosnian war. 
In the third stage, from 1995 to present day, NATO has fully embraced its new 
objectives to be involved in selective out-of-area missions. Over this period of time, 
NATO has been involved in three different types of missions. The first type of mission 
involves operations who reside within the Euro-Atlantic area, such as those in Albania in 
1997. A second type of mission are composed of "able and willing," such as in the 
Kosovo military campaign. The third and final type of mission the Alliance is involved 
in is missions based upon assistance from the Partnership for Peace. Operations of this 
nature include those in Bosnia and Darfur. As NATO continues to expand and test its 
operational boundaries, its core mission has consistently been upheld since its founding 
in 1949. 
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Entering in the 21st century NATO's mission has remained consistent -
maintaining peace and security - and operations have changed. However, the attacks of 
September 11th were a wakeup call for the member states of NATO. The attacks called 
for drastic steps to be taken by the member states in order to ensure the safety and 
stability of the Alliance. In response to the attacks, the member nations invoked Article 5 
of the North Atlantic Treaty. The adoption of Article 5 effectively signaled a new 
chapter in the history of NATO. 
NATO's New Mission 
On September 11 2001, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New 
York and the Pentagon in Washington D.C., ended in the deaths of hundreds and the 
injury of thousands. The impact of September 11th was felt immediately and directly. 
The attacks of September 11th were a call for sweeping transformations to be made in the 
global security environment. The NATO member states took historical steps and made 
the extraordinary decision by unanimously agreeing to invoke Article 5 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty which stated "an attack on one or more of them in Europe or North 
America as an attack against them all."28 
Within mere hours of the attacks of September 11th, the Bush Administration 
announced a war on terrorism. The goals of the war were to bring Osama bin Laden and 
al-Qaeda to justice and prevent the rise of other terrorist organizations. These goals 
would be accomplished by two means. First, the United States would place economic 
and military; sanctions on any state perceived as harboring terrorists while increasing 
intelligence distribution and worldwide surveillance. Second, US-led military operations 
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would be launched in Afghanistan to overthrow the oppressive Taliban rule and oust al-
Qaeda forces. 
Within twenty-four hours after the attacks on New York and Washington D.C, the 
fight against terrorism was identified as a central tenet for NATO and its member nations 
in the 21st century. On 12 September 2001, the NATO member nations immediately 
pledged their loyalty and support of the war on terrorism. The first steps the member 
nations took were to invoke Article 5 in the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 and adopted 
measures, if needed, to fight against terrorism. In parallel with these dealings, the 
Alliance also agreed to deploy elements of its Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern 
Mediterranean in order to provide NATO presence and demonstrate resolve; and to 
deploy elements of its AWACS force to support operations against terrorism. These 
actions enabled the Alliance to better assist its member nations and their national 
authorities in the protection of their populations. These collective actions, 
operationalized in Article 5, clearly "demonstrated the member nations' resolve and 
commitment to support and contribute to the U.S. led fight against terrorism."30 
NATO involvement in the fight against terrorism is a commitment of a wide-
ranging, long-standing effort by the Alliance and its members. The mission would 
require a combination of political, economic, and diplomatic action and law enforcement 
measures, as well as military tactics. Consequently, the NATO member countries agreed 
on the need for a long-term, versatile approach which would includexthe "members of the 
Chapter 1: What is NATO? - Terrorism and the Emergence of New Threats. 
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Alliance and as members of other international organizations."31 The first test of this 
long-term approach would be NATO's mission in Afghanistan. 
NATO's Mission in Afghanistan 
In 2001, following the September 11th attacks, the military of the United States 
with the help of several NATO member nations invaded and toppled the al-Qaeda 
regime. The invasion of Afghanistan would prove to be a test of will, ideologies, and 
military capabilities for NATO and its member nations. Indeed, Afghanistan created a 
venue for which NATO members would have to go beyond their European theater and 
combat the threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The mission 
in Afghanistan can truly be called NATO's first out-of-area mission. 
The efforts undertaken by NATO in Afghanistan are the Alliance's first mission 
beyond the boundaries of the European continent. The purpose of the Afghanistan 
mission was to stabilize and reconstruct the country. Even though NATO has 
participated in several stabilization and reconstruction missions, such as in Kosovo, the 
operations in Afghanistan were different. Different because there has never been a long 
standing centralized Afghanistan government, the presence of Taliban, the out-of-area 
scope and abrasive terrain, its historical context, and standing amongst the international 
community. The mission in Afghanistan has played an important role for NATO, its 
leadership, and will play a role in the Alliance's future. 
For approximately sixty years the mission of NATO has never deterred or 
wavered from its course as established in the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 - to 
safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples and seek to 
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promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. Over this period of time, 
NATO has expanded its security umbrella far beyond the tradition European theater. In 
2001, NATO became involved in its largest challenge to date ; - operations in 
Afghanistan. Today, NATO continues to be involved in Afghanistan operations and will 
continue to expand its role and be involved in various selective out-of-area missions. But 
taking a step back and looking at the larger picture, one questions why now and why 
Afghanistan? Indeed why did NATO become involved in Afghanistan? 




TOWARD AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Albert Einstein observed, "It is theory that decides what can be observed." This 
sentence explains that there are many theories that can explain a circumstance or a 
phenomenon. Thus a theory is what is observed by explaining what was responsible for 
the situation and conveys an understanding of what is seen. Based upon this explanation, 
there are multiple theories on security at different levels of analysis - the individual 
decision maker, the domestic determinant, the bureaucracy, and the international 
environment - which may explain the developments and occurrences in the global 
security environment, specifically NATO's involvement in Afghanistan. Recognizing 
that there are multiple scholars whose research explores security and its environment, this 
particular research will use the international level of analysis and analyze NATO policy 
regarding out-of-area to understand why the Alliance became involved in Afghanistan in 
2001. Specifically, this thesis will apply Brian Frederkirig's rule-oriented constructivist 
theory and dialogical analysis to analyze NATO's out-of-area policy from 1996 to 2003. 
This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section will provide a 
summary of the related literature and related explanations. This section will establish that 
the school of constructivism provides the strongest foundation for this thesis and its 
analysis. The section will end with a discussion on constructivism, explicitly expanding 
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on the theory of this thesis - rule-orientated constructivism. The second section of the 
chapter will discuss Brian Frederking's Constructing Post-Cold War Collective Security. 
The section will examine Frederking's argument, summarize its main points, and point 
out its major flaws. In particular, the section will critique Frederick's argument distilling 
the inconsistency in methodology, his lack of ability to clearly define global security, and 
use of secondary resources. The lessons learned from Frederking's research will be 
applied throughout the thesis. 
Literature Review 
Discussion of Security 
The idea of security is a complex and highly contested concept which is 
profoundly weighed down with emotion and deeply held values. Security is defined as 
"state of being free from the threat of harm."34 As such, there are both objective and 
subjective aspects in security. Most people would agree that security is a problem which 
occurs when someone - a person, group, organization, or state - threatens another's life 
or livelihood. For example think about a gunman in a dark alley way demanding your 
valuables or your life. Or more realistically, imagine the terror of a citizen in New York 
City on September 11 2001, witnessing firsthand the attack and destruction of the World 
Trade Center. ( 
While few people would likely dispute that each of these examples are security 
threats, many would also seek to extend the meaning of security to other beliefs and 
interests. For example, they may apply the term to infectious diseases, the exponential 
growth of the human population, global warming, or to human rights. Thus where do we 
draw the line when studying security? What should be included or excluded? The study 
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of security is a broad and contentious field, but for the purposes of this thesis, the study 
of security will be studied at the international level and narrowly defined as the survival 
of NATO and its member nations from threats and attacks. 
The study of security is a complex and ever-growing and changing field. The 
field of security studies has a long and varied history. For the purposes of this thesis, the 
development of security will be discussed from the 1980s to present day.35 
Security Studies 
The study of security has a long and varied history which can be predated to the 
Greeks and Romans. Based upon the expansive depth of the field, security studies in this 
thesis will primary focus on the period between the 1980s to present day. 
The field of security studies has been attractive for many researchers and analysts 
i 
over the decades. At the end of the 1970s and beginning of 1980s, the field began to see 
a dramatic resurgence. In addition to the dramatic increase of professional interest and a 
rise in publications regarding security related topics, "security studies became more 
rigorous, methodology sophisticated, and theoretically inclined."36 These patterns would 
result in a renaissance of security studies, which would last for the next three decades. 
In the early 1980s, the focus of scholars and research in the studies of global 
security revolved around explaining why the Soviets and Americans thought differently 
about nuclear strategy. Scholars argued that differences in a nation's security and 
defense policies stemmed from variations in macro-environmental variables. A pioneer, 
Jack Snyder (1977) argued that specific domestic elements develop aggressive strategic 
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perspectives that serve particular political interests in order to achieve security. These 
interests are then manipulated by elites and used as a means of propaganda. This 
propaganda only served to obscure the true realities of the security found in the 
international community. Snyder points out that "statesmen and societies actively shape 
the lessons of the past in way they find convenient that it is to say that they are shaped by 
them."37 Thus, developments involving security are a result of historical experience 
linked with political culture. Similarly, Colin Gray (1981) and David R. Jones (1990) 
point out that "cultures comprise the persisting socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, 
traditions, habits of mind and preferred methods of operation that are more or less 
specific to a particular geographically based security community that has had a unique 
historical experience."38 Thus security is not static. It changes gradually as society 
responds to challenges from within and without being based upon historical experience, 
culture and geography. 
While Snyder, Gray, and Jones are considered some of the leading scholars in 
security studies, there are multiple shortcomings in each of their research. Since the 
analysis of security was relatively new during the 1980s, there were definitional problems 
which lead to unwieldy characteristics. By introducing problems dealing with patterns of 
behavior implied security led consistently to one type of behavior. When in reality it did 
anything but this. By not addressing these key elements created gaping holes in the field 
which in turn led researchers to take a different approach when regarding security studies. 
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In the mid-1980s a new wave within security studies emerged. Scholars at this 
time began to question the differences between what political leaders thought or said, as 
opposed to their deeper motivations. Scholars argued that security was used as a 
governmental tool in security decision-making models. Despite the new outlooks 
presented by the scholars of the late 1980s, each still had a problem with symbolic 
discourse; there was ho analysis of what factors may be influencing the development of 
global security. Additionally, many scholars of the age relied upon secondary resources 
and these sources where uncertain if there were differences in policy-making. Once 
again, the field of security studies had many new ideas but all of whom were filled with 
gaps and uncertainties. The end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s signaled 
new hope in the field with the rise of new outlooks and perspectives in security studies. 
As the Cold War came to an end, the 1990s signaled a renewed interest in 
discerning motivations and related sources of behavior in the field of security. At this 
period of time, scholars and researchers were more rigorous in their studies and 
discriminating in their conceptualization and operationalization of variables. In this 
context, a majority of theorists and researchers took a realist approach and cases focused 
on structuralist-materialist notions. This approach proved that interests cannot explain a 
particular strategic choice, especially in making security policy. Noteworthy, Alastair 
Iain Johnston (1995) reasoned that the literature on security is both under and over-
determined. Additionally, scholars have so far been unable to offer a convincing research 
design for isolating effects of security.39 Johnston writes that security theory today does 
not reject rationality. Instead, a historically imposed inertia on choice makes strategy less 
responsive to specific contingencies. Johnston, like many scholars of this "new age" 
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security, avoids determinism that was used by security scholars in the 1980s. In this 
sense, researchers and scholars no longer used behavior as their independent variable 
when establishing causal relationships. Rather, competitive theory testing was used, 
which pins alternative explanations against one another illustrating a new outlook for the 
field of security. , 
This new wave of studies within the field of security marked the 1990s and 
attributed to the ever-growing knowledge in the field of international relations. However, 
holes still remained. Three main shortcomings still continued to plague scholars - a lack 
of a definition of security; the flawed use of realism; and the use of organizational culture 
as the cause for the influence on security policy. 
To date, the interpretation of security has become one of the largest challenges in 
the fields of security studies and international relations. Presently, the field of security 
studies rest on an ill defined and often debated netherworld. Despite the tensions within 
the field there are three alternative theories - realism, liberalism, and constructivism -
used throughout security studies to help explain the global security environment and its 
developments. 
Alternative Theories 
/ The alternative theories - realism, liberalism, and constructivism - each have 
strived to explain global security and its environment. Each of these theories differs 
significantly in their compositions and demeanors. The following section will briefly 
highlight each theory and will identify the theory which the thesis will be based upon. 
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Realism 
Realism, a traditional approach to security, is comprised of a variety of concepts 
and methods. It has remained a dominant theory within the field of security studies. 
Realism, associated with Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Morgenthau, as well as many\ 
others,40 emphasizes that "the state is the principal actor in international affairs and there 
is no authority superior to these sovereign political units."41 This position asserts that 
analysis should focus on the behavior of individual states. Accordingly, states will act 
upon their own personal goals to maintain safety and achieve security. Thus, a state 
disregards the interdependence between states in order to achieve their personal interests. 
Accordingly, realism presents itself in several tenets within security studies: 
1. Nation-states are unitary and geographically based actors in an anarchic 
international environment who have no authority to regulate interactions between 
each state in the system;42 
2. Sovereign states are the primary actors in the international environment;43 
3. States, being the highest actor within the, international system, are always in a 
constant state of competition with one another; and 
4. States each act in rational manner that pursue their own self interest in order to 
" ' • • 1 i • • ' • • 4 4 
maintain and secure their own security. 
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In summary, realists believe that all mankind and states are self-centered, aggressive, and 
competitive. Furthermore, realists believe that states are inherently aggressive and are 
consumed by the idea of security. Thus, aggression is present at all times and when this 
aggression builds up a security dilemma is created.45 Within a security dilemma a state's 
objective is to increase its power; however it can create instability for itself, while 
another state is building up their security! 
Difficulties with the Realist Analysis 
There are several cleavages within realism. These problems would call its 
relevance into question when specifically regarding this thesis. First, in the post-World 
War II period, realism emerged as the central structure for understanding international 
relations and security studies. However the rise of the Cold War gave birth to a 
"pessimistic view of human nature, and assumptions about the prevalence of the pursuit 
of power, underpinned more classical approaches to realism."46 When the Cold War 
came to an end, the bipolar world, which realists,argued was a triumphant and stable 
configuration, also ceased to exist. Secondly, it has been cited that the end of the Cold 
War was due to internal problems within the USSR not from a systemic failure, as realists 
would have contended. These governments then began to shift their behaviors toward 
"becoming Western-style political and economic systems and joined Western community 
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institutions, turning to cooperation or at least band-wagoning for their security."47 Many 
realists believed tMat the end of the Cold War would result in a multiplicity of power. 
Rather the United States rose to become the hegemony in the international community. 
Finally, these two patterns have risen to become larger than some realist may have 
anticipated. Although realists assert that they have time and history on their sides to rely 
upon, the post-Cold War global security environment displays characteristics -
hegemony and levels of interdependence and cooperation - which are particularly 
difficult and at times tricky to explain from a realist point of view. 
Liberalism 
Liberalism, a counter to realism, arose during the 17th and 18th centuries during 
the age of Enlightenment.48 The concept of liberalism did not begin to take root until 
after World War I when it was necessary to explain a states' inability to find a 
counterbalance to war within international relations. 
Liberalism, associated with Locke, Smith, Kant, and other French and German 
thinkers, argue for equality of opportunity and individual liberties. In this sense, 
liberalism holds that the individual is the main actor and as such there will be plurality in 
actions. Preferences will vary and be largely dependent on culture, government type, and 
economic organization. Thus there are various streams of thought concerning liberalism, 
but liberalism holds several general beliefs concerning security studies: 
1. The individual is the primary actor in the international environment;49 
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2. State behavior is primarily determined by state preferences rather than their 
capabilities;50 
3. State preferences will vary from state to state and are not limited; 
4. State cooperation and interdependence exists allowing for absolute gains;51 and 
5. States are generally united by their support for freedom of sought and speech, 
governmental limitations, the rule of law, right to property, and transparency in 
government.5^ 
Based upon these tenets, liberalism substantially discourages the use of force among 
states due to the associated risk with gains.53 Liberals argue that the costs to use force are 
high and consequently using force to achieve security is unattractive. A state would 
rather cooperate and achieve a balance in security than use force. States rely upon a web 
of interdependencies to achieve their interests regarding security. As long as a high level 
of interdependence can be maintained there is a reason to hope for balance in security 
amongst countries and a diminished use of force and a potential security dilemma.54 
Difficulties with the Liberalist Analysis 
Liberalism stresses equality of opportunity and individual liberties; nevertheless 
there are serious problems with the liberal perspective when dealing with this particular 
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thesis. First, there are "recurring tensions in theory and practice over priorities."55 In 
other words, in order to achieve security and peace, it is important to cooperate with other 
governments and countries. However, where should a country's priorities lay; in trying 
to build stable and successful relations with other countries or to protecting itself? This is 
one of the largest tensions evident - whether a state should place emphasis in self-
determination or building relations and viable states. As Bush Jr. discovered, invading a 
state embedded with terrorist activities and then trying to create a stabilized state of 
fractioned minorities, raises alarm with those whom reside within the countries as we'll as 
states which are located within the region and around the world. The liberalist standpoint 
offers no remedy to resolve these internal and external conflicts in theory and does not 
provide any sound basis for governments to make pertinent resolutions. 
A second problem with the liberalist theory can be found in the justification of 
using force. Specifically in two scenarios, (1) when governments disagree "about when 
force is justified or how to determine the will of the international community" and (2) 
when there is large strife and unhappiness in a certain scenario and the "willingness to 
see force used to deal with it but widespread reluctance to bear the costs."56 In both of 
these cases, liberalism is of little aid when trying to justify the use of force and those who 
should bear the burdens when becoming involved. The characteristics outlined above 
illustrate that it is easier said than done when trying to explain the global security 
environment from a liberalist perspective. 
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Preferred Alternative Theory: Constructivism 
Since the Gold War, the perceptions surrounding the development of global 
security and related policies became refocused in a new manner. In this new 
environment, war was no longer considered the only threat which nations faced. Rather 
global security grew to include threats from transnational forces, failed states, spread of 
infectious and deadly diseases, terrorism, and cyberspace. Today global security has 
been redefined as the preservation of sovereignty and the protection against all physical 
threats, domestic and foreign, through global response and multinational cooperation.57 
Today, the global security environment has become complex in its nature as NATO and it 
member nations strive to survive and maintain themselves. 
Today, global security is focused on problems which fall outside the realm of 
weapon defense systems. The global security environment and its associated threats and 
challenges have become all encompassing and have continually challenged the traditional 
assumptions - realism and liberalism - about the nature of international relations and 
global security. Accordingly, the fields of security studies and international affairs have 
employed several theories to explain the developments in global security. However after 
the end of the Cold War, some researchers saw that the realist model which focuses on 
state action, and the liberal model which advocates complex interdependence and 
cooperation, as inadequate and each needed to be modified to reflect the modern global 
security environment. One answer to the shortcomings of realism and liberalism was the 
constructivist approach. 
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Fashioned in the 1990s, constructivism emerged as an alternative to realism and 
liberalism. Constructivism emerged as a new theory which could explain events like the 
end of the Cold War and the development of the global security environment. The rise of 
constructivism in the post-Cold War environment influenced the theoretical works of 
international relations especially concerning the subfield of security. Constructivism 
inspired a new wave of research with the promise of new avenues for future 
development. 
Constructivism 
Constructivism, associated with Alexander Wendt, Martha Finnemore, Peter 
Katzenstein, Nicholas Onuf, as well as many others, asserts that the "existence of social 
C O 
structures - including norms, beliefs, and identities - constitute world politics." The 
, theory of constructivism seeks to demonstrate that the state system is socially 
constructed. That is, the state is embedded in a larger society and in this society states 
agree to particular rules and institutions. Within the society, social arrangements are 
determined by "shared ideas rather than by material forces," and "the identities and 
interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by 
nature."59 The social arrangements are constitutive and regulative. These so called 
"patterns of rules" tell us who we are and who others are, and what to do. Essentially, 
they tell us how the world works, and states and actors come to live and abide by these 
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arrangements. In a larger sense, these arrangements make up the complex and 
overlapping world of international relations. 
Constructivism asserts that the state system is embedded in a larger more complex 
society. As cited above, particular social arrangements constitute the society. Many 
leading constructivists cite different factors that influence the social arrangements. For 
example, Wendt (1999) cites Mead's symbolic interactionism and Bhaskkar's scientific 
realism.60 While Onuf (1989) identifies Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, Gidden's 
structuralism, Habermas' theory of communicative action, and Searle's speech act 
theory.61 Despite these differences, each scholar references the use of language. Many 
constructivists reference language in their studies because language is seen as a 
representative of the world which creates and makes action possible. In short, language 
is action itself and signals a "post-positivist turn in the social sciences."62 
The use of language in constructivism is seen as a representative of the world. 
Language is a key factor which creates and makes actions possible, and essentially 
influences social arrangements. Accordingly, constructivists emphasize three common 
positions. Each of these positions is ontological in nature: 
1. Social factors are the main influence of interaction between humans; 
2. Social structures and identities of goal-oriented actors; and 
. • - . •
 r . . . 
3. Agents and structures construct each other; where rules make the agent and agents 
make the rules.63 
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Based upon these tenets, constructivism can be called a social theory. The theory of 
constructivism "offers a synthesis between material, subjective, and inter-subjective 
dimensions of the world." In short, constructivism and its use of language can help 
explain social arrangements of the world and its developments. 
In order to analyze and interpret the social world and its arrangements, 
constructivists have developed a variety of methods to analyze language. These methods 
include Crawford's (2002) use of linguistic methods,65 Hopf s (2002) phenomenological 
approach,66 Mattern's (2001) analysis of narrative strategies,67 the discursive practices of 
Doty (1993), conversation analysis,68 event data,69 anddialogical analysis. Each of these 
methodologies are unique in their understanding and execution, however each in some 
fashion or another to help emphasis that norms, rules, and institutions can help in 
understanding an environment where "people make society, and society makes people."70 
The diverse constructivisms and their methodologies each use ontology in order 
to depict the world. Constructivists describe a world which is made up various 
arrangements. These arrangements are constituted by types of rules. These types of rules 
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include beliefs, norms, and identities. "Beliefs are shared understandings of the world."71 
Beliefs are social rules which make claims of truth about the world. "Norms are shared 
understanding of appropriate actions." Norm rules are social rules which make 
appropriateness claims about relationships. Finally, "identities tell agents who they are 
and who others are; they enable agents to make the actions of themselves another 
intelligible."73 The social rules of identity make sincerity claims about agents. Each type 
of constructivist argument emphasis one of these rules for they each help to guide and 
conduct while at the same time creating objects and agents. 
The use of language has allowed constructivists to account for aspects within, 
international relations which realists and liberalists have ignored completely. The use of 
ontology has allowed constructivists to tackle obstacles which other theorists have 
encountered and not been able to overcome m international relations and security studies. 
First, constructivists have "put in the center of attention the constitution of international 
agents."74 It is no longer assumed that "sovereign states and other international agents 
considered as given" and it appears that "national interests, state identities, social 
movements, and transnational networks appear in need of explanation."75 Second, since 
there is a central focus on the construction of norm, identities, and institutions. 
Constructivists are able to explain alterations that may occur in strategies. For example, 
71
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war and collective security are not tools "toward an end but constitute the enactment of 
diverse games and rules on which reasoning actors draw" when dealing with a particular 
security threat. Finally, constructivists have developed a rich and diverse understanding 
in social arrangement and changes in the international realm. This has made the 
constructivist approach attractive to those who seek to explain the end of the Cold War 
and the transformation of the global security environment. It will prove to be a concrete 
and sound methodological approach when analyzing NATO's out-of-area policy. 
Rule-Orientated Constructivism 
The theory of rule-oriented constructivism is a theory which holds practices and 
social arrangements in terms of social rules. As discussed above and according to 
Frederking, social rules that are driven by beliefs, norms, and identities help to define 
77 
social arrangements of a society. Essentially, rules and norms are the linchpin in 
constructivist studies. 
Constructivists believe rules are the reasons for actions. Rules are able to provide 
reason for action because they provide significance, establish criteria, and create 
conditions. Rule-orientated constructivists have two key tenets regarding rules. First, 
"rules give meaning to human action by communicating 'shared understandings' that 
no 
shape and orient behavior." In this sense, social arrangements, which are constituted by 
a stable pattern of rules, make up the structure of world politics. Additionally, "rules also 
76Locher(2001), 114. 
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guide and regulate behavior." Thus, rules convey standards of how we should act. 
Rules make it possible for actors, such as states, to act: "They tell us how the world 
works; they tell us who we are and who others are; they tell us what we should do." 
Rules constitute the world at large. 
The second rule establishes that rational actors use speech acts to construct social 
rules.81 This rule-oriented constructivist claim is based upon the pre-existing speech act 
theory and the notion of communicative rationality of Habermas. According to the 
speech act theory, the effect of a speech is analyzed in relation to the speaker and 
listener's behavior. Austin (1962) explains that acts of speech contain particular sentence 
types which have conventional relationship to certain types of speech acts. In this sense, 
a verbal statement defines an action. For example, saying "I swear to tell the whole truth 
• ( • • • ' 
and nothing but the truth" in a court of law is a meaningful social act because it invokes 
v . . . • • • • ' • 
social rules in the institution of the court. The "speech act theory argues that language is 
action; speech acts (promising, declaring, apologizing, etc.) are both plentiful and central 
to social life." In brief, the speech act theory is the backbone of the rule-orientated 
constructivist theory. 
Language is the primary catalyst to drive an action according to the speech act 
theory. In order to determine what kind of action will take place, I will use Onuf s three 
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types of speech acts - assertions, directives, and commitments. These different types of 
speech acts help to determine the social rules that have fashioned the particular speech 
act. When analyzing a speech act art assertion will "convey knowledge about the 
world."85 Examples of speech acts involving assertion rules are trade agreements and 
arms shipments. A directive conveys "what we must or should do and often include 
consequences for disregarding them."86 Examples of directive rules are use of force and 
1
 • 0*7 
. trade sanctions. Finally, commitments are "promises to act in a particular way." 
Examples of speech acts invoking commitment rules are international trade and treaties. 
The second rule-oriented claim also uses Habermas's notion of communicative 
rationality which builds upon the speech act theory. Communicative rationality is a 
theory which tries to explain human rationality based upon outcomes of successful acts of 
speech. Habermas argues communication is "oriented to achieving, sustaining and 
reviewing consensus - and indeed a consensus that rests on the intersubjective recognition 
of criticisable validity claims."88 Habermas asserts that a "rational agent performs a 
speech act, convey validity claims, interpret and evaluate the claims of others, and act on 
the basis of mutually recognized validity claims." In this process, agents express and 
evaluate one another's validity claims of speech acts which help to construct and 
reconstruct social rules and perhaps social arrangements. Frederking emphasizes that 
rule-oriented constructivists "rely on Habermas because only communicatively rational 
85




 Ibid., 366. 
88
 Habermas (1984), 17. 
89
 Frederking (2003), 366. 
, 39 
actors can achieve the interpretive accomplishments ascribed to them by constructivist 
argument."90 < 
Rule-orientated constructivism is a theoretical framework that takes into account 
the structure in social analysis and provides the means to analyze the complex 
interrelationship between agents, speech acts, and social structures. Rule-orientated 
constructivists are able to explore what makes social action possible and meaningful.91 
Essentially, rule-orientated constructivism asserts that people use information from their 
own experience to create constructs in order to problem solve; this can help 
constructivists anticipate future events and to make sense of the world. 
Rule-Orientated Constructivist Theory and the Global Security Environment 
The theory of constructivism seeks to demonstrate that the state system is socially 
constructed. That is, the state is embedded in a larger society where states agree to 
particular rules and institutions. This position can only assert the existence of the social 
arrangement and their so called "societal rules," however it cannot tell us the content of 
these rules. Thus, constructivists need to demonstrate that their theoretical assertions 
about social rules correlate to the speech acts and are produced by real-world agents. As 
such the rule-oriented constructivist theory is a solution which demonstrates a 
relationship between theoretical applications and speech acts that can explain the global 
security environment. 
As outlined above, a state system is constructed based upon a variety of social 
arrangements. These arrangements thus constitute the makeup of the world. For 
example, the global security environment is constituted by war, rivalries, collective 
90




security, and security communities. These social arrangements allow the global security 
environment to "go on;" although some arrangements may be more institutionalized or 
fluid than others. Concisely, what comprises a system depends on what logics are 
guiding particular social arrangement. 
The 'ideal typical rules' in these societal arrangements can be found in Figure 1. 
Each social arrangement has six rules which make up and rule action(s) - (1) Identity; (2) 
Autonomy; (3) Security; (4) Deterrence; (5) Enforcement; and (6) The Use of Force. The 
following are the scope of each of these rules: 
1. The identity rule establishes agent identities as enemies, rivals, citizens, or 
friends.92 
2. The autonomy rule establishes the extent to which the autonomy of both state 
and non-state agents are either threatened by others or limited by mutual 
obligations.93 
3. The security rule establishes the belief that security is acquired by either 
relative military capability or friendly political relationships.94 ! 
4. The deterrence rule establishes a dominant normative expectation either to 
recognize the autonomy of others or to follow the rules of the community.95 
5. The enforcement rule establishes the ultimate method of resolving conflict.96 
92










6. The use of force rule establishes the extent to which force is required to 
resolve conflict.97 
There are variations of these rules which makeup the 'ideal' social arrangements of war, 
go 
rivalry, collective security, and security communities. Each of these rules constitutes 
and helps to explain the global security environment. 
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Figure 1: The Global Security Environment Social Arrangements 
It is important to point out that each of these rules is not intended to be exact 
replicas of reality of the global security environment. Rather they are a reflection of the 
rule-oriented constructivist theory. Each is applicable to the task at hand and each is able 
to provide a concrete application in order to conduct research. It is recognized that these 
rules may not cohere with future research and may need to be refined or even abandoned 
when regarding the global security environment. 
• ' ' . • > . • • 
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Constructing Post-Cold War Collective Security: Brian Frederking 
Frederking (2003) argues that "September 11th did not fundamentally change 
world politics" rather "it exacerbated already existing tensions about the appropriate 
implementation of fledging collective security rules."100 For one terrorist event cannot 
mechanically change the development or rules of global security. Instead, Frederking 
uses dialogical analysis building upon rule-oriented constructivism and the collective 
security rules of the global security environment to explain that there exists a set of 
overlapping social arrangements. This helps to explain that "the dominant trend in the 
post-Cold War world is the gradual institutionalization of collective security rules."101 
This interpretive method is capable to yielding both theoretical and practical insights to 
"posit four social arrangements constituting the security structure of world politics: war, 
rivalry, collective security, and security communities."102 Frederick uses the analysis of 
the debates over Kosovo and Iraq to show that each of these events is very similar in 
nature. However the involvement in each of these circumstances is due to gradual 
institutionalism in the development of the global security environment. 
Frederking's research reveals three conclusions. First, "it contributes to the 
constructivist research program by offering a tentative rule-orientated constructivist 
theory by asserting the existence of war, rivalry, collective security, and security 
community social arrangements." Frederking asserts that the rule-orientated 
constructivist theory moves beyond the traditional methodology of social theory in 
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international politics. Unlike Alexander Wendt who argues that the structure and 
tendencies of social systems will depend on which of these three roles - enemy, rival, and 
friend - will dominate world politics and global security;104 Frederking argues that the 
global security environment is dominated by four sets of social arrangements which 
interact and overlap. Moving away from the original three roles, Frederking explains 
four sets are needed in order to understand the dominant security trends in the post-Cold 
War environment - "movement away from the Cold War rivalry" and the gradual 
institutionalization of collective security rules."105 Frederking builds upon the traditional 
assumptions of constructivism to explain development in the global security 
environment. u -
The second conclusion is in regard to dialogical analysis. Frederking's research 
holds that dialogical analysis, a means for modeling language in a serious manner,106 
"models a linguistic conception of social interaction capable of illustrating constructivist 
arguments."107 This particular methodology allows for pragmatic analysis, dialogical 
disputation analysis, and formal theorem proving. Pragmatic analysis "reveals 
proposition actors implicitly convey to and infer from one another."108 Dialogical 
disputation analysis "identifies additional tacit proposition that actors discursively convey 
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and summarize the flow of interaction."109 Finally, formal theorem-proving tests 
"hypotheses concerning the importance of particular propositions for interaction 
outcomes.110 In other words, dialogical analysis has the ability to help develop 
theoretical approaches into practical applications. It is a practical methodology which 
offers an approach to analyze social interaction of the global security environment. 
The third and final conclusion of Frederking's work involves its contribution to 
the "policy debates about U.S. foreign policy after September n t h " i n Frederking's 
research suggests that "preemption policies are premised on a flawed assumption that the 
events of September 11th fundamentally changed the world politics."112 The research 
refutes that the war on terrorism represents a "more aggressive, unilateral, and even 
preemptive U.S. policies."113 Rather Frederking argues that the events of Kosovo and 
Iraq, and the war on terrorism are an embedded part of a larger, more complex world of 
global security. Each is a result of gradual institutionalism of collective security rules 
and the arrangements in the global security environment. In short, the three conclusions 
of Frederking's work are consistent with the tasks of rule-oriented constructivism - "(1) 
assert the existence of social arrangements, (2) show how these rules make action 
intelligible, and (3) helps agents'go on'in the world."114 
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In sum, Frederking argues that terrorist events cannot change the overall rules of 
global security and its environment. "Even U.S. foreign policy, although tremendously 
important, cannot unilaterally construct a war socially arrangement through declarations 
of a 'war on terrorism' or even by invading Iraq."115 In the modern global security 
environment there is an existence of constitutive social rules and "communicatively 
rational actors constructing these rules through the performance of speech acts."116 As 
such these rules are constantly in a state of flux as they are negotiated, mediated, and 
facilitated through varies agents and facilities. The analysis presented by Frederking 
suggests that the post-Cold War rules and global security environment will remain 
relatively stable while gradual institutionalism takes place. As in Kosovo, the global 
security environment remains strikingly similar even after intervention by the United 
States. In the case of Kosovo, the United States sought the approval and authorization of 
the United Nation Security Council prior to the intervention. It is clear that the 
international community is reliant upon historical examples and constancy rather than ad 
hoc methods, and collective security rules are preferred over unilateral measures. 
Weaknesses 
Building upon the scholars of constructivism, Frederking's work is insightful and 
strives to move beyond the current epistemological debates; nevertheless it has four 
critical faults. First, there are definitional problems which lead to unwieldy 
characteristics within Frederking's research and analysis. Although Frederking 
introduces patterns of behavior inherent to the social arrangements - war, rivalry, 
collective security, and security communities - which constitute the security structures of 
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global security, he never provides a tangible definition of global security. Does global 
security involve "material circumstances and the psychological state produced by those 
circumstances?"117 Is global security the "physical survival of nations and its people by 
protecting from attacks by states and non-states?" Or is global security the "protection 
from transnational forces, such as the environment, weather, disease, and criminal 
activity - the physical survival and safety of the United States and its people by 
protecting from all physical threats?"119 Or is global security "the preservation of 
sovereignty against external and internal threats" by an international defense organization 
and its member states?120 i 
Presently in the field of security studies, the interpretation and definition of 
security has become one of the largest challenges in the field of international relations. 
Security concepts have continued to maintain their limitations and what does remain is 
largely oversimplified. Despite this, scholars, like Frederking, continue to drive on 
regardless of what critics argue. To some, the field of security studies exists in a 
comprehensible state. However, to others it is necessary to broaden the field of security 
studies in order (1) to narrow the definition of security and (2) to comprehend and study 
contemporary political debates.121 By not addressing this key element in methodology, 
there is a lack of conceptualization and operationalization of the variables presented. In 
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short, Frederking's work at best, acts as introductory survey to the development within 
global security environment and security studies. 
Secondly, Frederking research is based upon NATO operations in Kosovo and 
Iraq; however the researcher fails to incorporate any resources dealing directly or 
affiliated with NATO. Although there are a wealth of statistical and research data 
available today pertaining to Kosovo and Iraq, data dealing directly with NATO and its 
involvement in Kosovo and Iraq may not be readily available or available only in limited 
allotments. Although finding resources no small task, all material must be relative to the 
research at hand. 
Third, Frederking uses secondary resources as a primary basis for conducting his 
research. Although the use of secondary data has time and cost saving advantages, there 
are a number of disadvantages to using secondary data. First, the secondary information 
related to the research topic may either not be available or is only available in limited 
quantities. Second, the secondary information may be of a questionable nature pertaining 
to its authenticity, quality, and credibility. This can then lead to misleading interpretation 
of the facts or analysis. Third, the information may be in a different format or unit than 
what be desired by the researcher. Finally, secondary data may not be concurrent with 
what is sought after by the researcher. In short, Frederking's use of secondary sources 
leads to a lack of methodological consistency within his research. 
Lastly, Frederking's three faults, as cited above, lead to inconsistencies in the 
theoretical framework of the analysis. This then compels this research to (1) define 
global security; (2) use primary resources to explain what has affected the shift in policy 
which lead NATO's involvement in Afghanistan; and (3) create a consistent theoretical 
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framework. This thesis and its research will examine and build upon these faults in order 
to develop a consistent analytical framework. This framework will act as a foundation 
when trying to develop an understanding of NATO's policy concerning out-of-area 
missions and path to Afghanistan. 
A Way Forward 
Constructivism asserts that the "existence of social structures - including norms, 
beliefs, and identities - constitute world politics." The theory of constructivism helps 
paint the backdrop of the global security environments and developments within it. 
Bearing this concept in mind, this research recalls the original research question: why did 
NATO become involved in Afghanistan? Specifically, was it due to ad hoc tendencies or 
was it based upon adherence to collective security rules while gradually adapting 
institutional methods? It also recalls Brian Frederking's analysis of the global security 
environments of Kosovo and Iraq, which illuminates the global security environment is 
gradually institutionalizing towards collective security rules. According to Frederking, 
the post-Cold War rules and global security environment will remain relatively stable 
while gradual institutionalism takes place. However, how clear or certain is it that NATO 
is reliant upon historical examples and constancy rather than ad hoc methods? Or that 
collective security rules are preferred over unilateral measures? Thus, this research will 
apply Frederking's rule-oriented constructivist theory and dialogical methodology to 
determine what is affecting the development of NATO's out-of-area policy which may 






Nearly three decades ago, the United States and the former Soviet Union were at 
the end of a long ideological, political, and military battle which defined international 
relations, politics, and the global security environment for more than a generation. 
International relations and security studies, mirroring this struggle, primarily focused on 
the threat of nuclear war and defense which influenced the global security environment 
and related policies. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, established to "safeguard 
the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples" and "seek to promote 
stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area,"122 sought to protect its member 
nations against nuclear warfare and stabilize the global security environment. 
Today, the ideological battle between the United States and the Soviets has come 
to an end and new factors have arisen affecting the global security environment. In 
today's global security environment, NATO member nations have continued to carry out 
the Alliance's mission by way of an expanded agenda and selective participation in out-
of-area missions. Taking NATO's mission and history of operations into account, one 
has to ask: why did NATO become involved in Afghanistan! In today's global security 
environment and the activities taking place in Afghanistan, it is important to ask if NATO 
122
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member nations are holding fast to collective security rules while gradually adhering to 
institutionalism or simply is the Alliance's involvement in Afghanistan based upon ad 
hoc methods in the post-Cold War global security environment? 
Hypotheses 
To address the questions this thesis proposes, this thesis will test the following 
hypotheses: 
HO: If NATO member nations adopt a neutral attitude toward out-of-area 
missions then NATO will not become involved in Afghanistan. 
HI: If NATO member nations adopt an institutional attitude toward out-of-area 
missions then NATO would become involved in Afghanistan. 
H2: If NATO member nations adopt an ad hoc attitude toward out-of-area 
missions then NATO would become involved in Afghanistan. 
This study's hypotheses will test NATO member nations' attitude toward out-of-area 
missions. The thesis will determine if there is a particular attitude adopted by member 
nations regarding out-of-area missions. In this sense, attitude is defined as a manner, 
feeling, or disposition with regard to a person, circumstance, or thing which affects how 
particular actions are carried out. For example, if a state has a neutral attitude then they 
are "not aligned with or support any side or position in a particular circumstance."123 As 
compared to a state who has an institutional attitude which is a "well-established and 
structured pattern of behavior or of relationships that is accepted as a fundamental 
part"124 of a culture, institutional, or government when regarding a situation. On the 
other hand, if a state has an ad hoc attitude then they are impromptu in their manners and 
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usually rely upon a "temporary, provisional, or improvised" attitude to deal with a 
particular problem.125 If a particular aforementioned attitude is adopted by the member 
state regarding out-of-area missions, the analysis will determine how this attitude affected 
NATO's out-of-area policy and the Alliance's involvement in Afghanistan. The 
hypotheses which will be tested will seek to answer the proposed research question of the 
thesis. 
Unit/Level of Analysis 
This thesis will use the international level as the level of analysis and the 
international security organization, NATO, as the unit of analysis. This level of 
analysis and unit were chosen in order to properly measure the impact of the hypotheses 
which have been generated. Additionally, the international level of analysis is best suited 
for this research design because much of the literature concerning post-Cold War global 
security is conducted at this level, including Brian Frederking's research. Thus, there are 
considerable grounds for this thesis. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the analysis of an international defense 
organization is conducted at the international level because other techniques have proved 
to be spurious and cannot accurately measure a system of states. The international level 
of analysis helps to examine the behavior of states in the international environment. It 
can be argued that the international environment "determines a state's behavior (for) it 
"Ad hoc," available from http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ad%20hoc?o=100074; Internet, 
accessed 05 May 2009. 
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asserts that all state react similarly to the same objective external situation." Then 
changes in a "state's domestic regime, its bureaucratic structure, and the personalities and 
178 
the opinions of its leaders do not lead to changes of policies." Rather, changes in 
external conditions can alter a state's behavior. In other words, the global security 
environment can cause changes in a state's behavior. Finally, the international level will 
best serve this thesis because it allows for the identification of the characteristics of the 
complex process of the global security environment and will build an understanding of 
the shift in NATO's out-of-policy and help explain why NATO became involved in 




Having analyzed the selected literature on which this thesis draws, briefly 
describing rule-orientated constructivism, drawing on NATO's history and out-of-area 
policy, and keeping in mind the activities and circumstances in Afghanistan, a framework 
has been developed. Building upon the established framework, this thesis will conduct a 
crucial case study of NATO member nations' out-of-area policy between 1996 and 2003. 
I will apply Brian Frederking's rule-orientated constructivist theory to determine: (1) if 
there is evidence to support this research; (2) if rule-orientated constructivist theory is 
viable for this research; (3) if rule-orientated constructivist theory to explain the 
developments within NATO's out-of-area policy; (4) if there was indeed was a shift in 
member nations' attitude and out-of-area policy; and (5) what led NATO to become 
involved in Afghanistan in 2001. 
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For this research, a case study will be used because it is the most effective method 
of analysis. Rather than using large samples, which are difficult to define, quantify and 
follow protocol, a case study is in an in-depth analysis of a unit. In short, a crucial case 
study is a systemic way of conducting research. Thus, the unit of study in this thesis is 
NATO. It is important to note that NATO will not be used as a proxy but is recognized 
as an organization composed of member states that agree to and implement policy. 
Within this crucial case study, it is important to ask: how does one quantify an 
international security organization, such as NATO and its member nations, or the 
development of out-of-area policy? In order to answer these particular and crucial 
questions, this research will use a qualitative analysis to account for policy developments 
towards out-of-area and engagement in mission and operations. By employing a 
qualitative analysis, I will use this quality of data to explain the shift in policy and 
explain what led NATO to become involved in Afghanistan in 2001. 
For the purposes of this particular thesis, the qualitative method of dialogical 
analysis will be the primary methodology used. Dialogical analysis is a methodology 
which models "a linguistic conception of social interaction capable of illustrating 
constructivist arguments."129 This particular method uses speech acts to study "the 
category of things that exist or may exist in some domain."130 The end result is a catalog 
of the types of things that are presumed to be in a domain of interest from the perspective 
of a person who uses particular language for the purpose of talking about a particular 
12yJervis (1976), 363. 
130
 John F. Sowa, (2006) "A Dynamic Theory of Ontology," in B. Bennett and C. Fellbaum, Eds., Formal 
Ontology in .Information Systems, (Amsterdam, NL: IOS Press), 204-13. Also available from 
http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/dynonto.htm. 
55 
social arrangement.131 For this thesis, the focus on ontology emphasizes a particular type 
of social rules - beliefs, norms, or identities132 - which make up and influence social 
arrangements of the global security environment. 
Beliefs, norms, and identities are the types of rules that constitute the social 
arrangements within in the global security environment. Each of these rules is in line 
with Habermas' notion of communicative reality and the fundamental validity claims -
truth, appropriateness, and sincerity.133 Beliefs are social rules which make claims of 
truth about the world.134 Norm rules are social rules which make appropriateness claims 
* • • - . • • • 
about relationships.135 Finally, the social rules of identity make sincerity claims about 
agents.136 Each type of constructivist argument emphasis one of these rules. Dialogical 
analysis is then able to "illustrate constructivist arguments about the role of norms, 
beliefs, and identity."137 For it "posits the existence of social rules, communicatively 
with rational agents, and the arguments of validity claims." 
The method of dialogical analysis is comprised of three components. These three 
components are pragmatic analysis, formal argument analysis, and formal theorem-
proving. Pragmatic analysis is a method which "reveals propositions actors implicitly 
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convey to and infer from one another."139 Formal argument analysis is an additional tacit 
proposition which identifies which "actors discursively convey and summarizes the flow 
of interaction."140 Finally, formal theorem-proving "test hypothesis concerning the 
importance of particular propositions for interactions."141 Each of these components 
helps to identify and defines the international level of analysis and support the unit of 
study. 
The dialogical method is comprised of four steps. The four steps are identified as 
the following: 
1. One specifies . the background knowledge necessary to understand the 
• ' • 142 
interaction; , 
2. One accumulates explicit speech acts that conveyed meaning during the 
143 
interaction; 
3. One conducts a pragmatic analysis of the speech acts, deriving the implicitly 
conveyed propositions during the interaction;144 and 
4. One constructs a formal argument analysis from the inventory of pragmatic 
propositions to isolate consensual and disputed claims during the interaction.145 
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The method of dialogical analysis first begins with the researcher specifying the 
background knowledge that will be necessary to understand the dialogue which will be 
analyzed. Most importantly a set of rules which governs the interactions will be 
established. These set of rules should either he "politically noncontroversial facts or 
beliefs of the relevant party support by the archival evidence."146 The set of rules are the 
"theory which will be asserted by the analyst; dialogical analysis is the mythological tool 
to provide empirical evidence for the existence of these rules."147 The social 
arrangements - war, rivalry, collective security, and social arrangements - asserted in the 
previous chapter, will act as the set of rules and serve as the background knowledge 
needed in the dialogic analysis. 
Next the researcher gathers speech acts which occurred during the time of 
interaction by cataloging the specific moves which deal directly and indirectly with the 
interaction. This may include any nonverbal actions which illustrate significance, such as 
force deployments and diplomatic acts.148 In this step the speech acts are not selected on 
a random basis. Rather this step will be made up of a reconstruction of the speech acts 
from public sources. It is important to note that "no algorithmic coding rules exist to 
transform textual data into analyzable speech acts."149 It is possible that these kinds of 
rules are impossible to develop. In this sense the researcher gathers the speech acts 
which are most relevant with the same interpretive ability as other researchers have. 
Duffy (1998), 272. 
Frederking (2003), 369. 
Duffy (1998), 272. 
Frederking (2003), 369. 
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The analyst then conducts a pragmatic analysis of the dialogue. Pragmatics is the 
field of linguistics where the meaning of the language relates "contents to context."150 
Pragmatic analysis is concentrated on the aspects of meaning that "context-free, truth-
conditional semantics" cannot summarize.151 In this sense, speakers express more than 
nonsense; they make pragmatic statements which allow them to understand one another 
and correlate actions accordingly. A researcher is then able to construct a list of 
assertions, directives, and commitments conveyed by each person or party within a 
particular speech act. 
Drawing upon this list of assertions, directives, and commitments, an analyst is 
able to carry out the final step by constructing a "formal argument analysis composed of 
moves conveyed explicitly or implicitly." This "isolates and formalizes the disputed 
propositions and thus disputed social rules generated in the pragmatic analysis." 
Within this context, speech acts are tested by illustrating if particular speech act logically 
follows the belief inventories.154 This will help determine is a speech act is able to 
express an outcome for a particular party.155 If the speech act follows the established 
beliefs then it is considered adequate and if the speech act does not follow its contents 
then it is inadequate. If this happens the researcher must return to its original information 
and reconsider if the speech act(s) are applicable to the particular research. The "analysis 
150
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thereby yields a parsimonious account of practical inferences" consistent with the speech 
act.'56 The qualitative method of dialogical analysis is a viable technique that can 
account for the "changing construction of social rules both within and across social 
arrangements."157 Dialogical analysis will be used in this thesis in order to explain if 
there was a change in member nations' attitudes and a shift in out-of-area policy which 
may have contribute to NATO's participation in Afghanistan in 2001. 
Data 
In this research, in order to examine NATO's out-of-area policy, speech acts 
published by NATO's North Atlantic Council will be collected from the online NATO 
database. They will be accessed through the NATO official Press site; the online, full-
text archived database of Committee Reports and Committee Meeting summaries. This 
research will analyze communiques found in NATO Committee Reports between 1996 
and 2003. However, the key tenet for this study will be Brian Frederking's "Constructing 
Post-Cold War Collective Security," a constructivist study published in The American 
Political Science Review in 2003. These sources of data will enrich the quality of the 
research, as well as cover a large continuum which reduces spuriousness and allows for 
triangulation to occur. 
Key Variables 
Dependent Variable: NATO's involvement in Afghanistan 
Independent Variables: Attitude of member nations regarding out-of-area 
missions 
Duffy (1998), 273. 
Frederking (2003), 370. 
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Operationalization: Key Variables 
The first step in measuring a hypothesis is to define the variables used - the 
dependent and independent variables. For the purposes of this thesis, the dependent 
variable is identified as "NATO's involvement in Afghanistan" and the independent 
variable is identified as the "attitude of members nations regarding out-of-area missions." 
These two variables throughout the thesis will be operationalized as the following. 
"NATO's involvement in Afghanistan" shall mean an international defense 
Alliance (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) engagement in the regional territory of 
Afghanistan. 
"Attitude of member nations regarding out-of-area missions" shall mean a 
negative or positive point(s) of view and/or feeling(s) of members of an internal defense 
organization (NATO) toward 1.) internal and external threats and threats without borders 
(which include but are not limited to invasion, weapons of mass destruction, and 
terrorism) at the international level and 2.) bodies of personnel sent to foreign territories 
that reside outside of the traditional boundaries of the European theater. 
Measurement 
For this study, "NATO's involvement in Afghanistan" will be measured, as best 
as possible, in terms of (1) missions and operations, including out-of-area, between 1996 
through 2003 and (2) areas in which missions and operations were conducted in. 
Measuring the "attitude of member nations regarding out-of-area missions" will 
be done by analyzing communiques published by the North Atlantic Council between 
1996 through 2003. Each of the communiques, hereby known as speech acts, will be 
analyzed using dialogical analysis. Specifically, the "attitude of member nations 
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regarding out-of-area missions" in the speech acts will measured by using pragmatic 
analysis, dialogical disputation analysis, and formal theorem-proving. This research will 
look for evidence in changes or shifts in NATO's policy or treaty concerns, emotions or 
feelings regarding particular situations in the global security environment, or 
participation in treaties, missions, and operations. Thus, knowledge of NATO's policies 
and treaties, partnerships with member countries and other nations, Alliance processes 
and procedures, and missions are vital in measuring this data. 
In summary, after the end of the Cold War, ideologies and policies regarding the 
global security environment became refocused. The emergence of a new global security 
environment challenged the traditional assumptions of NATO. As such, NATO's has 
continuously transformed and changed to meet the threats and challenges of the new 
security environment. NATO member countries have continuously broadened its agenda, 
began a process of enlargement, and time after time committed the Alliance to engage in 
missions outside the realm of the traditional European theater. In 2001, NATO became 
involved in Afghanistan in the fight against terrorism. This involvement raised the 
question of why did NATO become involved in Afghanistan1? Exclusively, one has to ask: 
are the member states gradually adhering to collective security rules and institutionalism 
or simply was it an ad hoc reaction? 
Security studies are a vast field and usually understood on the basis of theory or in 
limited application. Security studies are usually justified on the basis of political or 
academic benefit and each are usually challenged on the impracticality, out datedness, or 
irrelevancy. This thesis can provide a window of opportunity to learn and understand the 
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transformation of NATO member nations' attitudes; shift in the Alliance's policy 




The past and the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have become 
linked to its mission in Afghanistan. NATO, an Alliance that was created to safeguard 
and promote stability within the North Atlantic area,158 was a player in the Afghanistan 
invasion and is an active participant in helping Afghanistan's new government against a 
resurgent Taliban. Afghanistan represents NATO's first mission which is outside of its 
traditional European theater, and the "largest operational deployment" in the history of 
the Alliance.159 NATO's mission in Afghanistan has become the test of the member 
nations and the Alliance's ability to transform and survive. However, in order to 
ascertain the Alliance's future it is important to comprehend why did NATO become in 
Afghanistan? 
This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section will summarize 
the purpose, mission and structure of NATO; outline NATO's policy toward out-of-area 
missions; briefly summarize the history of Afghanistan; and highlight NATO's 
involvement in Afghanistan. This section will provide the background information which 
is necessary to grasp the member nation's policy of out-of-area and understand the 
historical developments which led the Alliance to become involved in Afghanistan 
158
 The North Atlantic Treaty. 
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operations. The second section in the chapter will analyze the communiques agreed upon 
by the members of NATO. This section will conclude with a summary of the findings. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a transatlantic link which unites both 
North America and Europe in a distinctive and timeless collective defense coalition. 
NATO's mission is to protect and defend the liberty and security of each of its member 
nations and their people by political and military measures. Since its birth, NATO has 
continued to provide a collective defense to its members and serve as an "essential pillar 
of peace and stability" in the transatlantic theater.160 
Since the end of the Cold War, NATO and its members have continued to pursue 
the Alliance's original mission while taking on new fundamental tasks. In response to 
the global security environment, the member nations have continued to broaden the scope 
and agenda of the Alliance, and continuously committed the Alliance to additional 
responsibilities. These new responsibilities include addressing instability within the 
Balkans, and confronting threats beyond the traditional European theater such as in the 
Balkans, Afghanistan, and the Middle East. In its present day, NATO continues to 
engage in a large array of activities and missions which have been designed to promote 
cooperation within the international community, build partnerships, and find proactive 
solutions to the security threats and challenges of the 21st century. 
The Dynamics of the Alliance: Its Structure and How It Works 
The Alliance of NATO is a dynamic inter-governmental organization. The 
backbone of the Alliance is its membership. NATO is comprised of twenty-eight 
NATO in the 21st Century. 
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countries. Each member country has its own policies, objectives, and procedures. 
Each nation works with one another along side of the United Nations (UN), the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), 
and the Council of Europe. NATO works in accordance with each of its member nations 
and other entities to help create a peaceful and secure environment in which countries 
preserve their sovereignty and independence, economies can flourish, and individuals 
will prosper. In order to function in a cooperative and productive manner, the member 
states rely upon the consensus decision-making process. 
Consensus Decision-Making 
One of the key elements of NATO is its decision-making process. The decision-
making process is based upon a foundation of consensus. Consensus is usually sought 
when member nations must formulate policy on an important issue. In order to formulate 
policy and implement particular policy, "all member governments must being fully 
informed of each other's overall policies and intentions and the underlying considerations 
which give rise to them." Consequently, extended consultations and discussions are 
1 
required before an important decision can be made.164 Reaching a consensus in the 
16
' "NATO's member countries," available from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/nato_countries.htm; 
Internet, accessed 15 April 2009. 
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 The main objective of this process is the formation and publication of policy. These policy statements 
are published in the form of a communique. 
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decision-making process is a progression in which member states have multiple 
opportunities to provide and revise language in NATO's documents which reflect a 
nation's individual perspectives and objectives. Additionally, consensus amongst the 
member nations "represents the common determination of all the countries involved to 
implement them in full."165 The end result of the decision-making process is the formal 
publication of NATO's policy in the form of a communique.166 In short, the consensus 
decision-making process is a fundamental building block within the Alliance and results 
in the formulation and publication of policy statements. 
Within the member nations and in other allied governments, there is varied 
support for decision-making by consensus. However there are critics who believe that 
) the process needs to be altered or abandoned. Although the consensus decision-making 
process may be criticized as lengthy and cumbersome, it has two major distinctions and 
advantages. First, "the members of the Alliance safeguard the role of each country's 
individual experience and outlook while at the same time availing themselves of the 
machinery and procedures which allow them jointly to act rapidly and decisively if 
circumstances require them to do so."167 Secondly, once a decision has been made the 
i • . . . 
decision represents the determination of all the member nations and their commitment to 
countries to arrive at mutually acceptable agreements on collective decisions or on action by the Alliance as 
a whole." For more information refer to Chapter 7: Policy and Decision-Making - Consensus Politics and 
Joint-Decision Making in the NATO Handbook. 
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the decision.168 The consensus decision-making process is a fundamental cornerstone in 
the Alliance. 
Principal Players in the Decision-Making Process 
NATO is an alliance composed of multiple countries. Each pf these countries is 
the foundation upon which the Alliance rests and functions. Essentially, "the most 
important players in NATO are the member cpuntries who form the organization."169 
Each of these countries is represented at every committee level by a representative, as 
illustrated in Figure 2, at the political level. The Alliance is comprised of three principal 
committees - the North Atlantic Council, the Defense Planning Committee, and the 
Nuclear Planning Group - and their various subcommittees. The three political 
committees are each unique in their nature and each plays a vital rple within NATO. The 
North Atlantic Council is the principal decision-making body. The Defense Planning 
Committee is the ultimate authority regarding the Alliance's integrated military structure. 
The Nuclear Planning Group is involved in nuclear policy issues. Each group is 
discussed at greater length in the subsequent sections. 
168
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Figure 2: Principal Committees of NATO 170 
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The North Atlantic Council (NAC) 
The North Atlantic Council (NAC) was established by Article 9 of the North 
171 
Atlantic Treaty. The NAC is considered the highest authority and is considered the 
fundamental decision-making body in NATO allowing it to have "effective political 
authority and powers of decision."172 
Normally, the Council consists of Permanent Representatives of all member 
countries. The NAC meets at least once a week under the chairmanship of the Secretary 
General. In order to assist in its work, the Council maintains numerous committees, each 
of whom are responsible for carrying out the tasks the Council orders or.execute its 
decisions. Each committee, regardless if it is civil or military, is under the discretion of 
the Council. The type of decision and work the Council and the committees carry out 
allow the Council to maintain its public profile, while issuing "declarations and 
communiques explaining the Alliance's policies and decisions to the general public and 
to governments of countries which are not members of NATO."173 
The Defense Planning Committee (DPQ 
The Defense Planning Committee (DPC) is the highest authority within NATO in 
regards to the Alliance's integrated military structure. The DPC offers assistance and 
guidance to NATO's military authorities, and within its scope, has the same functions 
171
 The North Atlantic Treaty. 
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and authority as the NAC on issues within its aptitude. Essentially the DPC engages in 
matters pertaining to defense matters and subjects who are associated with collective 
security planning. 
The DPC is composed of representatives of all member countries, with the 
- . - • < . • 
exception of France. The DPC meets when necessary at the level of Ambassadors and 
twice a year at the level of the Ministers of Defense. It is chaired by the Secretary 
General of NATO. 
The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) 
The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) discusses specific policy issues which are 
related to or associated with nuclear forces. The NPG holds discussions which "cover a 
broad range of nuclear policy matters, including the safety, security and survivability of 
nuclear weapons, communications and information systems, deployment issues and wider 
questions of common concern such as nuclear arms control and nuclear proliferation."175 
The Planning Group is comprised of the defense ministers of member countries 
who participate in NATO's Defense Planning Committee. The defense ministers meet at 
regular intervals throughout the year. The NPG frequently reviews NATO's nuclear 
policy and any decisions are taken jointly in order to modify or adapt new measures in 
"Chapter 7: Policy and Decision-Making - The Principal Policy and Decision Making Institutions of the 
Alliance, The Defense Planning Committee," available from 
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light of new developments and to update planning and consultation procedures relating to 
^nuclear policy matters and subjects. 
In short, NATO is an environment which brings together countries that are willing 
to come together for a common cause and prepared to integrate their forces and engage in 
multinational activities during a particular period of time. The military and political 
structures of NATO provide for the advance planning which is required to enable 
member countries to secure themselves in the global security environment. It is indeed 
these structures and its process, that each member countries participates in, which 
contribute to NATO's policy shift concerning out-of-area, and contributed to the 
Alliance's involvement in Afghanistan in 2001. 
NATO's Missions and Operations 
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, NATO has continued to change while 
maintaining cohesion and unity of purpose within the Alliance. In reality, NATO and its 
member nations have not always been cohesive and unified, especially when dealing with 
missions and operations who reside outside the traditional European borders. The 
Alliance's inability to cope with out-of-area missions can be traced back to the 
foundation of NATO in 1949. 
The Cold War 
The tensions revolving around out-of-area policy of NATO can be traced back to 
the establishment of the Alliance. When NATO was first established in 1949, one of its 
fundamental roles was to deter any military aggressions. However, the member nations 
of the Alliance were presented with the "difficulty of balancing their collective interest in 
176
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North Atlantic security with their variously shared and perceived commitments in other 
parts of the world."177 In this context, the member nations were unable to find common 
v • • • 
grounds tb participate in anything beyond the boundaries of Europe.178 Throughout the 
Cold War, the member nations relied upon a non-policy on out-of-area missions. 
Since the foundation of NATO, conflicts regarding out-of-area was based upon 
differences in perceived interests, ideologies, and viewpoints of the member nations. 
From 1945 until the mid-1960s, the decolonization worldwide shifted European desires 
and willingness to control economic boundaries.179 The decolonization created a vacuum 
within the global security environment where NATO member countries found themselves 
overcome by "Americanism" and this was hard for many to swallow. Additionally, the 
realities of the Korean War affected member countries' interests and perceptions of 
threat.180 Since, that period of time, many member nations have felt that by having 
NATO forces involved in mission which resided outside the European boundaries would 
leave the Alliance vulnerable. While the United States felt that it was in the Alliance's 
J O ] 
bpst interest to engage in efforts outside of the European scope. The conflicting 
ideologies, perceptions, and interests remained a major stumbling block within the 
NATO when responding to out-of-area missions. The member states lacked a 
177Marc Bentinck, (1986) "NATO's Out-of-Area Problem," Adelphi Paper 211 :Autumn:3. 
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comprehensive consensus on how to deal with issues outside the geographical scope of 
the North Atlantic that threaten allied interests and defense. Thus throughout the Cold 
War, the Alliance continued to be hindered by its member states' ability to effectively 
deal with out-of-area issues. In short, throughout the Cold War the member nations 
'practiced' a non-policy on missions who resided outside the realm of the European 
theater. 
Post Cold-War 
Throughout the Cold War, NATO member nations met resistance on collective 
defense on out-of-area operations due to a lack of comprehensive consensus based upon 
disagreeing beliefs, viewpoints, and objectives. The end of the Cold War heralded a 
major shift in member nations' policy specifically regarding out-of-area. Many member 
nations began to pursue more global policies due to the realization that in the modern 
global security environment it is simply not possible to remain ambivalent about armed 
aggression and threats beyond the European borders.182 But more importantly the 
member nations were able to build upon differences in ideologies, perceptions, and 
interests to engage in several selective missions throughout the 1990s and its first out-of-
area mission in Afghanistan. 
The Afghanistan 2001 Invasion Case-Study at a Glance 
Initially, NATO was a creation of the Cold War era. Since the end of the Cold 
War, the global security environment has continued to become more complex. Therefore 
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the Alliance has taken on new and fundamental tasks in order to remain effective in the 
21st century. The member nations have continued to refocus its efforts to "adapt to the 
reality of asymmetrical threats" Furthermore, the member nations continue to adopt "a 
broader and more ambitious approach to security by further deepening and extending its 
partnerships, modernizing its forces and providing assistance in crisis areas that are new 
to the organization."185 In sum, NATO and it members continue to shift attitudes, update 
and adopt policy, and accelerate the Alliance's transformation to deal with the global 
security environment. The following is a brief historical description of Afghanistan and 
summarizes with NATO's involvement in the region. 
A Brief History of Afghanistan 
Throughout its history, Afghanistan has confronted centuries of strife and turmoil. 
Only until recently has the country been able to rebuild from the seemingly endless 
warfare that has plague the land since it conception. The history of Afghanistan is 
convoluted in conflict and social unrest but offers an intriguing and diverse tale. Because 
of Afghanistan's location, between the historical trade routes of Asia and the Middle 
East, the country has consistently been invaded and conquered by foreign invaders and 
governments. However, none of these foreign invaders successfully established and 
maintained a long withstanding rule of law. As history has illustrated, invasion and 
victory in Afghanistan will only be temporary at best, for success can be taken as easily 
as it was given. 
—: , : , 
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 Shaista Wahad and Barry Younderman, (2007) A Brief History of Afghanistan, (New York, NY: Facts 
on File). 
75 
j The history of Afghanistan has been a test to the global security environment and 
the international community at large. Approximately 50,000 years, Afghanistan's earliest 
settlers lived as hunters in caves until their numbers grew and moved to warmer plains 
and formed villages and began to domestic animals. The 6 to 15 century ushered in 
the age of invasion and conquest. The foreign rulers bequeathed to the region a rich and 
varied culture, and religious traditions which allowed Afghanistan to become a center of 
great cultural and economic heritage.188 This was only to decline in the 16th century due 
to constant foreign invasion and the discovery of other trade routes. The country was 
finally unified in 1747 under Pashtun tribal leader Ahmad shad Durrani.189 The country 
continued to be influenced by the presence of foreigners and was shaped largely by 
competition between the United Kingdom and Russia during the 1.8th and. 19th centuries. 
The region of Afghanistan relied upon an absolute monarchy, influenced by the 
British Empire, until 1922. Under the guidance of the elected president, Amanullah 
Khan, a state assembly and legislature were organized, and ministers were appointed to 
the cabinet.190 From the turn of the 20th century to the end of the 1960s, the western 
ideals of Khan and his successor Zahir Shah continued to challenge the powerful 
religious leaders. 
In the early 1970s the country was beset by serious economic problems. In 1973 
the monarchy was overthrown by former Prime Minister Mohammad Sardar Daoud 
Martin Ewans, (2002) Afghanistan: A New History, (London, UK: Routledge), 10. 




Kahan.191 Soon thereafter Daoud declared Afghanistan a republic and appointed himself 
the first president and prime minister.192 By the middle of the 1970s, President Daoud 
had decided to form closer ties with the West and the oil-rich nations of the Middle East 
while distancing the country from the Soviet Union. Gradually, the Soviet's presence 
was transitioned out of Afghan government and military positions. However, in 1978, a 
Soviet-backed coup by the Communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan 
(PDPA) ended in the overthrow and murder of President Daoud. In December 1979, the 
Soviet army invaded Afghanistan. 
The presence of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan continued for the next decade. 
During which time the Soviet army conducted military operations against Afghan 
Mujahideen rebels who were backed by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and CIA operatives. 
While the UN Security Council met to consider the Soviet Union intervention, which 
resulted in the adoption of the first series of "Situation of Afghanistan" resolutions 
(resolution ES-6/2).194 The resolutions "deplored the armed intervention in Afghanistan, 
called for the withdrawal of foreign forces, asked states to contribute humanitarian 
assistance, and asked the Security-General to keep it informed of developments."195 
Throughout the 1980s, the UN General Assembly and the international 
community continued to focus on Afghanistan by passing an additional series of 
191
 Ewans (2002), 126. 
192
 Ibid, 127. 
193
 Patricia Gossman, (2001) "Afghanistan in the Balance," Middle Eastern Research Project 221:9-12. 
194 «Tne situation in Afghanistan," available from http://www.un.org/ga/62/plenary/afghanistan/bkg.shtml; 
Internet, accessed 20 September 2008. 
195 "Afghanistan and the United Nations," available from http:www.unh.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/un-
afghan-history.shtml; Internet, accessed 20 September 2008. 
77 
resolutions. The resolutions "called for an end to the conflict, withdrawal of foreign 
troops, UN assistance to find a political statement and international help for refugees and 
others affected by the conflict."1 As international opposition from the United Nations 
vocally increased daily, various approaches were made with the intentions of trying to 
end the conflict. However, "action by the United Nations Security Council was 
impossible because the Soviets were armed with veto, but the UN General Assembly 
regularly passed resolutions opposing the Soviet Occupation."197 Assistance from the 
' ' ' • ' • ' ' ' . - . < 
international community - Germany, Great Britain, China, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia -
was offered in order to help Pakistan deal with more than three million refugees fleeing 
from Afghanistan. 
In June 1982, a breakthrough in the Afghan War occurred when "proximity" talks 
began between Pakistan and Afghanistan through the mediation of UN Secretary 
General's special representative, Diego Cordovez. The negotiations were aimed at 
reversing a policy, which had enormous political, material, and human capital 
ramifications, while achieving withdraw of the,Soviet forces.198 "The format had 
essentially been agreed upon by 1985. Meanwhile the United States and the Soviet 
Union had committed themselves to guaranteeing the implementation of an agreement 
leading to a withdrawal."199 An agreement was reached which affirmed the sovereignty 
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of Afghanistan and its right to self-determination, freedom from foreign invasion, and the 
right of refugees to return in a safe return.20 The core of the agreement was reached in 
"May 1988 that authorized the withdrawal of foreign troops according to a timetable that 
would remove all Soviet forces."201 The occupation of Russian forces ended in February 
1989 under the conditions of the Geneva Accords implemented by the UN. Nevertheless 
the Soviets continued to back the Communist PDPA under Mohammed Najibullah until 
the collapse and dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1992. 
After the withdrawal of Soviet forces, civil war between the various factions 
arose. The number of citizens fleeing the country resulted in the worst refugee crisis the 
international community had ever encountered. In 1992, the fighting intensified, making 
aid more difficult and shattering hopes of the country finding resolution. At the request 
of the UN General Assembly, in December 1993 the Secretary-General established the 
United Nations Special Mission Afghanistan (UNSMA).202 UNSMA was constituted to 
"canvass a broad spectrum of Afghan leaders and solicit their views on how the UN 
could best help with the national reconciliation and reconstruction." Meanwhile, the 
Taliban began to manifest their presence throughout the country. 
In 1994, the Islamic Pahtun Taliban movement began in the southern providences 
of Afghanistan.204 Over the next two years the movement began making rapid gains. 
Soon thereafter the Taliban "controlled approximately 95 percent of the country, 
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including the capital of Kabul, and all the largest urban areas, except Faizabad." After 
the seize of Kabul, the Taliban began to implement their own interpretation of the Islamic 
law and conduct. In a presidential statement by the president of the UN Security Council 
on 15 February 1996: 
The Security Council expressed concern about intensified hostilities around the 
capital city of Kabul, which prevented deliveries of humanitarian aid. It was also 
deeply concerned that the continuing conflict provided fertile ground for 
terrorism, arms transfers and drug trafficking, which destabilized the whole region 
and beyond.206 
As Taliban forces continued to establish their reign over the country, the UN Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1076.207 The Resolution was a call for all Afghan parties to 
cease all hostilities and to begin open dialogues aimed at achieving national unity and 
reconciliation. It echoed earlier concerns "that the conflict provided fertile ground for 
terrorism and drug trafficking and called on the parties to half such activities."208 
Disregarding the resolutions passed by the UN and the condemnation by the international 
community, the Taliban continued to expand its rule of law throughout the country and 
conduct terrorist activities. 
The rule of the Taliban and fighting between political and military fractions 
continued between 1997 and 2000.209 The UN General Assembly, Security Council, and 
international community continued to condemn the actions of the Taliban. Finally, on 15 
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October 1999, "citing the failure of the Taliban authorities to response to demands, the 
Council applied broad sanctions under the enforcement provisions of the UN Charter."210 
The sanctions included the freezing of all assets and funds owned or controlled by the 
Taliban. 
NATO in Afghanistan 
By the end of the 1990s, the nation of Afghanistan had become notorious for its 
rule under the Taliban, production of opium, and terrorist training camps. The situation 
in Afghanistan continued unresolved until the end of 2001. Throughout this period the 
international community, including the UN and NATO, tried with varying levels of 
success to provide aid to the citizens of Afghanistan.211 While condemnation by the 
international continued without any direct actions taken. This situation drastically 
changed after the attacks of September 11 2001 
• ) ' . . - • ' 
In 2001, immediately following the September 11th attacks, large scale 
transformations were fashioned and implemented in the global security environment. 
Within mere hours of the attacks in New York and Washington D.C., the Bush 
Administration announced a war on terrorism. Initially the goals of the war were to bring 
Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda to justice and prevent the rise of terrorist organizations. 
In order to accomplish each of these goals, the approach to be carried out by the United 
States was twofold. First, economic and military sanctions were to be placed on any 
country which was allegedly harboring terrorists while implementing global surveillance 
and intelligence sharing. Secondly, US-led military operations would be launched in 
Afghanistan to oust the oppressive Taliban and al-Qaeda forces. Soon thereafter, NATO 
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and its member countries issued statements which were the first step in its path to 
involvement in Afghanistan. 
Immediately following the attacks of September 11th' and the announcement of 
U.S.-led war on terrorism, NATO and its member states took historical steps by pledging 
their loyalty and support in the war on terrorism. For the first time in the history of the 
Alliance, NATO member nations made the extraordinary decision by unanimously 
agreeing to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Additionally, the Alliance also 
agreed to deploy its Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean and elements of 
its AW ACS force.212 The steps undertaken enabled the Alliance to better assist its 
member nations and their national authorities in the protection of their populations. The 
actions of the member states regarding Afghanistan created a venue in which NATO 
members would have to go beyond their European theater and combat the threats of 
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The mission in Afghanistan was 
NATO's first out-of-area mission. 
After the initial activities in Afghanistan by NATO and as the situation continued 
to unfold within the country, the international community met to discuss the situation at 
hand and determine a decisive course of action before engaging in military operations. 
On 12 November 2001, the "Six plus Two" group met in New York.213 Under the 
chairmanship of the Secretary-General Kofi Annan, representatives from six countries 
neighboring Afghanistan, as well as the United States and the Russian Federation, agreed 
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on "the need for a board based and freely chosen Afghan government."214 In a Joint 
Declaration, China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, the U.S. and 
Russia each pledged their support in trying to help the Afghan people find a political 
solution to the crisis within the country. Additional each country agreed that "there 
should be the establishment in Afghanistan of a broad based multi-ethnic, politically 
balanced, freely chosen Afghan administration representative of their aspirations and at 
peace with its neighbors.215 At the end of the meeting it was concluded by many 
participants, including some NATO member nations, that the crisis in Afghanistan was 
critical and required immediate action. 
Following the "Six plus Two" meeting, in December a further donor conference 
was held in Berlin. The focus of the Bonn Conference was to address the immediate and 
long-term needs of Afghanistan. Delegates from nations, international organizations, and 
• ) 
the European Union attended the conference in hopes of addressing humanitarian and 
reconstruction support for Afghanistan.216 The conference ended with the establishment 
of a new, interim government in Afghanistan, known as the Afghan Interim Authority 
(AIA). 
After the UN Security Council unanimously endorsed the agreement, the Council 
passed Resolution 1386.217 The Resolution "authorized the establishment of the 
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International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to help the Afghan Transitional Authority 
918 
maintain security in Kabul and its surrounding areas." Initially led by the United 
States, the ISAF was comprised of all NATO members as well as other partner states of 
the Alliance. Additionally, the Afghan National Army was also key members of the 
ISAF. The agreement of the^  ISAF paved the way for the creation of a three-way 
partnership between the Afghan Transitional Authority, UNAMA, and ISAF. 
As the mission of the ISAF continued, larger participation and assistance of 
NATO forces were requested at the behest of the Afghan President Hamid Karzai. In 
August 2003, NATO took over the command of ISAF. In its new role, the UN. Security 
Council Resolution 1776 called upon "NATO to disarm militias, reform the justice 
system, train a national police force and army, provide security for elections, and combat 
99A 991 
the narcotics industry." However, the Resolution failed to address how NATO 
should carry out these tasks. It was left up to the member nations, in consultation with 
the Afghan government, to take the provisions outlined in the Resolution and make them 
tangible and quantifiable in order to carry out a realistic policy. However, political 
leaders and local commanders have had to face considerable challenges - national 
caveats, difficultly in persuading some member states to contribute forces,222 counter 
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narcotics, and failure of provincial reconstruction teams. These challenges have 
influenced the implementation of the ISAF by member nations. Despite these challenges, 
over time NATO commanders implemented actions in Afghanistan to bring the country 
under NATO's operational responsibilities.225 Today the ISAF is the primary operation 
within Afghanistan. 
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Figure 3: ISAF Troop Locations in Afghanistan226 
Today, the two military efforts in Afghanistan continue with efforts to stabilize a 
potentially hostile country. The first operation, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF),227 
was a U.S. led combat mission against the Taliban and al Qaeda terrorist groups, 
primarily conducted along the Pakistan border. The OEF operation was not a NATO 
mission, although it did involve nations whom are a part of the NATO. The second 
operation involved in Afghanistan was the ISAF,228 who was established in order to 
stabilize the country by the international community. The ISAF includes troops from all 
twenty-eight states of NATO and has included troops from several non-NATO nations, 
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such as Azerbaijan, Austria, Jordon, New Zealand, and Sweden. "By July 2008, ISAF 
had an estimated 52,700 troops from 40 countries, with NATO members providing the 
core of the force. The United States has approximately 14,800 troops in ISAF." 
The efforts undertaken by NATO in Afghanistan are indeed the Alliance's first 
mission beyond the boundaries of the European continent. The purpose of the 
Afghanistan mission was to stabilize and reconstruct the country. Even though NATO 
has participated in several stabilization and reconstruction missions, such as in Kosovo, 
the operations in Afghanistan were different. Different because there has never been a 
long standing centralized Afghanistan government, presence of Taliban, the mission's 
out-of-area scope and abrasive terrain, and the country's historical context and standing 
amongst the international community. Different because this was the first mission where 
NATO was involved in a military operation outside of the European theater. 
The mission in Afghanistan has played an important role in NATO, in the future 
of the Organization, and for the leadership of its member nations. Most importantly, the 
mission illustrates the progression of the political and operational involvement of the 
Alliance since the beginning of the 19th century and a shift in NATO's out-of-area policy. 
By why would NATO shift its policy and become involved in Afghanistan? Is it a result 
of ad hoc tendencies? Or, is something more typical of policy development and 
adherence to institutional methods in the globalized, post-Cold War environment? The 
following analysis will address these questions and analyze NATO's out-of-area policy to 
understand what led NATO to become involved in Afghanistan. 
NATO's Role in Afghanistan. 
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Interpreting NATO in Afghanistan: A Dialogical Analysis 
Background Knowledge 
The background knowledge which is required for this analysis includes the 
knowledge of the four global security arrangements and the history of NATO, its policy 
of out-of-area, and involvement in Afghanistan,231 but more importantly, an 
understanding of the transition from the bilateral Cold War rivalry to the post-Cold War 
security environment of collective security arrangements and Alliances. The global 
security environment is made up of many international organizations, bi-lateral and 
multi-lateral treaties, policies and resolutions, non-governmental organizations, and 
diffusion of norms and each of these components continue to grow and will continue to 
govern the global security and its environment. Within this context, NATO has 
continued uphold its mission, shifted its views concerning out-of-area, and has become 
involved in Afghanistan. 
Speech Acts 
The speech acts in this analysis were gathered from communiques published by 
NATO's North Atlantic Council between 1996 and 2003. The communiques, policy 
statements, are a result of the consensus decision-making process. During this process 
representatives from the member states consult with one another. During the consultation 
process, member nations exchange views and information and discuss the language of the 
communique prior to reaching an agreement and taking any necessary action.232 This 
process enables each country to voice their views and express any hesitations or worries, 
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The result of the consultation and consensus decision-making process are policy 
statements published in the form of a communique. This process ensures that each 
communique is consistent in its format and reporting methods. In short, each speech act 
k ' • • • • ' • ' • - . 
of this analysis represents an official position of NATO member states. Each 
communique focuses on the issues of how the member states of NATO will respond and 
deal with the global security environment within the context of the appropriate security 
rules.233 
The following are the speech acts used in this analysis: 
1. Speech Act 1: Press Communique M-NAC-2 (1996)165 held at NATO HQ 
Brussels 10 Dec 1996.234 
2. Speech Act 2: Press Communique M-NAC-2 (1997)155 held at NATO HQ 
Brussels 16 Dec 1997.235 
3. Speech Act 3: Press Communique M-NAC-2 (1998)140 held at NATO HQ 
Brussels 8 Dec 1998.236 
4. Speech Act 4: Press Communique M-NAC-2 (1999)166 held at NATO HQ 
Brussels 15 Dec 1999.237 
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5. Speech Act 5: Press Communique M-NAC-2 (2000)124 held at NATO HQ 
Brussels 15 Dec 2000.238 
6. Speech Act 6: Press Communique M-NAC-2 (2001)158 held at NATO HQ 
Brussels 6 Dec 2001.239 
7. Speech Act 7: Press Communique M-NAC-2 (2002)59 held at NATO HQ 
Brussels 14 May 2002.240 
8. Speech Act 8: Press Communique M-NAC-2 (2003)152 held at NATO HQ 
Brussels 4 Dec 2003.241 
Content of the Speech Acts 
In speech act 1 the member states assert that the Alliance is in a state of reform. 
The member states assert they will strive to define a new structure and dimension in a 
different world and with a Europe in search of a new identity. The member states are 
resolved to preserve its political and military strength which will ensure its ability to 
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carry out a multiple missions. NATO member states will continue to build upon its 
security by "maintaining its capability for collective security, admitting new members, 
expanding and strengthening cooperative relationships with all Partners" and "realizing 
the European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance."242 The member states 
reconfirmed their mission statements and will continue to support all efforts to combat 
threats, like terrorism, which constitute serious challenges to harmony, security, and 
steadiness of NATO. 
NATO member states assert in speech act 2 that the Alliance is in a period of 
transition. The member states have expanded its membership to include the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Additionally, the member nations have expressed a new 
will and capacity to adapt to a new Europe through continual engagement in the 
Partnership for Peace and the transatlantic coalition. As such, the member nations will 
continue to consider options for a future of military presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and will continue to condemn all acts of terrorism.243 In doing so the member states of 
the Alliance will continue to pay particular attention to the Mediterranean since the 
security of Europe is directly tied to security and stability within the region. Thus 
securing peace over the long term will then require cooperative efforts but also using 
"arrangements in the Alliance for consultation on threats of a wider nature that affect 
Alliance security interests."244 
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In speech act 3 the member states continue to redefine the role of the Alliance in 
order to adapt, renew, and meet the security challenges of the 21st century. Internally, the 
member nations continue to strive to "maintain the Alliance's military effectiveness for 
the full range of its missions building on its essential collective defense capabilities and 
its ability to react to a wide range of contingencies, to preserve the transatlantic link, and 
to develop the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)."245 Additionally, the 
member nations continuously work to update the Strategic Concept. Externally, NATO 
member states continue to enhance the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the 
Partnership for Peace. These partnerships continue to be a focal point for the Alliance, in 
order to build "new patterns of practical military and defense-related cooperation across a 
wide range of issues."246 These efforts have proved useful in the crisis in Kosovo as 
cooperation in the region progresses and the establishment of a NATO Military Liaison 
Mission in Moscow. Finally, the members of the Alliance recognizes the proliferation of 
nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons are a means of serious concern; 
therefore member countries will work in conjunction with one another to urge all 
countries to fully implement the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
The member states of NATO assert in speech act 4 that the Alliance has embarked 
on a new chapter. The member states note that the new chapter was marked by three 
major milestones. First, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland became official 
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in mid-March. Secondly, the 
member states committed the Alliance to its first air-strike campaign. The objectives of 
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the campaign were twofold: (1) target Yugoslavian military targets to stop violence and 
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genocide and (2) force Belgrade to withdraw its troops from Kosovo. Finally, NATO 
celebrated its fiftieth anniversary since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. 
Each of these events has propelled NATO and its member countries to reconsider their 
ideas, concepts, and theories towards the Alliance at present arid in the future. In 
particular, the experience in Kosovo has confirmed that NATO member countries "must 
continue to adapt and improve its defense capabilities to ensure the effectiveness of 
future multinational operations across the full range of Alliance missions." The 
member states recognize that this is an important step in the Alliance's transformation 
especially in the 21st century. The member states will continue to enhance their 
cooperation with other states, consider options for security building measures, and strive 
to preserve its strategic stability. 
In speech act 5 NATO members asserted they will continue to pursue its current 
missions, including those endeavors in South-East Europe, while maintaining the 
Alliance's partnerships and cooperative efforts to assure peace and stability. In order to 
do so, NATO members will continue to "promote long-term stability based on regional 
reconciliation, good neighborliness, confidence-building measures, regional cooperation, 
(and) a lasting resolution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons."249 
Additionally, the member states will continue to review their progress in implementing 
the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). The D O will provide the "forces and 
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capabilities the Alliance urgently requires to meet the security challenges of the 21s 
century by ensuring the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full 
spectrum of Alliance missions."250 In doing so, the Alliance and its members will be able 
to supply forces which are well, structured, interoperable, scalable, mobile, highly 
capable and readily deployable. Each of these initiative require the member nations to 
make "the most effective use of resources" and to find "innovative approaches to 
overcoming shortfalls in capabilities, taking advantage of national contributions and 
possible cooperative and r collective arrangements and mechanisms, including 
multinational, joint and common funding."251 Additionally, the member nations have 
made substantial progress on the development of the European Security and Defense 
Identity, Mediterranean Dialogue, Partnership for Peace, OSCE, reaction and response to 
NBC and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Alliance's Open Door Policy, but 
important work remains to be done as the member countries continue to place high 
priority on strengthening relationships with all participants in the Euro-Atlantic 
community. 
The member states of NATO stress in speech act 6 the effects of the terrorist 
attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001. This act resulted in the invocation of 
- f 
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Amidst this tragedy, NATO member states have 
"taken stock of NATO's broad agenda, and given further guidance on its 
implementation"252 and issued statements regarding NATO's response to terrorism and 
250
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its contribution to the campaign against terrorism. The member states call into account 
their commitment to forge a new relationship with Russia; their continued efforts in 
enlarging the Alliance; and reiterated their commitment to peaceful, stable and 
democratic countries, particularly those in South-East Europe. NATO member states 
have demonstrated that the events of 11 September have challenged the Alliance and the 
global security environment "in a variety of different, sometimes unpredictable, ways." 
Thus the Alliance and its member states need to have the ability to ensure that each 
country and its forces have the best capabilities to meet the challenges and are able to 
work with one another in a seamless way. The members of NATO have demonstrated 
they have the ability to interact with one another based upon their ability to adapt and 
facilitate a "comprehensive strategy to meet these challenges, adopting an appropriate 
mix of political and defense efforts."254 In this context, NATO member countries will 
continue to actively contribute to the development of agreements and measures in the 
particular field while pursuing proactive policies and missions which are flexible and 
enduring. 
In speech act 7 the member states confirm that they have continuously engaged 
and upheld their core commitments "to deter and defend against any threat of aggression 
against any NATO member state, as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty,"255 The Alliance has continuously engaged in upholding the security of its 
member countries and in doing so it has changed by expanding its agenda and engaging 
in selective out-of-area missions, such as in South-East Europe. In order to survive, 
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NATO member nations have strived to transform the Organization. In doing so; the 
member nations have pledged to fight against terrorism and become engaged in 
operations in Afghanistan. The member nations' commitment and involvement in 
Afghanistan represents a new chapter in the Organization's history. In order to keep 
abreast in the static global security environment, the members of NATO vow to carry out 
the following: 
• Field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain 
operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives; 
• Develop new and balanced capabilities within the Alliance, including strategic lift 
and modern strike capabilities, so that NATO can more effectively respond 
collectively to any threat of aggression against a member state; 
• Confirm the Alliance's commitment to remain open to new members, and 
enhance security in the Euro-Atlantic area; 
• Commit ourselves to continuing to work with the aspirants to help them make 
sufficient progress to be invited to begin accession negotiations, and undertaking 
internal preparations to ensure its readiness to accept new members; 
• Upgrade the political and practical dimensions of our Mediterranean Dialogue; 
and 
• Reconfirm commitments to a peaceful, stable, and democratic South-East Europe 
and operations in the Balkans.256 
Each of these efforts confirm that NATO member nations will continue to work to 
transform the Alliance, as "new, more substantive relationship with Partners" are formed 
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and cooperation efforts are amplified when "responding to new security challenges, 
including terrorism."257 
Finally, NATO member nations in speech act 8 confirm the Alliance's ongoing 
transformation in order to meet the needs of the '2.1st century global security environment, 
its threats, and challenges which impose on the security of member countries, their 
populations, territories, and forces. The member nations reaffirm the transformation of 
the Organization within the global security environment by welcoming seven new 
members to the Alliance; rejecting and condemning all acts of terrorism; confirming its 
leadership of ISAF^ outlining the Alliance's mission in the Balkans and South-East 
Europe; reconfirming its commitment to those partnerships made and continually 
enhancing cooperative efforts across the Euro-Atlantic and Mediterranean area; and 
supporting the aims of Proliferation Security Initiative and CFE Treaty.258 Finally, the 
members of NATO demonstrate that their "commitment to multilateralism through 
effective action and shared commitment to: the transatlantic link; NATO's fundamental 
security tasks including collective security; shared democratic values; and the United 
Nations Charter" has laid the path for the Alliance's transformation and survival in the 
global security environment.259 
Context of the Speech Acts 
This thesis relies upon Frederking's (2003) theory of rule-orientated 
constructivism to contextualize NATO's communiques within the global security 
environment. According to Frederking's theory, actors perform speech acts that 
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construct, invoke, or contest the collective security rules. For this study, in order for 
NATO member countries to interact within the global security environment and maintain 
the Alliance, the member countries have identified and adopted several rules. The 
member nations of the Alliance abide by the following rules: 
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens; 
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral 
commitment to use; 
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political relationships; 
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully; and 
e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary. 
• Each of these rules was designed to ensure stability and security for the Euro-Atlantic 
area, help the member countries effectively conduct out-of-area missions, and allow the 
existence and transformation of the Alliance within the context of the global security 
environment. 
Pragmatic Analysis 
Pragmatic analysis refers to "a linguistic level that relates contents ,to context."261 
In other words, pragmatic analysis is concerned with the way in which the meaning(s) or 
significance of a word(s) and/or phrase(s) are constructed within a particular context 
composed of interactions. Central to pragmatics is the fact that we can mean much 
more than we say. In order to assess the meanings of a particular word or phrase involves 
the generation Of propositions. The important point is that propositions, as inferences, are 
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based on a grammatical item or clausal structure phrase chosen, arid fall directly within 
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the realm of the speech act. 
Pragmatic analysis helps to generate all propositions associated with a speech act. 
Each proposition concerns those aspects which convey truth, appropriateness, and 
sincerity claims. Therefore pragmatics reveals how each speech act illustrated claims of 
validity and how each uses or builds upon the global security arrangements and the social 
rules associated. During an interaction, either a speech or activity, a rational actor 
conveys multiple understood propositions, and each of these propositions is "consensual 
and/or irrelevant to the specific issue of how to implement collective security rules." 
Throughout the course of this thesis, in order to understand the context in which NATO 
member states are functioning in, the collective security rules identified above should be 
reference. 
Assertions, Directives, and Commitments 
The pragmatic analysis of the speech acts located within the communiques from 
1996 through 2003 illustrates each invoked the use of several collective security rules. 
Within the overall pattern, each speech act generated a distinctive set of assertions, 
directives, and commitments. The paragraphs below briefly summarize the distinctive 
and unique assertions, directives, and commitments from each speech act. 
In speech act 1, NATO member states assert that the Alliance would uphold 
security and stability while taking a new shape. The new shape of the Alliance would 
reflect the fundamental changes in the security environment in Europe and the enduring 
vitality of the transatlantic partnership which underpins our endeavors. In order to do so, 
the member nations of the Alliance would have to commit to: 
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• Agreeing on a new structure command; 
• Making arrangements for the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI); 
• Keeping the Alliance open for new membership; 
• Strengthening cooperative relations with all Partners, especially those with Russia 
and the Ukraine; 
• Enhancing Mediterranean dialogue; and 
• Further enhancing political and defense efforts relating to conflict prevention, 
crisis management, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD).264 
Additionally, the member nations directed all members to ratify, accede, and fully 
implement NATO treaties and policies. The publication of this speech act confirmed that 
each member nation has a clear understanding of NATO's mission and the necessary 
steps needed to be taken in order to carry out the mission. 
In speech act 2, the members of NATO asserted the Alliance has upheld its 
mission through the reinforcement of peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, based 
upon on Allied solidarity and cohesion. Additionally, the member nations have asserted 
they have been able to maintain a strong transatlantic link and form new cooperative 
partnerships with other Euro-Atlantic nations; began to build an ESDI within NATO, and 
remained effective and vigilant for a full range of missions. In order to do continue with 
these assertions, the member nations of the Alliance would have to commit to: 
• Maintaining a strong transatlantic link while remaining open through the 
admission of new members; 
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• Upholding the cooperative partnerships with Euro-Atlantic nations, especially 
with Russia and the Ukraine; 
• Continuing the comprehensive process of NATO enlargement; 
• Building a ESDI within NATO; 
• Strengthening the OSCE as a primary instrument for early warning, conflict 
prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation as well as for 
enhancing cooperative security and advancing democracy and human rights; 
• Continuing to support the Alliance in the effectiveness which enable it for a full 
range of its missions; 
• Endorsing and continue with measures for the proliferation of WMD; and 
• Continuing to support all efforts to combat terrorism. 
NATO also directed its member nations and other partners to ratify, accede, and fully 
implement NATO treaties and policies. Each of these efforts illustrate NATO is in a 
period of transformation as it continues to broaden its agenda and engage in mission 
which are outside the traditional boundaries of Europe. Indeed, the Alliance and its 
member nations comprehend the urgency to transform in order to meet the security 
challenges of the global security environment. 
In speech act 3, the member nations assert that the Alliance is able to adapt and 
renew in order to meet the security challenges of the 21st. In order to do so, NATO 
members have committed the Alliance to carry out the following acts: 
( ' ' 
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• Developing a comprehensive package that will continue the enlargement process, 
operationalize our commitment to the open door policy and underscore our 
willingness to assist aspiring countries in meeting NATO standards; 
• Continuing with internal adaption; 
• Improving the political, civil and military aspects of the Alliance; 
• Preparing to expand NATO's efforts to address the evolving proliferation threat; 
and 
• Combating terrorism in accordance with our international commitments and 
national legislation.266 
To carry out each of these acts, NATO member states direct each of its members and 
other nation to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO treaties and policies. In short, 
the purpose of this speech act is twofold; first to acknowledge NATO's fifty year 
establishment, and secondly, to illustrate that the Alliance members have to continuously 
redefine their role in order to adapt, renew, and have the ability to meet the security 
challenges of the 21st century. This has allowed the Alliance and its member nations to 
take on new roles and operations while maintain a clear and stable mission. 
In speech act 4, the members of NATO point out that the Organization has been 
able to secure and stabilize the global security environment while still being able to 
transform to meet security challenges. The member countries asserts they have been able 
to do so by maintaining stability and security; ensuring the effectiveness of bilateral and 
multinational operations across the full range of Alliance missions; maintaining civil-
military relations; implementing robust practical and political support provided by 
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Partner countries; having the ability to define, adopt, and transform policies; and 
establishing a strong, stable and enduring partnerships within the framework of the 
Alliance. In order to continue to engage in each of these measures, the Alliance and its 
member nations will commit to: 
• Further adapting the Alliance to the new security environment while continuously 
maintaining security and stability; 
• Continuing to consider means to ensure an effective and coherent Alliance 
contribution to the efforts of the international community to prevent and defuse 
conflicts, and to make recommendations where and if appropriate; 
• Monitoring closely the situation in South-East Europe; 
• Continuing efforts in Kosovo and other areas of involvement for the Alliance; 
• Helping to establish a peaceful, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo; 
• Contributing to effective conflict prevention; 
• Reinforcing the Alliance's European pillar; 
• Remaining open to new members and encouraging applicants; 
• Continuing to attach importance to consultations and practical cooperation with 
Russia and the Ukraine; 
• Maintaining efforts aimed at reducing nuclear weapons; and 
• Reaffirming the determination to combat it in accordance with our international 
commitments and national legislation.267 , 
Each of these efforts are broad in their demeanors and efforts, thus the members direct 
the help of its partners and other nations to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO 
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treaties and policies;, encourage the leaders in Kosovo to work together and with the 
international community in the reconstruction of Kosovo and the establishment of a 
democratic society; urge Belgrade and the government of Montegro to resolve their 
differences in a peaceful and pragmatic way and refrain from any destabilizing measures; 
push Russia to open all avenues for a political solution to the conflict; and support the 
Ukraine to move forward with its democratic and economic reforms. NATO member 
nations have changed the course of the Organization's history, as each countries 
continues to improve its collaboration with other states, think about options for security 
actions and procedures, and strive to protect its strategic strengthand security. 
In speech act 5, NATO members demonstrate that the Alliance has been able to 
uphold and maintain stability and security. The members of NATO assert they have had 
the ability to do so by remaining strongly committed to the achievement of security, 
stability, peace, democracy and respect for human rights for its member countries and in 
Out-of-area missions, including South-East Europe and remain steadfast and adhere to 
policies and treaties. Additionally, the member nations continue to condemn violence 
and terrorism by vigorously pursuing out-of-area missions; continue to enable countries 
to work together to ensure their own security; further strengthening their military 
capabilities and to reinforcing the Alliance's European pillar; and maintain cooperative 
efforts to work with Russia and any situations which arise concerning the nation. To 
build upon these efforts NATO and its member countries will carry out the following 
commitments: 
• Promoting long-term stability based on regional reconciliation, good 
neighborliness, confidence-building measures, and regional cooperation; 
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• Continue working towards a peaceful, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and democratic 
for all member nations and in out-of-mission areas; 
• Providing sufficient resources to efficiently carry out policies, treaties, and out-of-
area missions; 
• Effectively using resources and finding innovative approaches to overcoming 
shortfalls in capabilities by taking advantage of national contributions and 
possible cooperative and collective arrangements and mechanisms, including 
multinational, joint and common funding; 
• To work for permanent arrangements to ensure full transparency, consultation and 
cooperation between member nations; 
• Intensifying consultation in times of crisis; 
• Continuing to provide advice, feedback and assistance to the aspiring countries on 
their preparations for possible future membership; and 
• Considering ways to strengthen the political and practical dimensions of our 
cooperative relations with all partners.268 
. ' _ . ( . • . • 
As such, the member states will continue to reach out and direct its members and other 
countries of the global security environment to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO 
treaties and policies and to subscribe to and adopt its principles, commitments, 
confidence-building measures and incentives. Additionally, NATO members will 
continue to call upon the representatives and leaders in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Herzegovina 
to carry out their duties responsibly and work together and in close cooperation with the 
international community and adhere to all treaties and policies; urge Russia and 
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Chechnya to cooperate in good faith to find a solution to the conflict; and encourage 
Ukraine to move forward on its current path of political and economic reform. NATO 
members will then be able to continue to pursue its current missions, including those 
endeavors in South-East Europe, while maintaining its partnerships and cooperative 
efforts in order to assure peace and stability. 
In speech act 6, NATO member states assert that in order to maintain stability and 
security in a post September 11th environment for the Alliance, its member nations and 
their, citizens, it is essential that confident and cooperative partnerships, based on shared 
democratic values and the shared commitment to a stable, peaceful and undivided Euro-
Atlantics, are upheld. Furthermore, it is asserted that each member nation needs to 
uphold current policies and treaties; continue to condemn all use of violence and 
terrorism for either military or political means; engage in current and future out-of-area 
missions; and reaffirm the necessity of having the capability to defend appropriately and 
effectively against threats. The September 11th attacks will be forever remembered as a 
'day of infamy' for all citizens around the world and in order to help prevent incidents of 
this level, the member countries commit to: 
• Upholding its allegiance to its member states and its policies regarding the attacks 
of 11 September 2001; 
• Exploring and developing new, effective mechanisms for consultation, 
cooperation, joint decision, and coordinated/joint action; 
• Continuing the enlargement process; 
• Developing a peaceful, stable and democratic South-East Europe and the Balkans; 
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• Promoting regional reconciliation and cooperation, good neighborliness, stable 
and secure borders, protection of rights of members of all ethnic groups and 
minorities, confidence-building measures, and lasting solution to the problem of 
refugees and displaced persons; 
• Continuing to denounce terrorism and all acts of violence; 
• Further broadening and strengthening cooperation in the framework of the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP); 
• Ensuring that Alliance forces have the best possible capabilities to meet these 
challenges and are able to work together seamlessly; 
• Continuing to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet these 
challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts; and 
• Finding a swift resolution of remaining issues between Russia and Georgia.269 
To carry out each of these objectives, the member states direct the help of its members 
and the defense community to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO treaties and 
policies and to continue to cooperate with the international community. Moreover, 
NATO member nations urge Russia and Chechnya to cooperate in good faith to find a 
solution to the conflict; encourage the elected leaders of Kosovo to exercise their new 
functions in strict compliance and carry out their duties responsibly and work together 
and in close cooperation with the international community and adhere to all treaties and 
policies; persuade the Ukraine to continue to take concrete steps to take its reform 
process forward; and finally, encourage the Partners to seek a more active relationship 
with the Alliance. Based upon the static global security environment and the attacks of 
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September 11th, the members of the Alliance will continue to adhere to its goals and 
rigorously pursue their commitments. 
In speech act 7, NATO member states assert that the Alliance has continued to 
transform in order maintain stability and security while striving to survive within the 
global security environment. Consequentially, the member nations assertively have 
remained steadfast in order to promote peaceful, stable, and democratic nations, including 
those countries in South-East Europe'while continuing to combat the threat of terrorism 
and preventing the use of WMD, along with deterrence and defense. Also, member 
nations continue to maintain out-of-area missions and field forces that can move quickly 
to wherever they are needed, sustain toperations over distance and time, and achieve their 
objectives. The member states continue to work with Russia and the Ukraine to enhance 
cooperation in addition to ensuring crisis are met with the most appropriate military 
response, effective crisis management is implemented, and upholding current policies and 
treaties. NATO member states have been able to do by directing its members and other 
nations in the global security environment to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO 
treaties and policies and to continue to cooperate with the international community; 
encouraging Russia to enhance its cooperation with NATO to facilitate our efforts to 
verify this claim as soon as possible; urging Russia and Chechnya to cooperate in good 
faith to find a solution to the conflict; supporting Croatia in their quest to continue to 
contribute to stability in the Balkans; persuading the Ukraine to implement the reforms 
required to achieve this objective and stand ready to continue to assist it in this regard; 
and continuing to call on the local authorities in all out-of-area missions to take on 
greater responsibility for and ownership of the process of implementing policies and 
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treatments. Each of these assertions and directives will be build upon as the member 
states commit to: 
• Acting on its core commitments to deter and defend against any threat of 
aggression against any NATO member state; 
• Adapting to be better able to perform its fundamental security tasks and to 
strengthen security right across the Euro-Atlantic area; 
• Strengthening national and collective capacities to protect our populations, 
territory and forces from any armed attack, including terrorist attack, directed 
from abroad; 
\ . 
• Working with member nations and Partners to deal with the threat posed by 
possible use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including their possible use 
by terrorists, and the means of their delivery; 
• Developing new and balanced capabilities within the Alliance; 
• Launching the next round of NATO enlargement; 
• Remaining open to new members, and enhancing security in the Euro-Atlantic 
area; . 
• Building a new, more substantive relationship with Partners; 
• Upgrading the political and practical dimensions of our Mediterranean Dialogue; 
• Promoting regional reconciliation and cooperation, protection of rights of 
members of all ethnic groups and minorities, confidence-building measures and a 
lasting solution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons; 
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• Adapting the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet the threats posed by the 
proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, adopting an appropriate mix of 
political and defense efforts; 
• Developing a peaceful, stable and democratic South-East Europe and the Balkans; 
and 
• Continuing to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet these 
challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts.270 
Each assertion, directive, and commitment provides evidence that the member nations 
have shifted their out-of-area policy and transformed the Alliance within the context of 
the global security environment in order to survive and deal with its challenges. Indeed, 
the member countries of the Alliance have stayed true to their core commitments "to 
deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state,"271 
while adopting an ever-broadening agenda and missions who are beyond the realm of the 
traditional European theater. 
Finally, member nations in speech act 8 assert that NATO has continued to serve 
as a keystone in the collective defense of the Euro-Atlantic area. Additionally, the 
Alliance is an essential transatlantic forum for security in the current global security 
environment. The Alliance's member countries and partners have patiently and tirelessly 
worked towards the on-going transformation of the Organization to meet the 21st century 
threats and challenges. The members of NATO assert they have done so by continuing to 
expand the Alliance and encouraging new members to join; continuing to combat 
terrorism; ensuring peace, stability, and reconstruction in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans; 
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continuing to help to improve the security environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
continuing to prevent the use of WMD, along with deterrence and defense; carrying out 
the full range of its missions and field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are 
needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives; continue 
developing relationships with Russia and the Ukraine; enhancing cooperation between 
the member nations and the EU; ensuring crisis were met with the most appropriate 
military response and effective crisis management is implemented; maintaining out-ofr 
area missions; and upholding current policies and treaties. In order for the Alliance to 
continue to transform in the global security environment, NATO member nations have 
committed to: 
• Preserving peace through its operations; 
• Spreading stability through its partnerships; 
• Reinforcing the community of shared values through the most robust round of 
enlargement in our history; 
• Using all means at its disposal and to cooperate fully with other international 
Organizations and with its Partners to fight terrorism; 
••• Assisting in the emergence of a united, sovereign country, integrated into the 
international community; 
• Developing a comprehensive strategy for NATO's engagement in Afghanistan, in 
close consultation with other International Organizations and the Afghan 
Transitional Authority; 
• Supporting territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the countries in the Balkans 
and help those countries to integrate fully into Euro-Atlantic structures; 
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• Enhancing cooperation between NATO and the EU; 
• Considering ways to further enhance relationships by generating a more ambitious 
and expanded framework; 
• Building on the progress between NATO and Russia, and NATO and the Ukraine; 
. ? Supporting arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to play 
a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives, including 
preventing the spread and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their 
means of delivery; 
• Encouraging multilateralism through effective action and our shared commitment 
to the transatlantic link; and 
• Implementing measures to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
Organization.272 
Furthermore, NATO member nations have directed its members to ratify, accede, and 
fully implement NATO treaties and policies and to continue to cooperate with the 
international community. The member states have also directed the defense community 
to encourage all parties in Kosovo to work constructively to meet the agreed standards; 
encourage regional cooperation among the Balkan countries; encourage Albania, Croatia 
and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to continue pursuing the reforms 
necessary to advance their candidacies for NATO membership; encourage Ukraine to 
pursue all reforms necessary to its goal of full Euro-Atlantic integration; and urge swift 
resolution of the outstanding issues between Georgia and Russia and call upon the parties 
to resume negotiations at an appropriately senior level. The member nations' devotion to 
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its mission and its on-going transformation are part of a process to "enhance the security 
of Alliance member countries and the future stability and prosperity of the Euro-Atlantic 
area as a whole."273 
The analysis of each assertion, directive, and commitment derived from each 
speech act reveals that NATO member states have adhered to its commitments as 
outlined in the North Atlantic Treaty while transforming its out-of-area policy to 
effectively deal with the global security environment. 
Explicit Performatives and Implicit Contents 
In the pragmatic analysis, each assertion, directive, and commitment are then 
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expressed as an "explicit performative," grouping the category and subcategory of each 
srjeech act. Then each speech act is identified for implicit contents (reflexive intentions, 
implicatures, and presuppositions)275 that can be inferred. In this sense, explicit or 
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274The propositions add 'hereby' to each speech act to stress the fundamental point of speech act theory that 
language is action. 
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 A reflexive intention is the proposition which specify implicitly conveyed intentions. Reflexive 
intentions differ depending on the type of speech. Assertions follows P is the case and the intentions are S 
believes that P and S wants H to believe that P. Directives follow Do X and the intentions are S believes 
that his utterance, in virtue his authority over H, constitutes sufficient reason for H to do X and S wants H 
to do X because of X's command. Commitments follow I will do Y and the intentions are S believes his 
utterance obligates him to do U on the condition that H indicates he wants S to do U; S wants Y on the 
condition that H indicate he wants S to do Y; and S wants H to believe (a) and (b). 
A implicature is a proposition which comes from Grice's cooperative principles, which includes 
the following maxim of conversation: 
The maxim of these propositions come from Grice's cooperative principle, which includes the 
following maxims of conversation: 
• The maxim of quality: Do not say what you believe to be false, and do not say anything for which 
you lack adequate evidence, 
• The maxim of quantity: Make your contribution as informative as is required for the current 
purposes of the exchange. 
• The maxim of relevance: Make your contributions relevant. 
• The maxim of manner: Avoid obscurity, avoid ambiguity, be brief and be orderly. 
A presupposition is an inference that needs to be true for a statement to be meaningful or have a 
truth value. Most suppositions have the characteristics of 'constancy under negation.' The classic example 
is as follows: 
' ••• The King of France is bald. 
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implicit contents of any utterance may cancel or even alter any of the beliefs of the 
member countries of the Alliance thereby affecting the collective security rules used. 
Because space is insufficient here to present the entire pragmatic analysis, there will only 
be brief list of implicit propositions of significance.276 A listing of the propositions I 
analyzed and generated can be found in Table 1 and should be referenced throughout the 
analysis. 
• The King of France is not bald. 
• The King of France exists. 
The first two statements help to suppose the third, even through the first two negate one another. This is 
consistent under negation. Most presuppositions in the pragmatic analysis have this property. 
276 For the pragmatic analysis in its entirety refer to the Appendices. 
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Pragmatic Analysis of NATO in Afghanistan 
Speech Act 
Speech Act 1 Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, and Enforcement 
Explicit Performative: 
a. The member nations hereby assert that the Alliance will uphold 
the security and stability while taking a new shape, reflecting the 
fundamental changes in the security environment in Europe and 
the enduring vitality of the transatlantic partnership which 
underpins our endeavors. 
b. The member nations hereby encourage the member states and 
other nations to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO 
policies and treaties. 
Reflective Intentions: 
a. Assertion: 
a. "The member nations believe that its must maintain 
security and stability while being able to evolve and 
survive in the current global security environment. 
b. The member nations want the Alliance to uphold its 
mission by carry out cooperative measures through 
political and military means. 
b. Directive 
1. The member nations believe that its utterance, in virtue 
of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient 
reason for to the member nations to ratify, accede and 
fully implement NATO treaties and policies. 
2. The member nations want its members to ratify, accede 
and fully implement NATO treaties and policies because 
of NATO's command. 
Implicatures: The intentions of the member nations are sincere and 
normative. 
Presuppositions: 
a. If the member nations preserve their political and military 
strength, ensuring its ability to carry out the full range of its 
mission, then the Alliance will be able to stabilize and secure the 
whole Euro-Atlantic area and the global security environment. 
b. If the member nations do not preserve their political and military 
strength, ensuring its ability to carry out the full range of its 
mission, then the Alliance will not be able to stabilize and secure 
in the whole Euro-Atlantic area and the global security 
environment. 
Speech Act 2 Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, Deterrence, and Enforcement 
Explicit Performative: 
a. The member nations hereby commits the Alliance to do the 
following: 
a. Continue with the comprehensive process of enlarging 
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Speech Act 3 
NATO; 
b. Continue to remain open through the admission of new 
members into the Alliance; 
c. Create a strong, stable, and enduring partnership with 
Russia and the Ukraine; , 
d. Continue efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
e. Endorse and continue with measure for the proliferation 
ofWMD;and 
f. Continue to support all efforts to combat terrorism. 
Reflective Intentions: 
a. Commitment: 
a. The member nations believe that its utterance obligates 
the Alliance to promote peace and stability in the Euro-
Atlantic area and the global security environment on the 
condition that the member countries continue with the 
comprehensive process of enlarging NATO; continue to 
remain open through the admission of new members into 
the Alliance; create a strong, stable, and enduring 
partnership with Russia and the Ukraine; continue efforts 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina; endorse and continue with 
measure for the proliferation of WMD; and continue to 
support all efforts to combat terrorism. 
b. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the 
directive on the condition that the member countries will 
be able to promote peace and security amongst 
themselves. 
c. The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and 
(b). 
Implicatures: The intentions of the member nations are sincere and 
normative. • 
Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, Deterrence, and Enforcement 
Explicit Performative: , 
a. The member nations hereby assert the Alliance is able to adapt, 
renew, and is ready to meet the security challenges of the 21st 




a. The member nations believe the Alliance must be able to 
adapt, renew, and is ready to meet the security challenges 
of the 21st century through security and stability 
throughout the global security environment. 
b. The member nations want the Alliance to believe it has 
the ability to adapt, renew, and has the ability to be ready 
to meet the security challenges in the global security 
environment while upholding security and stability. 
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Implicatures: The intentions of the member nations are siricere and 
normative. 
Presuppositions: 
a. If the member nations are able to adapt, renew, and is ready to 
meet the security challenges of the 21st century, the Alliance will 
be able to maintain security and stability for its member nations 
and throughout the global security environment. 
b. If the member nations are not able to adapt, renew, and is ready 
to meet the security challenges of the 21st century, the Alliance 
will not be able to maintain security and stability for its member 
nations and throughout the global security environment. 
Speech Act 4 Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of 
Force ' 
Explicit Performative: 
a. The member nations hereby assert the Alliance has been able to 
adapt, renew and is ready to meet the security challenges of the 
21s ' century by maintaining stability and security; ensuring the 
effectiveness of bilateral and multinational operations across the 
full range of Alliance missions; maintaining civil-military 
relations; implementing robust practical and political support 
provided by Partner countries; having the ability to define, 
adopt, and evolve policies; and establishing a strong, stable and 
enduring partnerships within the framework of the Alliance. 
b. The member nations hereby direct the following: 
a. Leaders in Kosovo to work together and with the 
international community in the reconstruction of Kosovo 
and the establishment of a democratic society; 
b. Russia to open all avenues for a political solution to the 
conflict; and 
c. Ukraine to move forward with its democratic and 
economic reforms. 
c. The member nations hereby commit to the following: 
a. Monitor closely the situation in South-East Europe; 
b. Continue efforts in Kosovo and other areas of 
involvement of the Alliance; 
c. Help to establish a peaceful, multi-ethnic and democratic 
Kosovo; and 
d. Continue to attach importance to consultations and 
practical cooperation with Russia and the Ukraine. 
Reflective Intentions: 
a. Assertion: 
a. The member nations believe the Alliance has been able 
to adapt, renew and is ready to meet the security 
challenges of the 21s ' century. 
b. The member nations want the Alliance to believe it has 
adapted, renewed, and is ready in the global security 
117 
environment based upon the Alliance's ability to 
maintain stability and security; ensuring the effectiveness 
of bilateral and multinational operations across the full 
range of Alliance missions; maintaining civil-military 
relations; implementing robust practical and political 
support provided by Partner countries; having the ability 
to define, adopt, and evolve policies; and establishing a 
v strong, stable and enduring partnerships within the 
framework of the Alliance. 
b. Directive: 
a. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of 
its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient 
reason for leaders to work together and with the 
international community in the reconstruction of Kosovo 
and the establishment of a democratic society. 
i. The member nations want the leaders of Kosovo 
to work together and with the international 
community in the reconstruction of Kosovo, and 
the establishment of a democratic society because 
of NATO's command. 
b. The member nations believes in its utterance, in virtue of 
its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient 
reason for Russia to open all avenues for a political 
solution to the conflict. 
i. The member nations want Russia to open all 
avenues for a political solution to the conflict 
because of NATO's command. 
c. The member nation believes in its utterance, virtue of its 
authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason 
for the Ukraine to move forward with its democratic and 
economic reforms. 
i. The member nations want the Ukraine to move 
L forward with its democratic and economic 
reforms because of NATO' s command. 
c. Commitment: 
a. The member nations believe its utterance obligates the 
Alliance to adapt, renew and is ready to meet the security 
challenges of the 21st century on the condition that the 
member countries want to maintain stability and security; 
ensure the effectiveness of bilateral and multinational 
operations across the full range of Alliance missions; 
maintain civil-military relations; implement robust 
practical and political support provided by Partner 
countries; have the ability to define, adopt, and evolve 
policies; and establish a strong, stable and enduring 





The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the 
directives on the condition that the member nations 
would be able to maintain the ability to adapt, renew, and 
have the ability to be ready to meet the security 
challenges in the global security environment while 
upholding security and stability 
The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and 
(b). 
The intentions of the member nations are sincere and 
Speech Act 5 Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of 
Force 
Explicit Performative: 
a. The member nations hereby commit to the following: 
a. Promote long-term stability based on regional 
reconciliation, good neighborliness, confidence-building 
measures, regional cooperation, a lasting resolution to the 
problem of refugees and displaced persons, and 
cooperation; 
b. Continue working towards a peaceful, multi-ethnic, 
multi-cultural and democratic for all member nations 
and in out-of-mission areas where all its people, 
irrespective of ethnic origin or religion, can live in peace 
and security and enjoy universal human rights and 
freedoms on an equal basis, including through 
participation in democratic institutions; 
c. Providing sufficient resources to ensure its 
implementation to efficiently carry out policies, treaties, 
and out-of-area mission; 
d. Effectively use resources and find innovative approaches 
to overcoming shortfalls in capabilities, taking advantage 
of national contributions and possible cooperative and 
collective arrangements and mechanisms, including 
multinational, joint and common funding. 
e. To work for permanent arrangements to ensure full 
transparency, consultation and cooperation between 
member nations, especially in regards to NATO and the 
EU; 
f. Intensify consultation in times of crisis; 
g. Continue to provide advice, feedback and assistance to 
the aspiring countries on their preparations for possible 
future membership; and 
h. Consider ways to strengthen the political and practical 




a. The member nations believe its utterance obligates the 
Alliance to be able to maintain and uphold its original 
mission while being able to adapt, renew, and be ready to 
meet the challenges of the global security environment 
on the condition that its member countries want to 
promote long-term stability based on regional 
reconciliation, good neighborliness, confidence-building 
measures, regional cooperation, a lasting resolution to the 
problem of refugees and displaced persons, and 
cooperation; continue working towards a peaceful, multi-
ethnic, multi-cultural and democratic for all member 
nations and in out-of-mission areas where all its people, 
irrespective of ethnic origin or religion, can live in peace 
and security and enjoy universal human rights and 
freedoms on an equal basis, including through 
participation in democratic institutions; provide sufficient 
resources to ensure its implementation to efficiently carry 
out policies, treaties, and out-of-area mission; effectively 
use resources and find innovative approaches to 
overcoming shortfalls in capabilities, taking advantage of 
national contributions and possible cooperative and 
collective arrangements and mechanisms, including 
multinational, joint and common funding; work for 
permanent arrangements to ensure full transparency, 
consultation and cooperation between member nations, 
especially in regards to NATO and the EU; intensify 
consultation in times of crisis; continue to provide 
advice, feedback and assistance to the aspiring countries 
on their preparations for possible future membership; and 
consider ways to strengthen the political and practical 
dimensions of our cooperative relations with all partners. 
b. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the 
directives on the condition that the member nations will 
be able to maintain and uphold its original mission while 
being able to adapt, renew, and be ready to meet the 
challenges of the global security environment. 
c. The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and 
(b). 
Implicatures: The intentions of the member countries are sincere and 
normative. 
Speech Act 6 Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of 
Force 
Explicit Performative: 
a. The member nation hereby assert in order to uphold and 
maintain stability and security in a post 9-11 environment for the 
Alliance, its members nations and their citizens it is essential 
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that confident and cooperative partnerships, based on shared 
democratic values and the shared commitment to a stable, 
peaceful and undivided Euro-Atlantics are upheld; continuing to 
uphold current policies and treaties; condemning all use of 
violence and terrorism for either military or political means; 
continue to engage in current and future out-of-area mission; and 
reaffirming the necessity of having the capability to defend 
appropriately and effectively against threats, 
b. The member nations hereby commit to the following: 
a. Upholding it's allegiance to its member states and its 
policies regarding the attacks of 11 September 2001; 
b. Explore and develop, in the coming months, new, 
effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, joint 
decision, and coordinated/joint action; 
i c. To develop a peaceful, stable and democratic South-East 
Europe and the Balkans; 
d. Continue to denounce terrorism and all acts of violence; 
e. Further broaden and strengthen cooperation in the 
framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
(EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP); 
f. Ensure that Alliance forces have the best possible 
capabilities to meet these challenges and are able to work 
together seamlessly; and 
g. Continue to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy 
to meet these challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of 
political and defense efforts. 
Reflective Intentions: 
a. Assertion: . 
a. The member nations believe that the Alliance needs to be 
able to uphold and maintain stability and security in the 
post 9-11 in order to meet the challenges of the global 
security environment. 
b. The member nations wants the Alliance to be able to 
uphold and maintain stability and security in the post 9-
11 environment by being confident and cooperative 
partnerships, based on shared democratic values and the 
shared commitment to a stable, peaceful and undivided 
Euro-Atlantics are upheld; continuing to uphold current 
policies and treaties; condemning all use of violence and 
terrorism for either military or political means; continue 
to engage in current and future out-of-area mission; and 
reaffirming the necessity of having the capability to 
defend appropriately and effectively against threats. 
b. Commitment: 
a. The member nations believe its utterance obligates the 
Alliance to be able to be able to uphold and maintain 
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stability and security in the post 9-1.1 in order to meet the 
challenges of the global security environment on 
condition that the member nations indicate they would 
uphold its allegiance to its member states and its policies 
regarding the attacks of 11 September 2001; explore and 
develop, in the coming months, new, effective 
mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, joint decision, 
and coordinated/joint action; continuing the enlargement 
process; develop a peaceful, stable and democratic 
South-East Europe and the Balkans; continue to 
denounce terrorism and all acts of violence; further 
broaden and strengthen cooperation in the framework of 
the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the 
Partnership for Peace (PfP); ensure that Alliance forces 
have the best possible capabilities to meet these 
challenges and are able to work together seamlessly; and 
continue to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy 
to meet these challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of 
political and defense efforts. 
b. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the 
directives on the condition that the member nations will 
be able to uphold and maintain stability and security in 
the post 9-11 in order to meet the challenges of the global 
security environment. 
c. The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and 
(b). 
Implicatures: The intentions of the member nations are sincere and 
normative. 
Presuppositions: 
a. If the member nations are able to uphold and maintain stability 
and security in the post 9-11 environment, then the Alliance will 
be able to maintain security and stability for its member nations 
and throughout the global security environment. 
b. If the member nations are not able to uphold and maintain 
stability and security in the post 9-11 environment, then the 
Alliance will not be able to maintain security and stability for its 
member nations and throughout the global security environment. 
Speech Act 7 Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of 
Force 
Explicit Performative: 
a. The member nations hereby commit to the following: 
a. Act on its core commitments to deter and defend against 
any threat of aggression against any NATO member 
state; 
b. Adapt to be better able to perform its fundamental 
security tasks and to strengthen security right across the 
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Euro-Atlantic area; 
c. Strengthen national and collective capacities to protect 
our populations, territory and forces from any armed 
attack, including terrorist attack, directed from abroad; 
d. Work with member nations and Partners to deal with the 
threat posed by possible use of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), including their possible use by 
terrorists, and the means of their delivery; 
e. Develop new and balanced capabilities within the 
Alliance; 
f. Build a new, more substantive relationship with Partners; 
g. Upgrade the political and practical dimensions of Our 
Mediterranean Dialogue; 
h. Promote regional reconciliation and cooperation, 
protection of rights of members of all ethnic groups and 
minorities, confidence-building measures and a lasting 
solution to the problem of refugees and 
i. Continue to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy 
to meet these challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of 
political and defense efforts. 
Reflective Intentions: 
a. Commitment: 
a. The member nations believe its utterance obligates the 
Alliance to be able to maintain security and stability for 
its member nations and in out-of area-mission in order to 
meet the challenges of the global security environment 
on the condition that the member nations to act on its 
core commitments to deter and defend against any threat 
of aggression against any NATO member state; adapt to 
be better able to perform its fundamental security tasks 
and to strengthen security right across the Euro-Atlantic 
area; strengthen national and collective capacities to 
protect our populations, territory and forces from any 
armed attack, including terrorist attack, directed from 
abroad; work with member nations and Partners to deal 
with the threat posed by possible use of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), including their possible use by 
terrorists, and the means of their delivery; develop new 
and balanced capabilities within the Alliance; build a 
new, more substantive relationship with Partners; 
upgrade the political and practical dimensions of our 
Mediterranean Dialogue; promote regional reconciliation 
and cooperation, protection of rights of members of all 
ethnic groups and minorities, confidence-building 
measures and a lasting solution to the problem of 
refugees and continue to adapt the Alliance's 
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comprehensive strategy to meet these challenges, 
adopting an appropriate mix of political and defense 
efforts. 
b. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the 
directives on the condition that the member nations will 
be able to maintain security and stability for its member 
nations and in out-of area-mission in order to meet the 
challenges of the global security environment 
c. The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and 
(b). 
Implicatures: The intentions of the member nations are sincere and 
normative. 
Speech Act 8 Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of 
Force 
Explicit Performative: 
a. The North Atlantic Alliance remains the basis of our collective 
security and the essential transatlantic forum for security. 
Today, we took stock of NATO's ongoing transformation to 
meet 21st century threats and challenges to the security of our 
populations, territory and forces, from wherever they may come, 
and gave direction on work still to be done thus the member 
nations need to continue expand the Alliance and encourage new 
members to join; continue to combat terrorism; ensure peace, 
stability and reconstruction in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans; 
continue to help to improve the security environment in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina; continue to prevent the use of WMD, along 
with deterrence and defense; to carry out the full range of its 
missions and field forces that can move quickly to wherever they 
are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and 
achieve their objectives; continue to develop the relationships 
with Russia and the Ukraine; enhance cooperation between the 
member nations and the EU; ensuring crisis are met with the 
most appropriate military response and effective crisis 
management is implemented; continue to maintenance out-of-
area missions; and uphold current policies and treaties.. 
a. The member nations hereby commit to the following: 
a. Preserve peace through its operations; spread stability 
through its partnerships; and reinforce our community of 
shared values through the most robust round of 
enlargement in our history. 
b. Use all means at its disposal and to cooperate fully with 
other international Organizations and with its Partners to 
fight terrorism; 
c. Assist in the emergence of a united, sovereign country, 
integrated into the international community; 
d. Develop a comprehensive strategy for NATO's 
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engagement in Afghanistan, in close consultation with 
other International Organizations and the Afghan 
Transitional Authority; 
e. Support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty 6f all 
the countries in the Balkans and help those countries to 
integrate fully into Euro-Atlantic structures; 
f. Continue with the enlargement of NATO; , • 
g. Enhancing cooperation between NATO and the EU; 
h. Consider ways to further enhance relationships by 
generating a more ambitious and expanded framework; 
i. Build on the progress between NATO and Russia, and 
NATO and the Ukraine; 
j . Closely follow the development of events in Georgia and 
support the independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Georgia; 
k. Support farms control, disarmament and non-
proliferation will continue to play a major role in the 
achievement of the Alliance's security objectives, 
including preventing the spread and use of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery; 
1. Multilateralism through effective action and our shared 
commitment to: the transatlantic link; and 
m. Implementation of measures to enhance the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the Organization. 
Reflective Intentions: 
a. Assertion: 
a. The member nations believe the Alliance is the basis of 
collective security and the essential transatlantic forum 
for security and as such it needs to maintain security and 
stability for its member nations and Partners in order to 
meet the challenges of the global security environment. 
b. The member nations want the Alliance to maintain 
security and stability for member nations and Partners by 
taking stock of NATO's ongoing transformation to meet 
21st century threats and challenges to the security of our 
populations, territory and forces, from wherever they 
may come, and gave direction on work still to be done 
thus the member nations needs to continue expand the 
Alliance and encourage new members to join; continue 
to combat terrorism; ensure peace, stability and 
reconstruction in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans; 
continue to help to improve the security environment in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina; continue to prevent the use of 
WMD, along with deterrence and defense; to carry out 
the full range of its missions and field forces that can 
move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain 
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operations over distance and time, and achieve their 
objectives; continue to develop the relationships with 
Russia and the Ukraine; enhance cooperation between 
the member nations and the EU; ensuring crisis are met 
with the most appropriate military response and effective 
crisis management is implemented; continue to 
maintenance out-of-area missions; and uphold current 
policies and treaties, 
b. Directive: \ 
a. The member nations believes in its utterance, in virtue of 
its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient 
reason for the member nations to ratify, accede and fully 
implement NATO treaties and policies. 
i. The member nations want its members to ratify, 
accede and fully implement NATO treaties and 
policies because of NATO's command. 
b. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of 
its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient 
reason to encourage all parties in Kosovo to work 
constructively to meet the agreed standards; 
i. The member nations want the Alliance to 
encourage all parties in Kosovo to work 
constructively to meet the agreed standards 
because of NATO's command. 
c. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of 
its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient 
reason to encourage regional cooperation among the 
Balkan countries; 
ii. NATO wants its member nations to encourage 
regional cooperation among the Balkan countries 
because of NATO's command. 
d. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of 
its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient 
reason to encourage Albania, Croatia and the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to continue pursuing 
the reforms necessary to advance their candidacies for 
NATO membership. 
iii. The member nations wants the Alliance to 
encourage Albania, Croatia and the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to continue 
pursuing the reforms necessary to advance their 
candidacies for NATO membership because of 
NATO's command. 
e. The member nation believe in its utterance, in virtue of 
its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient 
reason to encourage the Ukraine to pursue all reforms 
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necessary to its goal of full Euro-Atlantic integration, 
iv. The member nations want the Alliance to 
encourage the Ukraine to pursue all reforms 
necessary to its goal of full Euro-Atlantic 
integration, 
f. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of 
its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient 
reason to urge swift resolution of the outstanding issues 
between Georgia and Russia and call upon the parties to 
resume negotiations at an appropriately senior level. 
i. The member nations want the Alliance to urge 
swift resolution of the outstanding issues between 
Georgia and Russia and call upon the parties to 
resume negotiations at an appropriately senior 
level, 
c. Commitment: 
a. The member nation believe its utterance obligates the 
Alliance to be able to maintain security and stability for 
its member nations and in put-of area-mission in order to 
meet the challenges of the global security environment 
' on the condition that the member nations strive to 
preserve peace through its operations; spread stability 
through its partnerships; and reinforce our community of 
shared values through the most robust round of 
enlargement in our history; use all means at its disposal 
and to cooperate fully with other international 
Organizations and with its Partners to fight terrorism; 
assist in the emergence of a united, sovereign country, 
integrated into the international community; develop a 
comprehensive strategy for NATO's engagement in 
Afghanistan, in close consultation with other 
International Organizations and the Afghan Transitional 
Authority; support for the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of all the countries in the Balkans and help 
those countries to integrate fully into Euro-Atlantic 
structures; continue with the enlargement of NATO; 
enhancing cooperation between NATO and the EU; 
consider ways to further enhance relationships by 
generating a more ambitious and expanded framework; 
build on the progress between NATO and Russia, and 
NATO and the Ukraine; closely follow the development 
of events in Georgia and support the independence, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia; support 
farms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will 
continue to play a major role in the achievement of the 
Alliance's security objectives, including preventing the 
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spread and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
and their means of delivery; multilateralism through 
effective action and our shared commitment to: the 
transatlantic link; and implementation of measures to 
enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
Organization. 
b. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the 
directives on the condition that the member nations will 
be able to maintain security and stability for its member 
nations and in out-of area-mission in order to meet the 
challenges of the global security environment 
c. The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and 
(b). 
Implicatures: The intentions of the member nations are sincere and 
normative. 
Table 1: Pragmatic Analysis of NATO's Communiques 
128 
The pragmatic analysis for this thesis, which generated explicit performatives and 
implicit contents, revealed several patterns. The first pattern is connected to the use of 
collective security rules. In speech act 1, the member nations justify their speech act with 
the collective security rules of Identity (We are fellow citizens), Security (Security is 
based on multilateral commitment to use military capability; Security is based on political 
relationships), and Enforcement (We will resolve conflicts peacefully). In speech act 2, 
the member nations justify their speech acts by building upon the rules of speech 1 and 
adding the rule of Deterrence (Do not break the rules of our community). Finally, in the 
remaining speech acts (3 through 8), the member nations justify their speech acts with the 
collective security rules of Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of Force 
(The use of force is sometimes necessary). 
NATO member states recognition and utilization of collective security rules 
allows the Alliance to engage and participate in the global security environment. The use 
of the rules illustrates a relationship between theoretical application and actions. Thus 
the member nations' adoption of the collective security rules constitutes the overlapping 
nature of the social arrangements of the security environment and provides a means to 
survive and interact. Each rule provides significance, established a basis for criteria, and 
creates the conditions which member nations have continued the Alliance's role in the 
global security environment while continuing to transform. 
A further look into the pragmatics of the speech acts via the use of the explicit 
performatives, reflective intentions, and presuppositions brings to light the member states 
dedication to the original mission of the Alliance and highlights both the member nations 
and the Alliance ability to transform and adapt. In speech acts 1 and 2, the member 
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nations assert it is maintaining its original commitments and mission, but the Alliance is 
in a state of reform and transformation. By providing the basis for the collective security 
and preserving a balance in the Euro-Atlantic area throughout the 1990s, NATO member 
countries have continued to preserve its liberty and sovereignty. NATO member states 
are building upon the foundation it has created in order to fulfill its core functions, in 
addition to assuming new tasks. These measures include the enlargement process of the 
Alliance; creating a strong and stable partnership with Russia; continue engagement in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina; and measures to effectively deal with violence and terrorism. 
It is apparent in speech acts 3, 4, and 5, the NATO member nations have forged 
ahead to equip the Alliance for both security challenges and opportunities of the 21st 
century. It is evident that the Alliance needs to adapt, renew, and must be ready to deal 
with the modern global security environment as well as be able to guide its future 
political and military developments. Reaffirming the importance of the transatlantic link 
and of maintaining the military capabilities of the Alliance, the member nations commit 
to its broad approach to security and stability, specifically ESDI; conflict prevention and 
crisis management; partnership, cooperation and dialogue; enlargement; and arms 
control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The adoption of the new Strategic Concepts 
is the principal formal statement of the Alliance's objectives and the wide range of 
political and military means that constitutes the member nations' policy to achieve them. 
Indeed the conceptual context lays the groundwork for the member nations and the 
Alliance's gradual transformation internally and externally. In short, it allows the 
member nations to respond to the new challenges of the global security environment 
while continuing the process of adaption, gradual transformation, and institutionalism of 
• ) 
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policies which enable the Organization to assume a large array of obligations and 
responsibilities. 
Speech act 6 illustrates that since the establishment of NATO, the member 
countries have continually been effective in the deterrence and defense against the threat 
of war. The primary objective of the Alliance remains guaranteeing the security and 
territorial integrity of its member states and their citizens. Although the task of 
deterrence and collective security has remained unchanged, a different security situation 
has arisen since 1996. The development of a new global security environment has 
allowed the Alliance military forces to take on new roles in addition to fulfilling their 
primary purposes. For example, the Alliance forces have been increasingly involved in 
missions and operations, most notably in Kosovo and the Balkans. However, with the 
surfacing of new threats and in particular the impact of the terrorist attacks of 11 
September 2001, NATO's military and political policies and activities have continued to 
expand and transformed. Speech act 6 depicts the transformation of the member nations 
in terms of developing the necessary capabilities to undertake its tasks and further 
adaption alongside institutionalization of structures and procedures to reflect the needs of 
the global security environment. 
Since September 11th, NATO and its member nations have continued to change 
by adapting and transforming the roles of its allied military forces and its defense posture 
and policies to reflect the global security environment. Speech act 7 asserts that the 
member states continue to act on their core commitment to deter and defend against any 
threat of aggression against NATO member states. The analysis revealed the member 
states' commitment to war on terrorism and their engagement in the out-of-area mission 
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in Afghanistan. This new commitment signals a historical step in NATO's history by 
becoming involved in a mission which is outside of the traditional boundaries of Europe. 
The members of the Alliance also are committed to strengthening national and collective 
policies; continuing to promote substantive relationships with member countries; and 
promoting regional reconciliation and cooperation. In sum, these commitments represent 
a milestone in NATO's transformation and further illustrate gradual institutionalism of 
NATO member countries' attitudes and policies within the global security environment. 
Finally, speech act 8 asserts that the Alliance remains the basis of collective 
security in the global security environment and is an essential transatlantic forum for 
security and defense. The speech act illustrates that the structures and arrangements 
which have been built since 1996 have not only enabled member countries to benefit 
from the political, military and resource advantages of collective action and collective 
defense but allows the member states to remain flexible, mobile, and maintain composure 
of multi-nationality. Additionally the arrangements are based on a gradual 
institutionalization of an integrated structure; common funding and operational planning; 
multinational formation; an integrated air defense system (such as AW ACS) balance of 
roles amongst the member states; common standards and procedures; and infrastructure, 
armament, and logistics cooperation.277 The assertions, directives, and commitments of 
the member nations illustrate the gradual transformation and institutionalization of the 
Alliance in order to promote stability, peace, and security in the global security 
environment of the 21st century. In short, the net effect of each speech act illustrates that 
the member countries of the Alliance are gradually transforming themselves and 
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institutionalizing procedures, policies, and structures. This transformation has 
substantially affected NATO's agenda and shifted the Alliance's policy regarding out-of-
area missions.
 x i; 
Argument Analysis 
The argument analysis formalizes "the alternating, context-constructing flow of 
argumentative dialogue."278 This type of analysis is suppose to show the proponents of a 
thesis, which then forms categories or 'proviso' assertions, these may be countered by 
• 970 
'cautious' or 'proviso' denials of the assertions. However, based upon the consensus 
decision-making process of NATO, the speech acts reveal no disputes which may have 
been generated by the pragmatic analysis. In this context, each speech act follows the 
beliefs and norms of/the member nations of NATO. Each is a policy statement and a 
testament for shift in NATO's policy regarding out-of-area missions. Each speech act 
accounts for the collective security rules and arrangements in the development of the 
global security environment. , 
Summary of Findings 
This chapter has briefly outlined NATO, its structures, its major players and 
explored the history of Afghanistan and the member nations' policy toward out-of-area 
missions and operations, This information provided the background information needed 
to conduct the analysis. This analysis has proposed dialogical analysis as a method for 
analyzing NATO's out-of-area policy. This methodology combines the knowledge of 
historical background and the linguistic analysis of the speech acts to test hypotheses. By 
( . ' . ' " ' • ' , . 
tackling the assertion, directive, and commitment discourses and the background 
278
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assumptions (which make the speech acts understandable), dialogical analysis illustrates 
a deeper and more refined understandings of member nations' attitudes, policies and 
actions of the Alliance from 1996 to 2003. This allows for elaborate understandings of 
NATO's policy regarding out-of-area which played significant role in the Alliance's 
involvement in the Afghanistan 2001 operations. 
The use of dialogical analysis was used in an analysis of eight speech acts 
obtained from the communiques published by the North Atlantic Council. A surface 
reading of each speech act supports the contention that the member nations have 
progressively expanded the Alliance's missions and operations since 1996 while 
gradually institutionalizing its procedures, policies, and structures. However, a deeper 
contextual reading of each of the speech acts revealed (a) a chronological timeline of the 
member nations' policies and activities regarding missions and operations in the global 
security environment from 1996 to 2003, (b) the member states' recognition and 
utilization of collective security rules, and (c) the transformative280 nature of the member 
states in conjunction with the Alliance within the global security environment. 
The speech acts, spanning between 1996 through 2003, have revealed a detailed 
timeline of policies and activities the members nations have directed and committed to. 
Recall from the speech acts that there were several monumental events which the 
member states have engaged in between 1996 to 2003. Between 1996 and 1997, the 
member states launched the Mediterranean Dialogue; continued to enhance the 
Partnership for Peace Program alongside strengthening its "European pillar;" conducted 
air operations against Bosnian Serb forces; and deployed military forces in Bosnia and 
280
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character. 
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Herzegovina. Additionally, the members of NATO signed a special NATO-Russia 
agreement and NATO-Ukraine Charter while reinforcing their relationship with its 
partner countries. In parallel, in 1998 the Taliban regime came to power in Afghanistan. 
The 1999 was marked with the celebration of NATO's 50th anniversary; the signing of 
three new member countries; the adoption of a new Strategic Concept; NATO's air 
campaign to end ethnic cleansing in Kosovo; and the deployment of a NATO-led forces 
c • • 
in Kosovo. The end of 1999 and the beginning of 2000 were marked with the ratification 
• • ' • • . ' 
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and SALT II by Russia. Under the dark cloud of 
the large-scale terrorist attacks perpetrated against the U.S. in 2001, the member states 
invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history; the member nations continued with their 
institutionalize efforts within the Alliance; the member countries deployed forces to the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; and the Alliance members became involved in 
an international coalition against terrorism in Afghanistan. In 2002, the member nations 
formalized when and where it is necessary to fight terrorism; introduced major reforms to 
prepare the Alliance against major threats and challenges; and the member states worked 
with Russian representatives to create NATO-Russia Council whose aim was to 
strengthen relations between Russia and the member countries. The end of the analysis 
closes with the year of 2003. In 2003, the member nations streamlined its military 
command structure; NATO became the leader of the ISAF in Afghanistan; and the first 
NATO Response Force prototype was launched. The sequential events found in the 
speech acts illustrate the member nations' shift in policy regarding out-of-area. 
In short, the Alliance is an environment which brings the member countries 
together for a common purpose. In order for the member countries to survive in the 
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global security environment, they along with the Alliance must change. As a result the 
members of NATO have transformed gradually by formalizing policies, procedures, and 
out-of-area activities. The transformative nature of the member countries has led NATO 
to become involved on a larger scale in the global security environment. The timeline of 
events reveals that the member countries change gradually as they respond to the 
challenges of the global security environment. It is indeed the transformation of member 
nations' policy of out-of-area which contributed to the Alliance's engagement in 
operations in Afghanistan in 2001. 
NATO's active participation in the global security environment through 
transformation and adoption of policy, and involvement in selective out-of-area missions 
depicts an understanding and use of collective security rules by the member countries. 
The collective security rules adopted by the member nations help to merge the bridge 
between theoretical application and actions. The adherence of the collective security 
rules by the member nations have helped to lay the foundation for the Alliance's 
interaction within the global security environment and help to dictate its policies and 
actions. Each rule of the Alliance - Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use 
of Force - allows the member states to understand the overlapping relationships that are 
present within the global security environment. Adherence to collective security rules 
and an understanding of the social arrangements in the global security environment has 
allowed the member nations to comprehend what logics are guiding the global security 
environment. This in return has allowed the member countries to understand and 
formulate policy accordingly. The collective security rules of the Alliance adopted by the 
member states are required in order stabilize and secure themselves within the global 
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security environment. Without a doubt, the collective security rules of the Alliance 
played a critical factor in NATO's policy shift in out-of-area, wherein the member 
countries commitment to efforts in Afghanistan. 
The dialogical analysis of the speech acts has verified the member nations' 
transformative and institutional nature within the global security environment. Based 
upon the chronological timeline of NATO's policies and activities in relation to the 
global security environment from 1996 to 2003 and NATO's recognition and utilization 
of the collective security rules, the Alliance is gradually transforming and the member 
nations are institutionalizing its policies, procedures, and out-of-area missions. Each of 
these elements converged to lead NATO to become involved in Afghanistan. In sum, the 
analysis of NATO's communiques illustrates that the institutional attitude of the member 
states towards out-of-area missions lead NATO to its involvement in Afghanistan. 
The transformative and institutional nature of NATO member nations has allowed 
the Alliance to maintain its historical roots and continue to survive in the global security 
environment of the 21st century. Additionally, this analysis has confirmed Frederking's 
conclusion that 11 September was not a driving factor which led NATO involvement in 
Afghanistan. This analysis illustrates that attacks of September 11th and its aftershocks 
are not a substantial driving force to cause an immediate rearrangement of the collective 
security rules or cause a complete overhaul of policy within the Alliance. Rather 
September 11th only exacerbated the already present tension evident in the global security 
environment. In accordance with the tenets of Frederking and this analysis, uncertain 
events and ad hoc attitudes do not dictate the attitude of member countries regarding the 
out-of-area policy. Nevertheless these events help to contribute to the member nations' 
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continual adherence to gradualism and institutionalization which help the countries to 
deal effectively with the out-of-area policy and at large with the threats and challenges of 
the global security environment. 
Finally, the methodology of this thesis has revealed several factors and led to 
several conclusions. First, the use of dialogical analysis illustrates this methodology is a 
viable method used in the study of language. In this sense, dialogical analysis has the 
ability to help develop theoretical approaches into practical applications. The 
methodology of this thesis is an approach to analyze language, its affects, and influence 
on social interactions within global security environment. 
Secondly, the use of this methodology has revealed strengths and weakness of the 
research. On one hand, the methodology has helped to further the understanding of 
NATO's consensus decision-making process; provided a definition of global security; 
allowed for the use of primary resources to explain what has affected the shift in policy; 
and created a consistent theoretical framework. On the other hand, the dialogical analysis 
of the NATO communiques does not allow for formal argument analysis. Since, the 
analysis is unable to reveal any disputes which may be present within the speech acts, the 
entire picture of the communique cannot be seen and the actions throughout the 
consensus decision-making process are absent. The reader is led to believe that 
transformation of NATO is picturesque when regarding the member nations' attitudes 
and shift of out-of-area policy; however the consultation and the decision-making process 
are lengthy and difficult to navigate at times. In short, the reader is unable to fully 
comprehend the full meaning of the communiques, the decision-making process, and 
fundamentally the transformation of NATO and its member nations. 
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Thirdly, the use of dialogieal analysis has revealed a chronological timeline of the 
member nation's policies and activities regarding out-of-afea missions from 1996 to 
2003, the member countries' recognition and utilization of collective security rules, and 
the transformative and institutional nature of the member states in conjunction with the 
Alliance within the context of the global security environment. Each of these elements 
contributes to the rule-orientated constructivist theory by acknowledging the use of 
language by the member states. This use of language helps to establish a pattern of rules 
which helps the Alliance comprehend and recognize the existence of particular social 
arrangements. In return, NATO has been able to uphold its mission while adopting an 
institutional attitude toward out-of-area missions' which led to its involvement in 
Afghanistan. In conclusion, dialogieal analysis supports the theory of rule-orientated 
constructivism, helps to uphold the conclusions of this thesis and also contributes to the 
theory and conclusions made by Frederking. 
The summary of findings presented in this analysis presents two conclusions. 
First, the findings establish dialogieal analysis as a viable methodology, exposed the 
strengths and weaknesses of the research, and verified the theory of rule-orientated 
constructivism. Secondly, the findings help to develop an understanding of the member 
nations' shift in policy regarding out-of-area and helps to explain what may have 
contributed to NATO's involved in Afghanistan. NATO's adherence to collective 
security rules established a particular ideology and a means to engage in specific actions 
within the global security environments. These actions in return provided a basis for the 
formation of social arrangements. These social arrangements allowed NATO to maintain 
security and stability while it member states broadened its agenda and shifted the 
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Alliance's out-of-area policy, which help lead the Alliance to become involved in 
Afghanistan operations in 2001. In short, NATO's involvement in Afghanistan was a 
result of NATO member nations' change in attitudes and ideologies, gradual 
development of policy and procedures, and transformation of out-of-area missions within 




In over half a century of existence, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its 
member nations, and the global security environment have developed in ways in which 
the NATO's founding fathers would have never imagined. As the global security 
environment continues to change, and challenges arise, NATO member nations have 
continued to adapt and transform the Alliance at an ever increasing pace. Today, the 
member nations have to cope with a larger array of security threats and challenges than it 
has in the past. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization main mission is to "safeguard the 
freedom, common heritage and civilization of their people" while trying to "promote 
stability and well being in the North Atlantic area."281 The organization of NATO 
created an environment which brought countries that were willing to come together for a 
common cause, prepared to integrate military forces, and willing to engage in 
multinational activities over a particular period of time. Within the Alliance, member 
states have worked in cooperation and through the consensus decision-making process to 
establish policy and procedures. The policy and procedures agreed upon by the members 
of NATO have been sought after and achieved through political and military means. 
Essentially, the military and political policy and structures of NATO have enabled 
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 The North Atlantic Treaty. 
141 
member countries to secure themselves within the global security environment. As a 
result, the Alliance has been able to uphold its mission while the member nations 
continue to expand its agenda and engage in broader range of activities which includes 
selective out-of-area missions. 
Since the inception of the Alliance^ the member states of NATO have continued 
to change while maintaining an air of cohesion and unity amongst one another. Despite 
these picturesque conditions, the member nations have not always been unified; 
particularly when dealing with mission and operations which took place beyond the 
traditional borders of Europe. The tensions revolving around the member nations' 
inability to deal with out-of-area missions can be traced back to the foundation of the 
Alliance. 
From 1949 till the end of the Cold War, NATO member countries had extreme 
difficulty in balancing collective interests with other shared and perceived commitments 
throughout the world. The members of NATO were unable to find common grounds due 
to conflicting ideologies, perceptions, and interests which would allow the Alliance to 
participate in activities beyond the borders of Europe. Thus throughout the Cold War, the 
Alliance continued to be hampered by its inability to deal with out-of-area issues. 
Eventually, the member countries relied upon a non-policy on out-of-area missions and 
operations. 
Throughout the Cold War, NATO member countries continued to meet opposition 
on out-of-area missions, however the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 signaled a major 
shift in member countries' attitudes and policy regarding out-of-area. At the end of the 
Cold War many member states began to pursue more global policies and practices. It is 
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clear that although tensions revolving around ideologies, perceptions, and interests 
concerning out-of-area had not been alleviated, the member states were able to work 
through these differences and shift its policy. The shift in policy has led to NATO's 
engagement in several missions throughout the 1990s and the Alliance's first out-of-area 
operation in Afghanistan in 2001. 
Main Conclusions Drawn from the Thesis 
The study of this analysis has used dialogical analysis as a method for analyzing 
NATO's policy regarding out-of-area, in hopes of understanding why NATO became 
involved in Afghanistan. The analysis of eight communiques through pragmatic and 
argumentative analysis reveals (1) a chronological timeline of the member nation's 
policies and activities regarding out-of-area missions in the global security environment 
from 1996 to 2003, (2) the member countries' recognition and utilization of collective 
security rules, and (3) the transformative and institutional nature of the member states in 
conjunction with the Alliance within the context of the global security environment. 
First, the speech acts bring to light a timeline, extending between 1996 through 
2003, of policies and activities the member nations have directed and committed. This 
timeline reveals the transformative and institutional nature of the Alliance and indicates a 
gradual shift in out-of-area policy by the member nations. The transformative and 
institutional nature of the member nations illustrates the acknowledgement of the changes 
and challenges within the global security environment and indicates the necessary steps -
gradual shift in policy and adoption of institutional methods - the nations are willing to 
uphold its mission while adapting to ever-changing global security environment. In 
short, the timeline of policy and events unveils (1) that the member nations change 
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gradually as they respond to challenges in the global security environment; (2) an 
institutional attitude toward out-of-area missions has been adopted; and (3) gradual shift 
in out-of-area policy contributed to NATO's Afghanistan engagement. 
Second, NATO's recognition and utilization of collective security rules allows the 
Alliance to be an activexparticipant in the global security environment. Within this 
environment, the Alliance's actions are "determined by shared ideas rather than by 
material forces," and "identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these 
shared idea rather than by the given nature."282 Thus member nations use collective 
security rules in order to interact within the global security environment at large. Each 
collective security rule adopted by the Alliance allows the member nations to 
comprehend the logic that is driving the global security environment. This has allowed 
NATO members to formulate policy accordingly and gradually apply institutional 
methods in order to create stability and security while enabling nations to have the ability 
to transform. In brief, the member nations' adoption and adherence of the collective 
security rules have (1) allowed the member countries to be active members in the global 
security environment; (2) help determine and dictate the shift in policy regarding out-of-
area; and (3) provided an environment in which the member nations formulate policy and 
commitment to activities in a gradual and institutional manner. 
Building upon the chronological timeline of NATO's policies and activities and 
NATO's recognition and utilization of the collective security rules, the speech acts verify 
the transformative and institutional nature of NATO member states within the confines of 
the global security environment. The transformation of the Alliance by the member 
countries, both internally and externally, is exhibited by the adoption of an institutional 
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attitude by the member nations, a shift in NATO's out-of-area policy, and gradual 
adherence to institutionalism within the Alliance. Each of the member nations are willing 
to work in cooperation with one another and each acknowledges the necessary 
capabilities - political and military measures - needed to sustain and survive within the 
global security environment. Evidentially, the Alliance is gradually transforming and the 
member nations are institutionalizing its policies, procedures, and operational 
engagements. Each of these elements coincided to lead NATO to become involved in 
Afghanistan. All told, the thesis upholds that if NATO member nations adopt an 
institutional attitude towards out-of-area missions then NATO will become involved in 
Afghanistan. 
The findings presented above explain that there was a shift in NATO's out-of-area 
policy. The shift in the policy occurred based upon adherence to collective security rules 
and gradually adoption of institutional measures by the member nations of NATO. The 
shift in policy, adoption and use of collective security rules, and institutional attitude of 
the member countries were elements that contributed to NATO's involvement in the 2001 
operations in Afghanistan. • 
In addition to using dialogical analysis as the primary method for analyzing 
NATO's policy regarding out-of-area, the methodology can be used in the analysis of 
Frederking's conclusions and be used to conduct a discussion regarding the theory of 
rule-orientated constructivism. As such, the use of dialogical analysis reveals (1) 
viability in regards to ontological analysis; (2) methodological strengths and weaknesses; 
and (3) contribution to the theory of rule-orientated constructivism. 
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First, the use of dialogical analysis in the analysis of eight communiques 
establishes its viability as a tool when analyzing language. Dialogical analysis can be 
used as an interpretive approach by helping to explain action. It can do so by showing 
consistency between speech acts and patterns of rules for a specific social arrangement. 
In accordance with Frederking, dialogical analysis can be added to the toolkit of 
interpretive methods,283 using it to study NATO member nations' attitudes and helping to 
explain the shift in out-of-area policy. In short, dialogical analysis is an approach to 
analyze social interaction. 
Second, this particular methodology has exposed the strengths and weakness of 
within this research. Building upon the weaknesses of Frederking, the use of dialogical 
analysis has (1) provided a definition of global security; (2) allowed for the use of 
primary resources to explain what has affected the shift in policy; (3) created a consistent 
theoretical framework; and (4) developed an understanding regarding NATO's consensus 
decision-making process. Additionally, the use of dialogical analysis in this particular 
research does not lend itself to formal argument analysis. Unlike Frederking's research 
who uses formal argument analysis, this research does not divulge 'proviso' assertions 
which are to be countered by 'cautious' assertions. The lack of formal argument analysis 
results in the reader's inability to entirely grasp the NATO decision-making process. 
Rather than revealing the bumpy reality of the communique process and non-linear 
transformative nature of the Alliance, the illusion of a smooth transformative process is 
imprinted on the reader's mind. In conclusion, the dialogical analysis allows for 
strengths and weaknesses to surface which can then be used as lessons learned for future 
research. 
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Finally, the use of dialogical analysis contributes to the support the theory of rule-
orientated constructivism. In the context of constructivism, the rule-orientated 
constructivist theory of constructivism within this thesis establishes that the global 
security environment is made up of overlapping social arrangements. These social 
arrangements are mainly influenced by language. The use of language makes action 
possible through the establishment of patterns of rules. These rules "tell us how the 
world works; they tell us who we are and who others are; they tell us what we should 
do."284 In short, dialogical analysis (1) supports the theory of rule-orientated 
constructivism.; (2) establishes consistency with the tasks associated with the theory 
(assert the existence of social arrangements; show how these rules make action 
intelligible; and help agents "go on" in the world); and (3) confirms the conclusions 
made by Frederking. 
The summary of findings of this thesis makes two conclusions. First, it 
establishes that there was a shift in NATO's out-of-area policy. The shift in the policy 
occurred based upon adherence to collective security rules and gradually adoption of 
institutional measures by the member nations of NATO. The shift in policy, adoption 
and use of collective security rules, and institutional attitude of the member countries 
were elements that contributed to NATO's involvement in the 2001 operations in 
Afghanistan. Secondly, it establishes dialogical analysis as a viable methodology and 
verifies the theory of rule-orientated constructivism. In short, each of the conclusions 
drawn from the thesis have helped to explain why NATO become in involved in 
Afghanistan and will act as building blocks for future research. 
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Recommendations for Future Studies 
In light of this case study's finding, there are several possibilities for future 
studies. Future studies could measure the viability of rule-orientated constructivism and 
dialogical analysis. This can be carried out by a applying this theory and methodology to 
a different case study. Additionally, future case studies could generate a new set of rules 
which constitute the global security environment. These rules then could be tested on the 
same case study or a different case study. Also, future studies could be conducted at the 
domestic level of analysis. The conclusions drawn from the domestic level could then be 
compared and contrasted to those results at the domestic level. Finally, future studies 
working at the international level, could conduct a cross analysis. A cross analysis could 
include the dialogical analysis of several resources. Each of these resources then could 
be complied and compared in order to compose a complete picture and dispute or justify 
the findings of this thesis. Thus, future studies could apply several techniques to 
determine the viability as well as the accuracy of rule-orientated constructivism and the 
dialogical method. -
Final Thoughts 
Analyzing NATO's policy regarding out-of-area operations has provided an 
opportunity leam about the institutional attitude of NATO members and the 
transformative nature of an Alliance. This thesis has briefly outlined NATO, its 
structures and its major players while exploring the history of the member nations' out-
of-area policy. This thesis has used dialogical analysis to analyzing NATO's policy. The 
combination the historical background knowledge, and linguistic analysis, has revealed 
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that the institutional attitude of NATO member nations and the institutional policy and 
- i ' 
procedures in the Alliance's military and political structures have led to a gradual shift in 
out-of-area policy. This shift in policy contributed to NATO's involvement in its first 
out-of-area mission - Afghanistan in 2001. In conclusion, this thesis illustrates that the 
NATO has maintained its mission while transforming and adapting to the global security 
environment due to its member nations' adherence to collective security rules and gradual 
adoption of institutional measures. Additionally, the thesis has verified the use of 
dialogical analysis as a viable tool in ontological studies and provided evidence in 
support of rule-orientated constructivism. In the future, this thesis can serve as a basis for 
making sound policies and procedures while justifying selective out-of-area missions and 
operations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and provide a base for research 
which involves rule-orientated constructivism and dialogical analysis. 
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1. As we look ahead, the new NATO is taking shape, reflecting the fundamental 
changes in the security environment in Europe and the enduring vitality of the 
transatlantic partnership which underpins our endeavors. The broad vision of 
this new NATO and its role in the development of a new European security 
architecture was set out at the 1994 Brussels Summit and further defined at our 
last meeting in Berlin. The Alliances adaptation and reform is well underway. 
We will take this process forward today. 
The Alliance is resolved to preserve its political and military strength, ensuring 
its ability to carry out the full range of its missions - as IFOR and its planned 
successor SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina clearly show. We have issued a 
separate statement in this regard. The Alliance will continue to strengthen 
European security by maintaining its capability for collective defense, admitting 
new members, expanding and strengthening cooperative relationships with all 
Partners, including building a strong security partnership with Russia and a 
distinctive relationship with Ukraine, and realizing the European Security and 
Defense Identity within the Alliance. 
The evolution of the Alliance takes place in the context of our aim to help build 
a truly cooperative European security structure. We welcome as a contribution 
the important decisions taken at the recent OSCE Summit in Lisbon and the 
decision by the States Parties to the CFE Treaty to begin negotiations in early 
1997 with a view towards adapting the Treaty to the changing security 
environment in Europe. 
2. Against this background, we have decided to recommend to our Heads of State 
arid Government to convene a Summit meeting in Madrid on 8/9 July 1997 to set 
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the course for the Alliance as it moves towards the 21st century, consolidating 
Euro-Atlantic security. To achieve this aim, major decisions will have to be 
taken by the time of the Summit concerning NATOs internal adaptation, the 
opening of the Alliance and its ability to carry out all its new roles and missions. 
The agenda for our Summit will include: 
o agreeing a new command structure, which enables all Allies to 
participate fully, and further advancing the implementation of the 
Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept, in order to enhance the 
Alliance's ability to carry out the full range of its missions, while 
preserving the capability for collective defense, based on a strong 
transatlantic partnership; \ 
o finalizing, to the satisfaction of all Allies, all the necessary arrangements 
for the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO, 
which will allow for the preparation and conduct of WEU-led operations 
with the participation of all European Allies if they were so to choose; 
o inviting one or more of the countries which have expressed interest in 
joining the Alliance to begin accession negotiations; 
o pledging that the Alliance will remain open to the accession of further 
members and will remain ready to pursue consultations with nations 
seeking NATO membership, as it has done in the past; 
o strengthening cooperative relations with all our Partners including 
through an enhanced Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the initiative to 
establish an Atlantic Partnership Council; 
o intensifying and consolidating relations with Russia beyond the 
Partnership for Peace by aiming at reaching an agreement at the earliest 
possible date on the development of a strong, stable and enduring 
security partnership; 
o further developing an enhanced relationship with Ukraine; 
o enhancing our Mediterranean dialogue; 
o further developing our ability to carry out new roles and missions 
relating to conflict prevention and crisis management; and 
o further enhancing our political and defense efforts against the 
proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their 
delivery means. 
We warmly welcome the decision of the Government of Spain, endorsed by the 
Spanish Parliament on 14 November 1996, to take the necessary steps to 
participate in the Alliance's new structure. Spain's participation will further 
strengthen the cohesion and military effectiveness of the Alliance, as it takes on 
new roles and missions, reinforce the transatlantic link and help develop ESDI 
within the Alliance. 
Stability and security in the whole Euro-Atlantic area are our primary goal. We 
want to help build cooperative European security structures which extend to 
countries throughout the whole of Europe without excluding anyone or creating 
dividing lines. Recent decisions at the OSCE Summit meeting in Lisbon on 
European security cooperation and the decision to adapt the CFE Treaty to the 
new European security environment establish a cooperative foundation for our 
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common security. The Alliance, for its part, has developed a broad pattern of 
intensive cooperation with North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and PfP 
Partner countries and with other international organizations and is thereby 
contributing to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. With the same 
aim, we are now working towards opening the Alliance to new members; 
developing ever-closer and deeper cooperative ties with all Partner countries 
who so wish; building a strong, stable and enduring security partnership with 
Russia; strengthening our relationship with Ukraine; and enhancing our 
Mediterranean dialogue. 
5. We reaffirm that the nuclear forces of the Allies continue to play a unique and 
essential role in the Alliances strategy of war prevention. New members, who 
will be full members of the Alliance in all respects, will be expected to support 
the concept of deterrence and the essential role nuclear weapons play in the 
Alliances strategy. Enlarging the Alliance will not require a change in NATOs 
current nuclear posture and therefore, NATO countries have no intention, no 
plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members 
nor any need to change any aspect of NATOs nuclear posture or nuclear policy -
and we do not foresee any future need to do so. 
6. A number of countries have long-standing aspirations to become full members 
of our Alliance and have undertaken intensive and wide-ranging preparations 
and reforms with this aim in mind. We are now in a position to recommend to 
our Heads of State and Government to invite at next year's Summit meeting one 
or more countries which have participated in the intensified dialogue process, to 
start accession negotiations with the Alliance. Our goal is to welcome the new 
member(s) by the time of NATO's 50th anniversary in 1999. We pledge that the 
Alliance will remain open to the accession of further members in accordance 
with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. We will remain ready to pursue 
consultations with nations seeking NATO membership, as we have done in the 
past. 
We are satisfied with the intensified, individual dialogue which the Alliance has 
been conducting throughout this year with interested Partners. This dialogue has 
improved their understanding of specific and practical details of how the 
Alliance works. It has provided the Alliance in turn with a better understanding 
of where these countries stand in their internal development as well as in the 
resolution of any external issues with neighboring countries. We have tasked the 
Council in Permanent Session to prepare comprehensive recommendations for 
decisions to be taken by the Summit on which country or countries to invite to 
begin accession negotiations. The process should include: 
o an intensified dialogue with interested Partner countries including in a 
"16+1" format, as appropriate; 
o analysis, on the basis of further political guidance to be elaborated by the 
Council in Permanent Session, of the relevant factors associated with the 
admission of potential new members; 
o preparation of recommendations on the adaptation of Alliance structures 
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necessary to integrate new members into the Alliance; 
o preparation of a plan for conducting the accession talks with one or more 
new members. 
7. We look forward to tomorrow's meeting of the NACC, which will mark its fifth 
anniversary. The NACC has provided us over the years with a valued 
opportunity to consult regularly with our Partners on political and security 
issues. Through NACC and Partnership for Peace, we have achieved the 
development of common approaches to European security and brought the 
NACC countries closer together in a spirit of cooperation and a common 
commitment to European security. We are committed to ensuring that the 
.NACC goals of enhancing transparency and confidence in security matters 
among member states remain central to future cooperation. In order to derive 
maximum benefit from our NACC meetings, we want to move towards further 
deepening our political dialogue and giving it more focus. 
8. We are pleased with the dynamic development of Partnership for Peace and the 
role it plays in building European security cooperation. The Partnership for 
Peace will continue as a,permanent element of the Alliances cooperative effort 
to contribute to the development of a more stable European security area and, 
with those Partners seeking to join NATO, will also facilitate their preparations 
to meet the responsibilities of membership in the Alliance. Substantial progress 
has been achieved in enhancing the scope and substance of our Partnership 
cooperation, in particular the growing range of exercises, the broadening and 
deepening of the PfP Planning
 sand Review Process, the intensification of work 
on civil-military relations, and civil emergency planning and disaster relief. In 
the current IFOR operation, in which 13 Partner countries are cooperating with 
Alliance armed forces, the Partnership for Peace has proved its value with regard 
both to political commitment to joint crisis management and to military 
interoperability. v 
We want to develop on the basis of transparency ever-closer and deeper 
cooperative ties open to all Partner countries by making the Partnership more 
operational; strengthening its political consultation element, taking full account 
of the respective activities of the OSCE and the relevant European institutions 
such as the WEU and the EU; and involving Partners more in operations 
planning and Partnership decision-making. To this end, the Alliance has set up a 
Senior Level Group to develop by the time of the Summit meeting a clearly 
strengthened and thus more attractive Partnership for Peace. We have received 
an interim report on the ongoing work and agree that work should begin without 
delay to implement its recommendations. These include: 
o enhancing the political dimension of the Partnership through increasing 
opportunities for political consultations; 
o expanding the agreed fields of military missions within PfP to the full 
range of the Alliance's new missions, as appropriate, including Peace 
Support operations over and above previously agreed areas; 
o broadening the NATO/PfP exercise program in accordance with the 
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expanded scope of the Partnership; 
o enabling Partner countries to participate in the planning and execution of 
PfP activities (exercises and operations); 
o involving Partners more substantively and actively in PfP-related parts of 
the regular peacetime work of NATO's Military Authorities; 
o affording the appropriate opportunity to Partners who join future NATO-
led PfP operations to contribute to the provision of political guidance for 
oversight over such operations, drawing on the experience gained in 
Operation Joint Endeavour; 
o examining, together with Partners, the possible modalities for the 
elaboration of a political-military framework for PfP operations, building 
on the current work of the Political-Military Steering Committee; 
o enhancing Partner participation in decision-making for PfP program 
issues; 
o increasing regional cooperation within the Partnership provided it 
remains open to all Partners and remains an integral part of the overall 
PfP; 
o expanding the Planning and Review Process; and 
o as soon as the Brussels Agreement on the Status of Missions and 
Representatives of Third States to NATO comes into force, offering 
Partners the opportunity to establish diplomatic missions with NATO. 
We have tasked the Council in Permanent Session to ensure implementation of 
these recommendations without delay and to continue the work on the 
enhancement of Partnership for Peace and also tofreview its common funding 
and resource implications, with a view to providing a further report by the SLG 
with recommendations for decisions at the time of the Spring Ministerial 
meeting. 
9. With the rapid growth of our activities under both NACC and PfP, we have 
identified a need for greater coherence in our cooperation in a framework which 
will establish with Partners a more meaningful and productive cooperative and 
consultative process, building on the elements of NACC and PfP which we and 
our Partners deem most valuable. To this end, we have agreed to work with 
Partners on the initiative to establish an Atlantic Partnership Council (APC) as a 
single new cooperative mechanism, which would form a framework for 
enhanced efforts in both practical cooperation under PfP and an expanded 
political dimension of Partnership. We have accordingly tasked the Council in 
Permanent Session to draw up the modalities for such a council, in close 
coordination with Partners, by the time of our next meeting. 
10. We affirm our support for the political and economic reform process in the 
Russian Federation. We welcome the landmark Presidential elections in Russia. 
We applaud the progress toward a lasting, peaceful settlement of the conflict in 
Chechnya. 
A broad process of integration and cooperation is underway in Europe; Russia is 
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a part of it through its membership in the OSCE and the Council of Europe and 
its relationship with NATO as well as the European Union and the WEU. The 
pattern of consultations anchored by our regular "16+1" discussions, provide a 
firm foundation on which to build. We welcome Russia's participation in 
Partnership for Peace and encourage it to take full advantage of the opportunities 
which the Partnership offers. _ <• . • 
We value the close and effective cooperation between Russia and NATO in 
IFOR. This cooperation demonstrates that NATO and Russia can collaborate 
effectively in the construction of cooperative security structures in Europe. We 
appreciate and welcome Russia's readiness to contribute to a follow-on 
operation to consolidate peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We look forward to 
continuing the experience of working closely together, which we believe will 
have a lasting, positive impact on our relationship. 
Today, we reiterate our commitment to a strong, stable, and enduring security 
partnership between NATO and Russia. This partnership demonstrates that 
European security has entered a fundamentally new, more promising era. It 
constitutes an important element of the developing European cooperative 
security architecture to which Russia has an essential contribution to make. It 
will further enhance stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. By the time 
of the Summit, we aim to reach agreement with the Russian Federation on 
arrangements that can deepen and widen the scope of our current relationship 
and provide a framework for its future development. We want to ensure that 
NATO and Russia have a strong, flexible means to consult and cooperate as part 
of our evolving relationship. Agreement might be expressed in a document or 
could take the form of a Charter, which could encompass: 
o the shared principles that will form the basis of our relationship; 
o a broad set of areas of practical cooperation in particular in the political, 
military, economic, environmental, scientific, peacekeeping, armaments, 
non-proliferation, arms control and civil emergency planning fields; 
o mechanisms for regular and ad hoc consultations; and 
o mechanisms for military liaison and cooperation. 
We therefore task the Council in Permanent Session to develop further guidance 
on these matters on the basis of which the Secretary General could explore with 
Russia the possibility of such agreement. 
11. We continue to support Ukraine as it develops as a democratic nation and a 
market economy. The maintenance of Ukraine's independence, territorial 
integrity and sovereignty is a crucial factor for stability and security in Europe. 
Ukraine's development of a strong, enduring relationship with NATO is an 
important aspect of the emerging European security architecture. We greatly 
value the active participation of Ukraine in the Partnership for Peace and look 
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forward to next year's exercise near Lviv. We also value Ukraine's cooperation 
with European institutions such as the EU and the WEU. Ukraine has made an 
important contribution to IFOR and UNTAES, and we welcome its commitment 
to contribute to a follow-on operation to consolidate peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
We welcome the continued development of our broad cooperation beyond PfP. 
We note with satisfaction the recent meeting between the Alliance and Ukraine 
on issues related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We 
welcome the progress made towards establishing a NATO information office in 
Kyiv, and look forward to its opening in the near future. We welcome Ukraine's 
active interest in further enhancing its relations with the Alliance. We are 
committed to the development in coming months, through high level and other 
consultations, of a distinctive and effective NATO-Ukraine relationship, which 
could be formalized, possibly by the time of the Summit, building on the 
document on enhanced NATO-Ukraine relations agreed in September 1995, and 
taking into account recent Ukrainian proposals. 
12. We support the Middle East peace process, and urge all participants to remain 
firmly committed to it. 
We reaffirm our conviction that security in Europe is closely linked with 
security and stability in the Mediterranean, and that the Mediterranean 
dimension is consequently one of the various components of the European 
security architecture. In this regard, as part of the adaptation of the Alliance, we 
will work towards enhancing our relations with non-NATO Mediterranean 
countries through our dialogue. 
The dialogue complements other international efforts, such as those undertaken 
by the Barcelona process, the OSCE and the WEU without creating any division 
of labor. We welcome the report of the Council in Permanent Session on the 
progress of and recommendations for future steps to develop the dialogue with 
Mediterranean countries through political dialogue and other activities agreed by 
the Alliance. Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia have 
reiterated their interest in the development of our relations. We have decided to 
enhance our Mediterranean dialogue in a progressive way and have tasked the 
Council in Permanent Session to report at our next meeting on the 
implementation of the activities foreseen in the report as well as on the scope for 
further development. 
13. We are carrying forward the process of the Alliance's internal adaptation, with 
the fundamental objectives of ensuring the Alliance's military effectiveness, 
maintaining the transatlantic link, and developing the ESDI within NATO. In 
keeping with the decisions taken by NATO Heads of State and Government at 
the 1994 Summit Meeting and by the Ministerial meetings in June this year in 
Berlin and Brussels and with a view to preparing for the Summit next year, our 
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primary focus has been on three closely linked issues: the development of a new 
command structure for the Alliance; the implementation of the CJTF concept; 
and the development of the ESDI within NATO. 
14. We welcome the progress made in the development of the future command 
structure, noting that two structural alternatives have been selected by the 
Military Committee for future assessment and subsequent political consideration 
and agree the proposed way ahead. We urge the Council in Permanent Session 
and the Military Committee to complete the work as quickly as possible. Once 
approved, this new command structure will help ensure the Alliance's military 
effectiveness so that it is able, in the changing security environment facing 
Europe, to perform its traditional mission of collective defense and through 
flexible and agreed procedures to undertake new roles in changing 
circumstances and to provide for increased participation by Parmer countries. It 
will constitute a renovated, single multinational command structure, reflecting 
the strategic situation in Europe and enabling all Allies to participate fully. 
15. We welcome the progress made towards realizing the CJTF concept, on the basis 
of the Overall Politico-Military Framework approved by us last June. We direct 
the Council in Permanent Session and the NATO Military Authorities to pursue 
vigorously their work on this concept, bearing in mind its importance for future 
Alliance operations, including the possible involvement of nations outside the 
Alliance, as well as for the development of ESDI. 
16. We are pleased with the progress made in developing the appropriate 
arrangements for ESDI within NATO, as decided at the Brussels Summit and at 
our meeting last June in Berlin. The newly created Policy Coordination Group 
has contributed significantly to this process. 
17. We note in particular the steps taken towards implementing the concept of 
separable but not separate capabilities: 
o the decisions of the Council in Permanent Session on political guidance 
concerning the elaboration of European command arrangements within 
NATO able to prepare and conduct WEU-led operations; 
o the decisions of the Council in Permanent Session regarding the 
arrangements for identifying NATO capabilities and assets which might 
be made available to the WEU for a WEU-led operation; 
o the progress to date on arrangements for the release, monitoring and 
return or recall of Alliance assets and capabilities; 
o the decision of the Council in Permanent Session with respect to 
modalities of cooperation with the WEU; 
o the progress on work regarding planning and conducting exercising for 
WEU-led operations, following receipt of illustrative profiles for WEU 
missions. 
18. We have directed the Council in Permanent Session to submit to the Spring 1997 
Ministerial meetings a report on the adaptation of Alliance structures and 
procedures related to the future command structure, on the implementation of 
the CJTF concept, and on further progress with recommendations for decisions 
in the development of ESDI within the Alliance. 
19. We welcome the close and intensifying cooperation between NATO and the 
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WEU. At their meeting in Ostend on 19 November 1996, WEU Ministers 
agreed that it would be valuable for WEU to become actively involved in the 
Alliances defense planning process and expressed their readiness to participate. 
Early agreement is now being sought in the WEU on the participation of all 
European Allies in WEU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities, as 
well as in planning and preparing for such operations. This would be a key 
contribution to the development of ESDI within the Alliance. We have tasked 
the Council in Permanent Session to develop the NATO-WEU relationship 
further in order to ensure effective cooperation in preparing for possible WEU-
led operations. 
20. We are pleased with the successful outcome of the OSCE Summit in Lisbon and, 
in particular, the adoption of a declaration on security as a result of work on a 
Common and Comprehensive Security Model for the 21st Century. The Lisbon 
Summit has created a security framework in which all European states can 
participate on an equal footing. The Security Model adopted in Lisbon is a 
comprehensive expression of the endeavor to strengthen security and stability. It 
complements the mutually reinforcing efforts of NATO and other European and 
transatlantic institutions and organizations. We attach great importance to the 
role of the OSCE as a primary instrument in preventive diplomacy, conflict 
prevention, post-conflict rehabilitation and regional security cooperation, as well 
as to the enhancement of its operational capabilities to carry out these tasks. We 
believe the OSCE, as the only pan-European security organization, has an 
essential role to play in European peace and stability. We are committed to 
supporting its comprehensive approach to security. The principles and 
commitments on which the OSCE is built provide the standards for the 
development of a comprehensive and cooperative European security structure. 
We commend the OSCE for its essential contribution to the implementation of 
civil aspects of the Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in 
supervising the preparation and conduct of the elections, in promoting and 
monitoring human rights and in overseeing the implementation of agreed 
confidence - and security - building measures and sub-regional arms control 
agreements. The OSCE thereby demonstrates its central role in contributing to 
regional stability and security. 
We are pleased with the support given by IFOR to the OSCE in carrying out its 
tasks. The cooperation between OSCE and IFOR is a good example of our 
concept of mutually reinforcing organizations. The practical assistance given by 
NATO to the OSCE in helping to establish measures to verify the confidence-
building and arms control agreements of the Dayton Accords testifies to a 
growing cooperation between NATO and the OSCE. We reiterate our readiness 
to further develop the cooperation between the two organizations. 
The democratic and economic development, independence, sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of all states are essential factors for stability and security in 
the Euro-Atlantic area. We commend the OSCE for its mediation efforts in a 
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number of regional conflicts through its various missions, and recognize the 
valuable work of the High Commissioner on National Minorities. We support 
the efforts of the Minsk Group to achieve a political settlement of the conflict in 
and around Nagorno-Karabakh. 
The OSCE acquis in the field of disarmament, arms control, and confidence- and 
security-building measures continues to contribute significantly to political and 
military stability. We consider the full implementation, the further development, 
and if necessary, the adaptation of these measures to be indispensable elements 
in our effort to further enhance the European security architecture. We welcome 
the recent adoption by the Forum for Security Cooperation of the Framework for 
Arms Control and its Future Agenda. 
21. The CFE Treaty is a fundamental cornerstone of security and stability for all in 
the Euro-Atlantic area. We are committed to maintain and strengthen it. 
Consistent with our broader goal of enhancing political cooperation and military 
stability in a Europe without dividing lines, we welcome the decision of the 30 
States Parties to the CFE Treaty on 1 December 1996 in Lisbon to launch 
negotiations to adapt the Treaty to the changing security environment in Europe. 
We look forward to beginning negotiations in the Joint Consultative Group in 
Vienna in January 1997 on the basis of the scope and parameters (Terms of 
Reference) document agreed in Lisbon. 
Our common goal is to enhance security for all States Parties, irrespective of 
whether they belong to an alliance, and preserve their right to choose and change 
their security arrangements.' Within the broader political context of enhanced 
security for all, this process should strengthen the cooperative pattern of 
relationships between States Parties, based on mutual confidence, transparency, 
stability and predictability. Committed, like the other States Parties, to adapting 
the Treaty by developing mechanisms which will enhance the Treaty's viability 
- and effectiveness, we will pursue steps to review the Treaty's group structure, to 
adapt the Treaty system of limitations and to enhance its verification and 
information provisions. To that end, the members of the Alliance will develop 
and table proposals for the negotiations in Vienna. 
We reaffirm our support for the CFE Flank Agreement, reached at this year's 
Review Conference in Vienna. We urge all States Parties who have not yet done 
so to approve this Agreement before the end of the extended provisional 
application period. 
We will play our full part in the intensive continuing efforts directed at resolving 
outstanding implementation issues. ( 
The members of the Alliance reaffirm the commitment made at Lisbon to 
exercise restraint during the period of negotiations as foreseen in the document 
in relation to the current postures and capabilities of their conventional armed 
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forces - in particular, with respect to their levels of forces and deployments - in 
the Treaty's area of application. As decided in Lisbon, this commitment is 
without prejudice to the outcome of the negotiations, or to voluntary decisions 
by the individual States Parties to reduce their force levels or deployments, or to 
their legitimate security interests. We believe that the CFE Treaty must continue 
to play a key role in ensuring military stability into the 21st century, and are 
committed to adapting it expeditiously in order to take account of new security 
challenges. 
22. We emphasize the importance of the START Treaties for international stability 
and security. We note with satisfaction the progress made by the United States 
and the Russian Federation in the implementation of START I. We urge the 
Russian Federation to follow the United States in ratifying the START II Treaty. 
We welcome the successful conclusion and signing by the great majority of UN 
members of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and we urge all other nations 
to sign this important international arms control agreement. We look forward to 
the early start of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. 
We are pleased that the Chemical Weapons Convention will soon enter into 
force and we look forward to its early implementation. We welcome the fact 
that States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention have at the 
Fourth Review Conference in Geneva in December 1996 again solemnly 
declared their recognition that effective verification could reinforce the 
Convention. 
Recognizing the heightened concern of the international community of the 
suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, we support the vigorous 
pursuit of an effective, legally binding international agreement to ban the use, 
stockpiling, production and transfer of antipersonnel mines and, as an important 
step to this end, support the early ratification of the revised Second Protocol of 
the Convention on Inhumane Weapons. 
We urge the early ratification of the Treaty on Open Skies by those states which 
have not already ratified. 
23. Proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their delivery 
means continues to be a matter of serious concern to us. Progress in expanding 
and intensifying NATOs political and defense efforts against proliferation, as 
directed by NATO Heads of State and Government in January 1994, is an 
integral part of NATOs adaptation to the new security environment. These 
efforts also contribute to NATOs ability to conduct new roles and missions. We 
remain committed to preventing proliferation in the first place, or, if it occurs, to 
reversing it through diplomatic means. The Alliance is improving its 
capabilities to address the risks posed by proliferation. We welcome further 
consultations and cooperation with Partner countries to address the common 
security risks posed by proliferation. We note with satisfaction the report of the 
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Alliances Joint Committee on Proliferation on the activities of the Senior 
Political-Military Group on Proliferation and the Senior Defense Group on 
Proliferation and direct them to continue their vital efforts. 
We attach particular importance to a solid preparation of the first preparatory 
committee of the strengthened review process of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT), scheduled for April 1997. This process will significantly 
contribute to the further strengthening of the NPT, which is the cornerstone of 
the global non-proliferation system. 
24. We reaffirm our commitment to the Alliance's common-funded program. 
We note with appreciation the progress made in moving existing resources to the 
highest priority program, such as Partnership for Peace and the support of 
enhanced information activities in Moscow and Kyiv. We have directed the 
Council in Permanent Session to keep under review the allocation of resources 
in order to ensure their optimal use. We have also directed the Council-in 
Permanent Session to identify the implications of adaptation for NATOs 
common-funded budgets and to make appropriate recommendations for dealing 
with these. 
25. We continue to support all efforts to combat terrorism, which constitutes a 
serious threat to peace, security and stability. 
26. The Spring 1997 meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session 
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1. Our Heads of State and Government, at their Summit in Madrid on 8th-9th July, 
took historic decisions to transform the Alliance. We welcome today the 
substantial progress made by the Alliance in putting into practice that far-reaching 
vision. In particular: 
o we will sign today Protocols of Accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland to the North Atlantic Treaty; 
o we have endorsed politico-military guidance for the development of 
options for a future NATO-led military presence in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina following the end of SFOR's mandate; 
o substantial progress has been achieved on the Long Term Study and an 
agreement has been reached on a new command structure as a whole, and 
in particular on the type, number and location of headquarters. 
Furthermore: 
o we will cooperate closely with the three invited countries through the 
coming months, building on the successful accession talks this year, and 
we will work for the timely ratification of the Protocols of Accession; 
o we have completed the initial estimates of the resource implications for 
accession of the three invitees, and have confirmed that the costs will be 
manageable; 
o we look forward to continuing in January 1998 intensified dialogues with 
those nations that aspire to NATO membership or that otherwise wish to 
pursue a dialogue with NATO on membership questions; 
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o we intend to realize the full potential of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council (EAPC), which has opened new consultative and cooperative 
channels with Partners, and of the enhanced Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
through expanding the scope and range of Partnership activities; 
o we will pursue vigorously our consultations and cooperation with Russia 
under the auspices of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, and 
look forward to the implementation of the 1998 work program; 
o we will carry forward our program of consultations and cooperation with 
Ukraine under the new NATO-Ukraine Charter, and will endorse later 
today with Ukraine a work plan for 1998; 
o we have carried out through our Mediterranean Cooperation Group a new 
round of individual dialogues with our six Mediterranean Dialogue 
Partners, and established a work program for cooperation; 
o we welcome the substantial progress in our internal adaptation and 
approve the progress made in the continued successful implementation of 
the Combined Joint Task Forces concept; 
o we note with satisfaction that significant progress has been made on 
developing the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the 
Alliance; 
o we will work constructively towards conclusion of the CFE Treaty 
Adaptation negotiations as expeditiously as possible, aimed at enhancing 
security and stability, and have introduced proposals to this end. 
Our aim is to reinforce peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, based on 
Allied solidarity and cohesion, as reflected in our common commitment to the 
core function of collective defense, and in the maintenance of a strong 
transatlantic link, a new cooperative partnership with other Euro-Atlantic nations, 
building a ESDI within NATO, and the Alliance's effectiveness for the full range 
of its missions. 
With this aim in view, NATO enlargement is part of a comprehensive process. It 
includes not only the decision of our Heads of State and Government to invite the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin accession talks with NATO, but 
also the continued openness of the Alliance to new members under Article 10 of 
the Washington Treaty; broad cooperation with Partners in the EAPC and the 
enhanced PfP; a strong, stable and enduring partnership with Russia; a distinctive 
Partnership with Ukraine; and an enhanced Mediterranean dialogue. 
We received a report by the Secretary General on the successful conclusion of the 
accession talks with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. We will sign later 
today the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty on their accession and look 
forward to timely ratification of the Protocols of Accession by our respective 
countries in order to allow the three invited states to accede to the North Atlantic 
Treaty in time for the Alliance's 50th anniversary in April 1999. We are 
convinced that the accession of the invitees will contribute to the security and 
effectiveness of the Alliance. We are pleased by the thorough and detailed 
preparations undertaken by the three nations for the accession talks. We welcome 
the confirmation by the invited countries of their willingness to assume the rights 
and obligations of NATO membership and to meet the associated political 
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commitments. They have confirmed their intention to participate fully in 
NATO's military structure and collective defense planning and, for the purpose of 
taking part in the full range of Alliance missions, to commit the bulk of their ( 
armed forces to the Alliance. All three fully support the continued openness of 
the Alliance towards new members, in accordance with Article 10 of the 
Washington Treaty as further elaborated in Paragraph 8 of the Madrid Summit 
Declaration. 
We will progressively involve the invited countries, to thev greatest extent possible 
and where appropriate, in Alliance activities, to prepare them to undertake the 
responsibilities and obligations of membership. In this regard, we welcome the 
proposal to develop a cooperation program with the invited countries, using 
Partnership for Peace tools and mechanisms, which is comprehensive and ensures 
transparency between multilateral and bilateral assistance program. 
5. As reaffirmed by our Heads of State and Government at the Madrid Summit, 
admitting new members will entail resource implications for the Alliance. We 
took note of a report on the resource implications of the accession of the three 
invited states, with particular emphasis on common-funded budgets. It provides 
an initial assessment of those costs which would be eligible for common funding, 
amounting to the equivalent of about 1.5 billion US dollars over a period of 10 
years, of which 1.3 billion US dollars would be for the NATO Security 
Investment Program. 
Overall, the analysis of the resource implications of the accession of the three new 
members has justified the confidence of our Heads of State and Government that, 
in the present and foreseeable security environment in Europe, Alliance costs 
associated with the accession of the three invitees will be manageable, and that 
the resources necessary to meet these costs will be provided. The analysis also 
concludes that the available and planned military forces and the capabilities of the 
current Allies and the three invitees are sufficient to ensure fully the collective 
defense of all members of the enlarged Alliance in the present and foreseeable 
security environment. We note with satisfaction that the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland will also make valuable contributions to the Alliance's 
ability to perform the full range of its missions. The newly acceding countries 
will assume all rights and obligations of membership and are ready to shoulder 
the resulting burdens. They plan to increase significantly their defense spending 
and to contribute appropriately to the Alliance's common-funded budgets. 
6. We remain committed to the ongoing process of enlargement in the terms set out 
in Paragraph 8 of the Madrid Summit Declaration, in which our Heads of State 
and Government clearly reaffirmed NATO's open door to new members under 
Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and we welcome the valuable efforts by 
countries which are aspiring members. To that end, we are maintaining our active 
cooperation with those nations that have expressed their interest in NATO 
membership as well as those who may seek membership in the future. We will 
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further encourage their active participation in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council and the Partnership for Peace. We will also continue our intensified 
dialogues with those nations that aspire to NATO membership or otherwise wish 
to pursue a dialogue on membership questions. In this context we have adopted 
modalities for the continuation of the intensified dialogues. These dialogues, 
which have already begun, will cover the full range of political, military, financial 
and security issues relating to possible NATO membership, without prejudice to 
any eventual decision. We will keep that process under continual review, looking 
forward to the review of the enlargement process which will take place at the 
meeting of our Heads of State and Government in 1999. We direct the Council in 
Permanent Session to report to us at our Spring Session on the intensified 
dialogues. 
7. Decisions taken at the Madrid Summit and the Sintra Ministerial earlier this year 
created the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) as the overarching 
framework for expanding the political and security dimensions of our partnership 
and practical cooperation under the Partnership for Peace. We look forward to 
tomorrow's meeting with our EAPC counterparts. The EAPC will deepen and 
focus political and security-related consultations and cooperation, and increase 
transparency among its 44 member states. For our part, we will continue 
developing the EAPC as an action-oriented forum with practical, cooperative 
tasks on its agenda. To this end, we look forward to endorsing with our Partners 
the EAPC Action Plan for 1998-2000. 
8. We are pleased with the progress of implementation of the EAPC Basic 
Document since its adoption in Sintra last May. We welcome the deepening 
consultations on political and security-related issues, including those in a limited 
format between the Alliance and open-ended groups of Partners to focus on 
functional matters or, on an ad hoc basis, on appropriate regional matters. We 
also note with satisfaction the growing number of cooperative activities under the 
auspices of the EAPC, which is based on the principles of inclusiveness and self-
differentiation, including in the fields of defense economic issues, science, 
defense-related environmental issues, cooperation in peacekeeping, and civil 
emergency preparedness. We welcome the establishment by a growing number of 
Partners of diplomatic missions to NATO under the Brussels Agreement. 
9. The Partnership for Peace continues to be the focal point of our efforts to build 
with Partners new patterns of practical cooperation across a wide range of security 
issues. We are pleased with the progress made since our Sintra meeting last May. 
We welcome the decisions to establish PfP Staff Elements at the strategic and 
regional levels of NATO's military command structure and note that Defense 
Ministers have mandated a report for May 1998 on the possibility of establishing 
them also at the sub-regional level. We also welcome proposals for the further 
development of the Planning and Review Process and the establishment of 
international military posts for Partners at the Partnership Coordination Cell. We 
note with satisfaction the identification of the first PfP projects to be supported 
under the NATO Security Investment Program and the start of work with Partners 
on the development of a political-military framework for NATO-led PfP 
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operations. We invite all Partner countries to take full advantage of the new 
possibilities to draw closer to the Alliance through the enhanced PfP. 
We look forward to endorsing with our Partners at tomorrow's EAPC meeting the 
concept to establish a Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre and a 
Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit. 
We task the Council in Permanent Session to increase further the effectiveness of 
the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the enhanced Partnership for Peace, in 
cooperation with Partners, and to report to us at our next meeting. 
10. The Partnership for Peace has shown its value in contributing to stability in 
Europe through the special assistance the Alliance is continuing to provide to 
Albania, in the context of PfP and drawing on the experience of the Italian-led 
Multinational Protection Force, in the rebuilding of its national armed forces 
following the crisis in that country in early 1997. We welcome the voluntary 
contributions of nations to Albania. 
11. The signature in Paris last May of the NATO-Russia Founding Act marked the 
beginning of a fundamentally new relationship between NATO and Russia. We 
are pleased that consultations in the Permanent Joint Council, created by the 
Founding Act, are developing into practical cooperation, on the basis of the 1997 
work program. which we adopted with Minister Primakov at the first PJC 
Ministerial meeting last September. Since then, NATO and Russia have made 
significant progress towards establishing the deeper relationship envisioned in the 
Founding Act. NATO and Russia have consulted together on many of the issues 
central to security in the Euro-Atlantic area, including the situation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and ongoing implementation of the Peace Accords, proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and conduct of peacekeeping operations. We are 
encouraged by the progress made in the working groups on civil emergency 
planning, peacekeeping, and defense conversion. We welcome the commitment 
shown by Russia to the broad range of cooperative activities, including the 
development of an active Individual Partnership Program in the context of PfP 
and the appointment of a Russian military representative at NATO Headquarters. 
This will open a new chapter in NATO-Russia defense-related and military-to-
military cooperation. 
We therefore look forward tomorrow to our second meeting with the Foreign 
Minister of the Russian Federation in the framework of the Permanent Joint 
Council. At that meeting, we expect to adopt a substantive work program for 
1998 that will further deepen our cooperation and strengthen mutual trust. We 
look forward in particular to enhancing NATO's information efforts in Russia, 
and we expect to open a NATO Documentation Centre in Moscow, as foreseen in 
the Founding Act, by 31st January 1998. The timely establishment of military 
liaison missions at various levels, as foreseen in the Founding Act, will usefully 
support its objectives. We encourage Russia to play an active role in the EAPC 
and the enhanced PfP. 
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The activities of the Permanent Joint Council will build upon the principles of 
reciprocity and transparency. In opening a new era in European security relations, 
we are fully committed to working together with Russia to realize the provisions 
and potential of the Founding Act. 
12. The Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine, signed at 
the Madrid Summit by Allied Heads of State and Government and President 
Kuchma, underscores the Alliance's view that Ukraine has a key role to play in 
European security. We underline our firm belief that Ukraine's sovereignty, 
independence, territorial integrity, democratic development, economic prosperity 
and its status as a non-nuclear weapon state are key factors for security and 
stability in Central and Eastern Europe and on the continent as a whole. 
We are committed to launching a rich and varied program of consultation and 
practical cooperation with Ukraine. We welcome the substantial progress already 
made in this regard since the conclusion of the NATO-Ukraine Charter, on the 
basis of initial elements agreed by the NATO-Ukraine Commission on 10th 
October 1997. We look forward to the implementation of the NATO-Ukraine 
work plan for 1998, which we, together with Ukraine's Foreign Minister 
Udovenko, will endorse later today when the NATO-Ukraine Commission meets 
for the first time at Ministerial level. We also look forward on this occasion to the 
signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on Civil Emergency Planning and 
Disaster Preparedness between NATO and Ukraine. We will continue to support 
an active information effort in Ukraine through the NATO Information and 
Documentation Centre in Kyiv. 
We also welcome Ukraine's intention to play an active role within the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council and the enhanced PfP. We are working with 
Ukraine on the development of a more focused Individual Partnership Program. 
We are pleased with the initial steps we have taken with Ukraine to implement 
this new partnership. We look forward to further progress in 1998 and beyond. 
13. We continue to give great attention to the Mediterranean region since security in 
the whole of Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the 
Mediterranean. NATO's Mediterranean dialogue has continued to develop 
progressively, and thus contributes to enhancing security and stability in the 
Mediterranean region. The Mediterranean dialogue is an important component of 
the Alliance's policy of outreach and cooperation. We welcome the progress 
made by the Mediterranean Cooperation Group, created at the Madrid Summit, 
which has the overall responsibility for the Mediterranean dialogue under the 
authority of the North Atlantic Council, and the expansion of the dialogues with 
our Mediterranean Partners, including in a 16+1 format. We also welcome the 
establishment of an appropriately funded work program for cooperation activities, 
which will help in building confidence through cooperation on security-related 
issues, and we task the Council in Permanent Session to provide a progress report 
next year on its implementation. 
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14. We attach great importance to an early and successful completion of the process 
of the Alliance's internal adaptation, on the basis of decisions taken in Berlin and 
Brussels in 1996 and subsequently. The fundamental objectives of this adaptation 
are to maintain the Alliance's military effectiveness for the full range of its 
missions including collective defense and its ability to react to a wide range of 
contingencies, to preserve the transatlantic link, and to develop the European 
Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance. 
We received a comprehensive report describing the progress made since the 
Madrid Summit in the three main areas: the development of the Alliance's future 
1
 command structure; the implementation of the Combined Joint Task Forces 
concept; and the building of the European Security and Defense Identity within 
the Alliance. 
Substantial progress has been achieved on the Long-Term Study and an 
agreement has been reached on a new command structure as a whole, and in 
particular on the type, number and location of headquarters. The structure will 
comprise two Strategic Commands (SC), one for the Atlantic and one for Europe. 
SC Atlantic will comprise three Regional Commands (RC), RC West (Norfolk), 
RC East (Northwood) and RC Southeast (Lisbon) as well as STRIKFLTLANT 
and SUBACLANT, both based at Norfolk. In SC Europe, two RCs are foreseen -
RC North (Brunssum) and RC South (Naples). Two component commands (CC) 
- CC Air (Ramstein) and CC Nav (Northwood) - will report to RC North together 
with three Joint Sub-Regional Commands (JSRC) - JSRC Centre (Heidelberg), 
JSRC Northeast (Karup) and JSRC North (Stavanger). RC South will command 
two CCs - CC Air and CC Nav (both at Naples) - and four JSRCs - JSRC 
Southeast (Izmir), JSRC Southcentre (Larissa), JSRC South (Verona) and JSRC 
Southwest (Madrid). Taken together, this will represent a reduction from 65 
headquarters at present to 20 in the proposed new command structure. The 
NATO Military Authorities have been tasked to develop a detailed plan, as 
proposed by the Military Committee, for the transition to the new command 
structure, for consideration and endorsement by Ministers next year. 
Allies welcome Spain's announcement of its intention to join the Alliance's new 
military structure and thus to take part in the new command structure on which an 
agreement has been reached in the terms stated above. Spain's full participation 
will enhance its overall contribution to the security of the Alliance, help develop 
the European Security and Defense Identity within NATO and strengthen the 
transatlantic link. 
Implementation of the CJTF concept will enhance the Alliance's ability to plan 
and conduct quickly and effectively a wide range of military operations 
employing multinational and multi-service forces capable of being generated and 
deployed at short notice. We are pleased with the progress made in implementing 
the CJTF concept, noting that an initial trial has already successfully been 
conducted. 
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We note with satisfaction that work on building the ESDI within the Alliance is 
progressing in close cooperation with the WEU. Important work has been carried 
out on European command arrangements; on consultation and information-
sharing; the development of mechanisms for the identification, release, 
monitoring and return or recall of NATO assets and capabilities made available 
for WEU-led operations; on the planning and conduct of WEU-led operations 
involving the use of such assets and capabilities; the modalities for the WEU's 
involvement in NATO defense planning; and military planning and exercises for 
illustrative WEU missions. 
We welcome the steady strengthening of cooperative relations between NATO 
and the WEU, and the successful, ongoing consultation between our two 
organizations under the aegis of the NATO-WEU Joint Council. We will 
continue to develop the arrangements and procedures necessary for the planning, 
preparation, conduct and exercise of WEU-led operations using NATO assets and 
capabilities. In this context, we welcome the WEU's readiness to consult on and 
coordinate all ESDI-related work at the earliest possible stage, including through 
greater use of joint working groups and through the possibility of setting up ad 
hoc expert working groups on specific topics. In addition we welcome the 
decisions of the WEU Council of Ministers at Erfurt to improve the WEU's 
operational capability in relation to crisis management and peacekeeping 
operations (the Petersburg tasks). We also welcome the results of the WEU 
Ministerial Council in Erfurt that aim at enhanced forms of cooperation between 
WEU and NATO, supporting the process of translating the political directives 
formulated by the respective Ministerial Councils into practical links between 
both organizations leading in particular to arrangements for WEU-led operations 
making use of Alliance assets and capabilities. 
We task the Council in Permanent Session to pursue further work, as required, on 
internal adaptation and to report to us at our next meeting. 
15. The Alliance Strategic Concept adopted by our Heads of State and Government in 
Rome in 1991, sets out the principal aims and objectives of the Alliance. As 
Foreign Ministers, we attach particular importance to the far-reaching, positive 
political developments which have occurred since 1991 in the security landscape 
in Europe and to new cooperative security structures which are being built 
throughout the Euro-Atlantic region. We therefore endorse the terms of reference 
agreed by the Council in Permanent Session for the examination, and updating as 
necessary, of the Alliance Strategic Concept, as mandated by our Heads of State 
and Government in Madrid. This work will confirm our commitment to the core 
function of Alliance collective defense and the indispensable transatlantic link. 
We look forward to receiving a progress report at our next meeting on the 
substantive work, which will begin early in 1998 for presentation to Heads of 
State and Government at their next Summit meeting in April 1999. 
16. We reaffirm our commitment to further strengthening the OSCE as a primary 
instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-
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conflict rehabilitation as well as for enhancing cooperative security and advancing 
democracy and human rights. Examples of the important role the OSCE plays as 
a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter are its tasks as a 
flexible coordinating framework for international assistance in Albania, the 
mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the efforts of the Minsk Group, and the 
mission in Croatia which will acquire particular importance in 1998 after the 
termination of the UNTAES mandate. We are committed to supporting the 
OSCE's comprehensive approach to security and its work on a Common and 
Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century, in 
accordance with the decisions of the 1996 Lisbon Summit, including 
consideration of developing a Charter on European Security. We welcome the 
initiative of the Chairman-in-Office to strengthen non-hierarchical cooperation 
between security institutions which accept and adhere to the principles and 
commitments contained in the relevant OSCE documents. In this regard, we 
recall the precepts set out in the Lisbon Document that security organizations as 
such are transparent and predictable in their actions, whose members individually 
and collectively adhere to OSCE principles and commitments, and whose 
membership is based on open and voluntary commitments. We look forward to a 
productive and successful OSCE Ministerial meeting in Copenhagen later this 
week. 
17. NATO remains committed to the full and unconditional implementation of the 
Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the establishment of that 
country as a single, democratic and multi-ethnic state. We welcome the progress 
achieved in many areas, including the conduct of elections, the reduction of 
armaments and the reform and restructuring of police. In addition, many refugees 
have returned. However, much more could have been achieved had the 
authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina contributed their full share. Peace, and the 
institutions of civil society to uphold it, remain fragile^ 
Accordingly, we strongly endorse the conclusions of last week's Peace 
Implementation Conference (PIC) in Bonn that are intended to achieve further 
progress in consolidating the peace. We support the High Representative's 
intention to facilitate implementation of the Peace Agreement by using his 
authority fully to promote the resolution of difficulties through binding decisions, 
as he judges necessary, on the issues identified by the Peace Implementation 
Council. In this context, we also consider it important to achieve early progress 
on such basic matters as the building of common institutions, the creation of a 
common currency and common symbols, and the establishment of a uniform 
vehicle registration system. We confirm that our countries will continue to 
support those who support implementation of the Peace Agreement, and to oppose 
those who seek to obstruct the peace process. 
NATO contributes to consolidating the peace by organizing and leading a 
Stabilization Force (SFOR) with the participation of all 16 Allies and 20 non-
NATO countries, including Russia and 14 other Partners. At our meeting today, 
we reviewed the SFOR operation twelve months into its eighteen-month mission. 
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Following consultations last week with the non-NATO contributors, we 
confirmed that SFOR would continue at its present force levels, subject to prudent 
adjustments, until otherwise directed. This will allow SFOR to continue its firm 
and even-handed approach to implementing its mandate and supporting civil 
implementation. We extend our deep-felt appreciation to the men and women of 
SFOR for their essential contribution. We express deep sympathy to the families 
of those who have lost their lives and to those who have been injured in the cause 
of peace. 
To succeed, the Peace Agreement must continue to be implemented in an 
environment of general security. The PIC recognized and supported the emerging 
consensus on the need for a military presence to continue beyond June 1998. It 
was the PIC's judgment that such a force should provide appropriate support to 
civil implementation while being readily available and effective enough to 
respond quickly to events on the ground in and across Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
With this in mind, we have endorsed politico-military guidance to the NATO 
Military Authorities for the development of options for a NATO-led military 
presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina following the end of SFOR's mandate. 
NATO Military Authorities will provide these options to the Council in 
Permanent Session no later than mid-January 1998 to allow for the early selection 
of an option, following consultations with non-NATO contributors and a careful 
assessment of the likely security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina after 
SFOR's mandate expires in June 1998. 
We welcome the continuing development of the confidence- and security-building 
measures under Article II of Annex IB of the Peace Agreement and the successful 
completion of declared reduction liabilities under Article IV of Annex IB. We 
congratulate the parties on the reduction of almost 6,600 pieces of armament. We 
underline the importance of starting the Article V process without delay to build 
on the achievements reached under Article II and IV. Steps in this context should 
not prejudice the integrity of existing arms control and CSBM agreements. A 
broad security dialogue would represent a significant element in establishing 
regional stability. 
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Securing the peace over the long term will also require further steps to promote 
confidence and cooperation among the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and to encourage the development of democratic practices and central defense 
mechanisms such as the Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM). 
NATO is organizing courses for military and civilian defense officials of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina at the NATO School to promote reconciliation among the 
formerly warring factions. We have also decided to launch an initial set of 
security cooperation activities with Bosnia and Herzegovina to include both 
Entities and all three ethnic groups. These activities, to be coordinated through 
the SCMM, will include additional courses, seminars and an assessment of how 
NATO can assist the SCMM in becoming fully effective. 
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While NATO will do its part to consolidate the peace, ultimately this 
responsibility rests with the democratically elected officials of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, as well as with the other Parties to the Peace Agreement. We will 
continue to insist that the Parties to the Peace Agreement comply fully with their 
commitments, including the transfer of indicted war criminals to The Hague. The 
results of last month's elections in Republika Srpska show encouraging signs of 
emerging genuine multi-party politics, which are essential for a strong democracy. 
We look forward to the early establishment of a new government committed to 
implementing the Peace Agreement and thereby allowing the people in that part 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina to benefit more fully from the peace. 
We confirm that NATO's interest in stability extends beyond Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to the surrounding region. We share the concerns expressed at the 
PIC concerning the escalating ethnic tension in Kosovo and other areas. We call 
upon those concerned to refrain from activities that might exacerbate existing 
difficulties and to strive for mutually acceptable solutions through responsible 
dialogue. 
18. We share the commitment of all 30 States Parties to continued full 
implementation of the CFE Treaty, and its associated documents, including the 
Flank Agreement. We are determined that the adaptation of CFE will strengthen 
the Treaty's continued key role in the European security architecture and as a 
cornerstone of European stability and security. 
The agreement reached in July 1997 on the Basic Elements of CFE Treaty 
Adaptation was an important step in the adaptation process. We note with 
appreciation the substantial progress achieved by the Alliance's High Level Task 
Force in elaborating the Alliance position on the operation of the future Treaty's 
system of limitations, appropriate flexibilities and consultative mechanisms, with 
the aim of enhancing security and stability in Europe. Introduction of Allies' 
illustrative Territorial Ceilings, together with their underlying rationale, in the 
Vienna negotiation is a further indication of the importance we attach to progress 
on CFE adaptation and our determination to work cooperatively with other Treaty 
Partners. We will work as expeditiously as possible towards the conclusion of the 
adaptation negotiation as foreseen in the timetable agreed in Lisbon on 1st 
December 1996. We call on other CFE States Parties to engage actively in the 
negotiations, including by putting forward proposed equipment ceilings under the 
adapted Treaty, considering reductions in their entitlements as NATO Allies have 
already done. We hope that these common efforts will enhance the climate of 
cooperation and confidence. 
19. The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their 
means of delivery poses risks to the Alliance. The principal non-proliferation 
goal of the Alliance and its members is to prevent proliferation from occurring, 
or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means. We note the report of 
the Joint Committee on Proliferation regarding the activities of the Senior 
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Political-Military Group on Proliferation and the Senior Defense Group on 
Proliferation. 
The Alliance shares with its Partners many of the risks arising from the 
proliferation of NBC weapons. We will therefore pursue a dialogue on this issue 
in the framework of EAPC and with Russia and Ukraine, with the aim of 
enhancing our cooperation in countering these risks. 
20. We note with satisfaction that implementation of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention is proceeding well, and that the number of countries ratifying this 
important agreement continues to grow. We particularly welcome the CWC 
ratification by the Russian Federation in early November. We urge all states that 
have not yet signed and ratified the Convention to do so, and call upon those that 
have ratified to carry out fully their obligations under the Convention. 
We continue to endorse efforts to negotiate an effective verification regime to 
strengthen the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. 
We support early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and an 
early start to negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. 
We continue to urge the Russian Federation to ratify the START II Treaty as soon 
as possible, so that negotiations on START III can begin. In this context, we 
welcome the agreements signed by Secretary Albright and Foreign Minister 
Primakov on 26th September 1997 to enhance the prospects for Russia's 
ratification of START II. We urge Russia to honor its commitments as stated by 
President Yeltsin in 1992 to substantially reduce its tactical nuclear weapons 
stockpile. 
We attach great importance to the Treaty on Open Skies and urge the Russian 
Federation, Belarus and Ukraine to take the necessary steps to permit its entry into 
force. 
We welcome the signing in Ottawa on 3rd and 4th December, 1997 of the 
Convention on the prohibition of the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of 
anti-personnel landmines and on their destruction. The impact of this agreement 
on NATO will be fully assessed in the months ahead. We will take the necessary 
action to ensure that national obligations under the Convention are compatible 
with our obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty. We welcome the efforts 
pursued in the Conference on Disarmament and in other fora on the issue of anti-
personnel mines and urge the Conference to intensify its efforts to achieve 
progress on the issue. 
21. We recognize the achievements of the NATO Science Program in fostering 
transatlantic exchanges and intra-Alliance cohesion. We welcome ongoing efforts 
to adjust the Program to NATO's new structures and tasks. 
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22. We strongly condemn all acts of terrorism. We will continue to support all efforts 
to combat terrorism, including using arrangements in the Alliance for consultation 
on threats of a wider nature that affect Alliance security interests. In accordance 
with our national legislation, we stress the need for the most effective cooperation 
possible to prevent and suppress this scourge. 
23. We accepted with pleasure an invitation from the United States to host the 
meeting of Allied Heads of State and Government in Washington in Spring 1999, 
on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty. 
24. The Spring 1998 meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session will 
be held in Luxembourg, on 28th May 1998. 
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1. At our meeting today, we discussed preparations for the Alliance's next Summit 
meeting in Washington in April 1999. At this Summit, which will mark the 50th 
anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, we will celebrate the 
historic achievements of NATO as a strong, united and successful Alliance and 
will welcome the three invited countries - the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland - as members of the Alliance. The Summit will also provide an 
opportunity to define the Alliance's role for the future, including ever closer 
relations with Partner countries. Accordingly, we recommend to our Heads of 
State and Government that at the Washington Summit they set out their shared 
vision of the Alliance in the years ahead - an Alliance adapted, renewed and ready 
to meet the security challenges of the 21 st century 
We reviewed the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the future of the 
NATO-led Stabilization Force, and consulted on the situation in and around 
Kosovo. On both these important subjects, we have issued separate statements. 
We have also issued a separate statement on "Adaptation of the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): Restraint and Flexibility". We 
gave additional guidance to the Alliance's ongoing work in implementing the 
decisions of the Madrid Summit of July 1997 to shape the new NATO. We are 
pleased with the successful completion by all Allies of the ratification process for 
the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the Washington 
Treaty. We welcome the progress made in preparations for membership by the 
invited countries, and encourage them and the NATO Military Authorities to 
accelerate their efforts towards completion of the relevant minimum military 
requirements of the Alliance. The membership of these countries will contribute 
to an overall strengthening of the Alliance and to enhancing security and stability 
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in Europe. We look forward to welcoming the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland as our new Allies before the Washington Summit. 
2. We reaffirm that the door remains open to NATO membership under Article 10 of 
the North Atlantic Treaty and in accordance with Paragraph 8 of the Madrid 
Summit Declaration. Taking into account a report on the intensified dialogue on 
membership questions, we reviewed this process, as mandated by our Heads of 
State and Government, in preparation for the comprehensive review which they 
will carry out at their meeting in Washington. We tasked the Council in 
Permanent Session to develop for the Washington Summit a comprehensive 
package that will continue the enlargement process, operationalize our 
commitment to the open door policy and underscore our willingness to assist 
aspiring countries in meeting NATO standards. 
3. We received a comprehensive report describing the progress made in our internal 
adaptation, to which we continue to attach great importance. The fundamental 
objectives of this adaptation are to maintain the Alliance's military effectiveness 
for the full range of its missions building on its essential collective defense 
capabilities and its ability to react to a wide range of contingencies, to preserve 
the transatlantic link, and to develop the European Security and Defense Identity 
(ESDI) within the Alliance. Implementation of the Combined Joint Task Forces 
(CJTF) concept and preparations for implementation of the new command 
structure are well in hand. Our aim is to have the necessary preparations 
completed to enable the Council to take a single and irreversible decision on the 
activation requests of all headquarters of the new NATO command structure by 
the beginning of March 1999, and we tasked the Council in Permanent Session 
accordingly. 
We reviewed the progress made in building the ESDI within NATO and welcome 
the close cooperation and consultation with the WEU in this regard. Regular 
meetings of the NATO and WEU Councils in Joint Session and of subordinate 
bodies, and arrangements for close consultation on the planning and conduct of 
WEU-led operations and exercises involving the use of NATO assets and 
capabilities, are important elements of the development of ESDI within the 
Alliance. Preparation within the Alliance for WEU-led operations making use of 
Alliance assets and capabilities is now well advanced. In this context, we 
welcome the results of the joint workshop on the NATO-WEU consultation 
process and look forward to a crisis management seminar in February 1999, 
leading up to a joint NATO-WEU crisis management exercise in 2000. We 
appreciate the steady strengthening of cooperative links between NATO and the 
WEU which was reaffirmed at the WEU Council of Ministers held in Rome on 
16th-17th November. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to ensure that 
the key elements of the work on implementing the Berlin and Brussels decisions 
relating to ESDI are in place, as set out in the report on internal adaptation 
submitted to us, by the Washington Summit. Moreover, we direct the Council to 
make recommendations on how best to further enhance the effectiveness of ESDI 
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within the Alliance, including the contribution made by all European Allies, 
beyond the Washington Summit. 
4. We reviewed the ongoing work on the examination^ and updating as necessary, of 
the Alliance's Strategic Concept, as mandated by our Heads of State and 
Government at their Summit meeting in Madrid in July 1997. This work must 
ensure that the Strategic Concept is fully consistent with the Alliance's new 
security environment. It should reaffirm our commitment to collective defense 
and the transatlantic link; take account of the challenges the Alliance now faces; 
and present an Alliance ready and with a full range of capabilities to enhance 
security and stability for countries in the Euro-Atlantic area in the 21st century, 
including through dialogue, cooperation and partnership and, where appropriate, 
non-Article 5 crisis response operations, such as that in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
with the possible participation of partners. We instructed the Council in 
Permanent Session to pursue this work vigorously so that the new text is available 
by the time of the Washington Summit. 
5. We are pleased that the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and an 
enhanced Partnership for Peace (PfP) are resulting in a stronger consultative 
forum and a more operational Partnership. This will improve the ability of Allies 
and Partners to contribute to security and stability through political consultations 
and practical cooperation. The EAPC has proven a valuable forum for 
consultations on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and on the crisis in 
Kosovo. We received a comprehensive progress report on implementation of the 
EAPC Basic Document and the enhanced Partnership for Peace. 
We welcome the EAPC's substantial updated Action Plan for 1998 - 2000 which 
includes exploring new issues. In the area of arms control, disarmament and non-
proliferation issues, these would include arms control, political and defense 
efforts against proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and 
missiles, and arms trafficking, control of small arms transfers and means of 
encouraging de-mining. 
We welcome as a positive development the inauguration last June of the Euro-
Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre, which has already coordinated 
emergency aid for relief operations in Albania and Ukraine. 
6. The Partnership for Peace continues to be the focal point of our efforts to build 
with Partners new patterns of practical military and defense-related cooperation 
across a wide range of issues. 
We note with satisfaction the ongoing discussions with Partners on the 
development of a political-military framework for NATO-led PfP operations. 
This will enhance future cooperation by establishing a basis for Partner 
involvement in political consultations and decision-making, command 
arrangements and operational planning for NATO-led non-Article 5 operations. 
The political-military framework will be a key element in future cooperation and 
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will provide for an increased role of Partners in one of the Alliance's major new 
tasks. The intention is to finalize this work, in tandem with the Strategic Concept, 
by the Washington Summit. 
We welcome the Concept for PfP Training Centers, which will advance the broad 
politico-military goals of PfP's overall education and training efforts, particularly 
in supporting enhanced military cooperation and interoperability. 
We are pleased that a substantial number of interested Partner countries are taking 
up the opportunity, provided under the expanded Planning and Review Process 
(PARP), to adopt initial Partnership goals in Spring 1999. This is an important 
effort towards closer Partner cooperation with Alliance structures and procedures, 
in particular by enhancing interoperability, a priority for the Alliance. 
We welcome the increased attention given to multinational formations as a means 
to enhance military cooperation between Allies and Partners, as in IFOR/SFOR in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
We tasked the Council in Permanent Session to put together, with Partners, the 
initiatives above and other work now underway to form a coherent package of 
measures intended to reinforce PfP's operational capabilities for the Washington 
Summit. 
Partnership for Peace program can also play an important role in contributing to 
Alliance efforts in reinforcing regional stability, such as in the Balkans. In this 
context, the Alliance has promoted, with participation of Partners, a substantive 
program of assistance to Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia. 
7. We are encouraged by the developing process of consultation and practical 
cooperation with Russia under the auspices of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) 
and remain committed to working together with Russia to achieve a strong, stable 
and enduring partnership, On the basis of the principles of common interest, 
reciprocity and transparency, as called for in the NATO-Russia Founding Act. 
The crisis in Kosovo has confirmed the value of the PJC as a consultative forum. 
The ongoing SFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a valuable 
example of practical cooperation between NATO and Russia. 
We are pleased that military-to-military cooperation is progressing well, and that 
agreement has been reached on the establishment of a NATO Military Liaison 
Mission in Moscow by the end of this year. 
We look forward to signing with Russia a Memorandum of Understanding on 
Environmental Protection and to establishing as soon as possible a NATO 
Information Office in Moscow. We welcome the establishment of the NATO-
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Russia Scientific and Technological Cooperation Committee, which recently held 
its inaugural meeting in Moscow; agreement on the establishment of an 
Information and Consultation Centre in Moscow on the retraining of retired 
military personnel; and Russian participation in the PfP exercise "Cooperative 
Assembly". We will continue to work closely with Russia to develop an updated 
and substantial Individual Partnership Program (IPP) to include a wide range of 
practical defense-related and military-to-military cooperative activities. 
8. We reaffirm our view that Ukraine has a key role to play in European security. 
We attach importance to the development of strong and active practical 
cooperation and political consultations with Ukraine, under the aegis of the 
NATO-Ukraine Charter. We welcome the announcement by the President of 
Ukraine of a "State Program of Cooperation with NATO to the Year 2001" as a 
tangible signal of Ukraine's commitment to a productive relationship with NATO. 
We intend to utilize as fully as possible the potential offered by Ukraine's active 
participation in enhanced PfP and the agreed NATO-Ukraine Work Plan for 1999. 
We also note with satisfaction the growing military cooperation between NATO 
and Ukraine. The newly established NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on 
Defense Reform is a unique partnership program. 
We welcome the agreement to be signed tomorrow on the appointment of two 
NATO liaison officers to Kyiv to enhance mutual cooperation. We will continue 
to support an active information effort in Ukraine through the NATO Information 
and Documentation Centre in Kyiv. 
9. Security in Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the 
Mediterranean. We therefore give great attention to our Mediterranean Dialogue 
which is part of the Alliance's cooperative approach to security, contributes to 
building confidence with participating countries and mutually reinforces other 
international efforts towards this end. We look forward to the positive 
contribution that the newly designated Allied Contact Point Embassies will have 
in fostering the Dialogue. We are committed to further improving the political, 
civil and military aspects of our Dialogue. We encourage Partners in the 
Dialogue to take full advantage of all its possibilities, including in the military 
field. We are ready to consider possibilities to enhanqe cooperation with 
participating countries in preparation for the Washington Summit. 
10. The establishment of the Kosovo Verification Missions has opened a new stage in 
cooperation between NATO and the OSCE. Through the close coordination with 
the OSCE over the last months in the planning and establishment of these 
missions, and our continuing cooperation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we have 
further demonstrated in practice our ability to work together in crisis situations. 
We also welcome the strengthening of relations between NATO and the OSCE 
over the past year, in the spirit of the OSCE's Common Concept for the 
Development of Cooperation between Mutually Reinforcing Institutions. We 
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continue to support the efforts of the OSCE to develop a Document-Charter on 
European Security, worthy of adoption at the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999. 
We welcome the outcome of the OSCE Oslo Ministerial of 2nd-3rd December 
1998. 
11. We continue to consider the CFE Treaty as a cornerstone of European security. 
We are committed to a successful adaptation of the Treaty. We will play our full 
part in seeking to complete this by the time of the OSCE Istanbul Summit. To 
this end, we will support efforts aimed at the resolution of key outstanding issues 
and the start of drafting work in the first months of next year. To assist this 
process, the North Atlantic Council and the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
have today issued a separate statement entitled "Adaptation of the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): Restraint and Flexibility." Pending 
Entry into Force of the Adapted Treaty, we regard continued strict 
implementation of the current Treaty and its associated documents as vital. 
12. We welcome the communique of the five nuclear weapons states of 4th June this 
year affirming their commitments relating to nuclear disarmament under Article 
VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We call on Russia to ratify the 
START II Treaty without delay. This would pave the way for considerable 
reductions of nuclear arsenals and would allow negotiations on a START III 
Treaty aiming at further far-reaching reductions of nuclear weapons stockpiles. 
We remain committed to an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty, and call upon all countries to accede to and implement the Treaty in due 
course. We support the early conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. 
13. The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their 
means of delivery continues to be a matter of serious concern for the Alliance. 
We note the report of the Joint Committee on Proliferation regarding the activities 
of the Senior Political-Military Group on Proliferation and the Senior Defense 
Group on Proliferation. The Alliance and its members remain committed to 
preventing proliferation and to reversing it, should it occur, through diplomatic 
means. At the same time, we recognize that proliferation can pose a direct threat 
to the Alliance. Building on the successful work of the NATO groups on 
proliferation, we are prepared to expand NATO's efforts to address the evolving 
proliferation threat. We therefore task the Council in Permanent Session to 
prepare for the Washington Summit proposals for an initiative to ensure that the 
Alliance has the political and military capabilities to address appropriately and 
effectively the challenges of the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of 
delivery. , 
14. We underline the risk to international and regional stability posed by the spread of 
NBC weapons. In particular, we urge all countries to accede to arid fully 
implement the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the cornerstone of the non-
proliferation regime. 
15. We are determined to achieve progress on a legally binding protocol including 
effective verification measures to enhance compliance and promote transparency 
that strengthens the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
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Convention. We re-emphasize the importance of universal adherence to the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. 
16. We call on Russia, Ukraine and Belarus to ratify the Open Skies Treaty without 
delay. 
17. Terrorism constitutes a serious threat to peace, security and stability which can 
threaten the territorial integrity of States. We reiterate our condemnation of 
terrorism and reaffirm our determination to combat it in accordance with our 
international commitments and national legislation. 
190 
APPENDIX D 
Press Communique M-NAC-2 (1999) 166 held at NATO HQ Brussels 15 Dec 1999 
Final Communique 
Issued at the Ministerial Meeting 
of the North Atlantic Council 
1. At our meeting today, we recalled NATO's major achievements in 1999: 
o We set forth NATO's vision for the 21st century and approved an updated 
Strategic Concept at the Washington Summit, where we also celebrated 
the Alliance's 50th Anniversary; 
o We admitted as new members the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland; 
and 
o We contributed decisively, in particular through the conduct of our air 
campaign and the subsequent deployment of KFOR, to the international 
community's objective of creating the basis for long-term peace and 
stability in Kosovo. 
We reviewed progress in implementing the Washington Summit decisions and 
took steps1 to further adapt the Alliance to the new security environment. We 
reaffirmed the Alliance's commitment to its fundamental security tasks, as set out 
in the Strategic Concept, and the importance of our individual and collective 
efforts to achieve our guiding objective of enhancing the security and stability of 
the Euro-Atlantic area. 
2. Against the background of political developments in the Balkans, we reviewed the 
status of NATO's comprehensive approach and continuing commitment to the 
promotion of security, stability, peace and democracy, and the peaceful resolution 
of disputes in the region, including through the NATO-led operations in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and in Kosovo, and the implementation of NATO's South-East 
Europe Initiative. Through the Council in Permanent Session and the NATO 
Military Authorities, we continue to monitor closely" the situation across the 
region. 
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3. We pay tribute to the service-men and women of all nations who are serving in 
the Balkans for their professionalism and dedication to the cause of peace and 
stability. We express deep sympathy to the families of those who have lost their 
lives and to those who have been injured in the cause of peace. 
4. The Kosovo air campaign, which demonstrated the cohesion and unity of the 
Alliance and its determination to act, reinforced the diplomatic efforts of the 
international community and achieved the key objectives of the NATO Allies and 
their Partners. The humanitarian catastrophe has ended; some 850,000 refugees 
have returned; a NATO-led international peace force (KFOR) has been 
successfully deployed; and the international community has assumed 
responsibility for the civil administration through the United Nations Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK). 
5. We are determined to play our part in meeting in full the aims of the international 
community as set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1244. We remain 
committed to a peaceful, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo where all peoples 
can live in peace and security and enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on 
an equal basis, including through participation in democratic institutions. 
We noted the progress made in restoring peace and stability since the deployment 
of KFOR in Kosovo in accordance with UNSCR 1244, in particular the reduction 
in violence and the re-establishment of civil institutions. We commend the work 
undertaken by UNMIK and are pleased with the excellent level of co-ordination 
and cooperation established between KFOR and UNMIK. Close civil-military 
relations are essential for the success of our common goals and of our peace-
building efforts in the region. In this respect, we have invited the UN Secretary 
General's Special Representative, Dr. Kouchner, to tomorrow's meeting of the 
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. 
6. While progress has been achieved, much remains to be done, in particular the 
continued protection of all ethnic groups and minorities. We condemn all acts of 
violence and intimidation from whatever quarter. We underline KFOR's 
determination to put an end to ethnically motivated violence and to act swiftly and 
decisively against all perpetrators, including through maintaining an effective 
military presence in Serb minority areas. We strongly commend KFOR's 
determination to combat arms trafficking, illegal possession of weapons, the 
development of parallel structures that threaten KFOR or UNMIK objectives or 
the rule of law, to monitor and provide security at the borders and boundaries of 
Kosovo and to work with UNMIK to avoid canonization. 
The achievement of the de-militarization and the dissolution of the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) under the supervision of KFOR was an important step in 
establishing an environment for post-conflict reconciliation. We welcome the 
establishment of a civilian, multi-ethnic Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) as 
another important step in the development of a civil society for the benefit of all 
communities. Close control of the KPC by UNMIK and KFOR is essential. We 
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underscore KFOR's determination to continue to provide day-to-day operational 
direction and tasking, under the overall authority of the United Nations Secretary 
General's Special Representative. / 
KFOR will continue to co-operate closely with UNMIK, providing support to its 
efforts towards establishing a fully functioning administration and democratic 
institutions, promoting the rule of law and respect for human rights, and assuring 
the safe return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes. It will be 
vital that UNMIK is adequately funded and staffed to fulfill its mission, 
particularly in the area of local administration and civilian international police. 
We will continue to do our utmost to provide a secure environment and we will 
give appropriate support for the conduct of free and fair elections under the 
auspices of the OSCE, which are to be held next year. We will also continue to 
provide strong support for the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia. 
We urge all community leaders in Kosovo, irrespective of their ethnic 
background, to work together and with the international community in the 
reconstruction of Kosovo and the establishment of a democratic society founded 
on the rule of law, tolerance and respect for human rights. We call in particular 
on the leadership of the Kosovar Albanian community to renounce violence, to 
demonstrate its commitment to a tolerant, democratic, multi-ethnic Kosovo, and 
to co-operate with UNMIK and KFOR against those who advocate and practice 
violence. In this context we welcome the creation by UNMIK of a Joint Interim 
Administrative Structure, and in particular the establishment of an Interim 
Administrative Council. We are encouraged by Kosovar Albanian agreement to 
participate in these structures, and underline the importance of early participation 
by representatives of all Kosovar peoples, including the Serb community. We 
expect all parties to co-operate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia, including by facilitating the conduct of its investigations. 
The continuing support of the international community will depend upon an 
adequate response to these requirements. 
Our common efforts in Kosovo demonstrate the value of the concept of mutually 
reinforcing institutions, a concept long championed by the Alliance. In this 
respect, our individual bilateral efforts, the substantial role of the EU and that of 
other international bodies, are making a decisive contribution to the economic 
reconstruction of Kosovo. We also commend the UNHCR for organizing relief 
efforts and resettlement, the UN Mine Action Centre for its role in coordinating 
the removal of mines, and the OSCE for its institution-building, human rights 
work and training of Kosovo police. We also express our appreciation for the 
significant role played by the many non-governmental organizations. 
We express our deep appreciation for the robust practical and political support 
provided by Partner countries of the region throughout the air campaign and 
thereafter. This support was and remains critical to success. In particular, we 
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reiterate our appreciation for the ongoing efforts of Albania and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in supporting KFOR. 
We are grateful to NATO's Partners and other nations for the substantial 
contributions they are making to efforts to bring peace and stability to the 
Balkans, which are the practical expressions of these countries' commitment to 
our shared values. 
10. The crisis in Kosovo demonstrated the resilience of the Dayton/Paris Peace 
Agreement. The Alliance remains committed to supporting a peaceful future for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single democratic state composed of two multi-
ethnic Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika 
Srpska. We are encouraged by the continuing progress in the full implementation 
of the Dayton Agreement. We welcome the appointment of Ambassador Petritsch 
as High Representative, whose vigorous approach to the implementation of the 
Dayton Agreement we strongly support. We note in particular the progress made 
in: 
o the development of functioning civil institutions; 
o increases in the level of refugee returns, especially to areas in which 
returnees are in the minority; 
o civil reconstruction; 
o reduction in arms holdings; and 
o the development of the role of the Standing Committee on Military 
Matters. 
We also welcome the progress made in the ongoing arms control and confidence 
building negotiations in the framework of the Dayton Agreement with the goal of 
establishing a regional balance in and around the former Yugoslavia. We urge all 
parties to demonstrate fully their commitment to the Dayton process and their 
cooperation with the High Representative, as the basis for further progress in 
transferring administrative responsibility to local authorities. 
11. SFOR has helped to secure a more stable and secure environment in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. As a result, it has been able to undertake significant restructuring. 
Early next year a smaller, more flexible force will be in place and will remain 
fully capable of carrying out its mandate. SFOR will continue to contribute to the 
maintenance of a secure environment and to give targeted and focused support to 
civilian implementation. In this respect, we fully endorse SFOR's close working 
relationship with the High Representative and other civil agencies in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and in particular SFOR's continuing strong support for the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in bringing 
indicted war criminals to justice. 
12. Despite this encouraging progress, important challenges remain, such as; 
o the return of displaced persons to minority areas; 
o further reduction of both Entities'armed forces; 
o further progress in humanitarian de-mining; 
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o improving the effectiveness of all common institutions, notably the 
Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and cooperation between Entities; 
o transferring to the ICTY persons indicted for war crimes; 
o the fight against corruption, organized crime and illegal secret services; 
o judicial and police reform; and 
" b the establishment of a state border service. 
Accordingly, we expect the Entities to work together fully in co-ordination with 
the Presidency, the Council of Ministers and on all other levels. We applaud the 
spirit of cooperation exhibited among the common institutions and between 
authorities of both Entities during preparations for hosting the Stability Pact 
Summit. We call upon the Presidency to implement in full the commitments 
made in the New York Declaration of 15 November, and to support the work of 
the Standing Committee on Military Matters. We also demand that all parties 
fully co-operate with the ICTY, in particular by surrendering inductees within 
their territory. Only on the basis of justice can a lasting peace be established. We 
emphasize the fundamental significance of implementing market oriented 
economic reforms. 
Taken together, these steps will reinforce the efforts of the High Representative to 
make the leaders and authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina the "owners" of the 
process of peace implementation and open the way to the integration of their 
country into Euro-Atlantic institutions. As Co-chair of the Stability Pact Working 
Table on Security Issues, Bosnia and Herzegovina can play an important role in 
promoting stability in the region. 
13. We remain concerned about continued tensions between Belgrade and the 
democratically elected government of Montenegro. We are therefore paying 
close attention to developments there. We call on both sides to resolve their 
differences in a peaceful and pragmatic way and refrain from any destabilizing 
measures. We express our support for the objective of a peaceful and democratic 
FRY, which protects the rights of all minorities, including those in Vojvodina and 
Sandjak. This would open the way for the eventual return of the FRY to the 
Euro-Atlantic family of nations. 
14. The forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections in Croatia will be 
crucial for its future. We hope that the entire Croatian leadership will seize the 
chance to re-vitalize implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, and 
demonstrate their commitment to democratic elections and due constitutional 
process. There is an opportunity for the next Croatian government to move 
towards a closer relationship with Euro-Atlantic institutions. 
15. Our goal remains the integration of all the countries of South-East Europe into the 
Euro-Atlantic Community. To this end, we are building on the Alliance's already 
extensive cooperation in 4he region as evidenced by NATO's leadership of the 
SFOR and KFOR operations. The South-East Europe Initiative, launched at our 
Washington Summit, is also working to achieve this goal, including through PfP 
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tools, the EAPC and the Consultative Forum, which all play valuable roles in our 
post-conflict efforts to win permanent peace in the region. Today we received a 
consolidated progress report on the South-East Europe Initiative and we note with 
satisfaction the range of activities already undertaken, by the countries in the 
region and by Allies, with the aim of harmonizing assistance program for the 
states of the region, as appropriate. 
NATO's South-East Europe Initiative promotes regional security and cooperation; 
it supports and complements the objectives of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern 
J Europe, adopted by Ministers in Cologne in June and endorsed by Heads of State 
and Government at the Sarajevo Summit in July. NATO is participating fully in 
the work of the Regional Table and the Working Tables established to implement 
the Stability Pact. The Alliance will continue to contribute to the success of the 
Stability Pact by making available its wealth of experience and expertise in 
practical military and defense-related cooperation and by ensuring that our efforts 
complement and contribute to the goals of the Pact. 
We welcome the constructive contribution of Partners and other nations of South-
East Europe to the stabilization of that region. We applaud the engagement of 
Montenegro in the Stability Pact and look forward to the time when the FRY will 
be able to play its rightful part in this endeavor. 
We direct the Council in Permanent session to pursue vigorously the various 
efforts under the South-East Europe Initiative and the Alliance's contribution to 
the objectives of the Stability Pact, and to report on progress by the time of our 
next meeting. 
16. In its Strategic Concept, NATO has committed itself to contribute to effective 
conflict prevention. Our common efforts to build peace and security in Kosovo, 
to support a peaceful future for Bosnia and Herzegovina and to enhance 
cooperation, including security cooperation, in South-Eastern Europe, are 
examples of such contributions by the Alliance, as are the recent initiatives to 
promote practical regional cooperation in the EAPC/PfP framework. We direct 
the Council in Permanent Session to continue to consider means to ensure an 
effective and coherent Alliance contribution to the efforts of the international 
community to prevent and defuse conflicts, and to make recommendations where 
and if appropriate. 
17. Our experience in Kosovo has confirmed that NATO must continue to adapt and 
improve its defense capabilities to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational 
operations across the full range of Alliance missions. Implementation of the 
Defense Capabilities Initiative (DO), agreed in Washington, will ensure that 
NATO's forces can meet the challenges of mobility, deployability, sustainability, 
effective engagement, survivability and interoperable and effective command, 
control and communications systems. The DCI will also promote greater 
interoperability among Alliance forces and, where applicable, between Allied and 
Partner forces. The DCI is essential to strengthening European defense 
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capabilities and the European pillar of NATO, so that European Allies will be 
able to make a stronger and more coherent contribution to NATO. It will also 
improve their capability to undertake EU-led operations where the Alliance as a 
whole is not engaged. We are encouraged by the useful initial results achieved to 
date in implementing the D O and look forward to further essential improvements 
in Alliance defense capabilities. Though the implementation of DCI is first and 
foremost a national responsibility, the provision of adequate resources, including 
multinational, joint and common funding arrangements, will be a critical factor. 
18. The development of an effective ESDI will strengthen the Alliance, through 
which we remain ready to pursue common security objectives wherever possible. 
We are committed to reinforcing the Alliance's European pillar. Building on 
existing arrangements between NATO and the WEU as agreed in Berlin, and 
reaffirmed at our Washington Summit, we support the development within NATO 
of separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European 
requirements and contribute to Alliance security. These developments will also 
result in a stronger and more balanced transatlantic relationship. 
19. We have set in train work on the development of the European Security and 
Defense Identity within the Alliance as set out in the Washington Summit 
Communique and the Strategic Concept. In this context, we have initiated 
discussions in the Alliance to address means to ensure the development of 
effective mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency, building on the 
mechanisms existing between NATO and the WEU; participation of non-EU 
European Allies; as well as practical arrangements for assured EU access to 
NATO planning capabilities and for ready EU access to NATO collective assets 
and capabilities on a case-by-ease basis and by consensus as set out at 
Washington. 
20. Alliance work will proceed on the Washington Summit agenda, on an ongoing 
basis, taking into account the evolution of relevant arrangements in the EU. In 
this regard, we note the results of the European Council meeting in Helsinki on 
the strengthening of the common European policy on security and defense and on 
the development of modalities for EU/NATO relations, which represent a major 
contribution to the process of reinforcing our Alliance and its European pillar. 
We acknowledge the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for 
autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where 
the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. We note that this process will avoid 
unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army. In 
this regard: 
a. We note the European Union's decision to set a common European 
headline goal and to develop collective capability goals to improve 
European military capabilities. The contribution of the non-EU European 
Allies to this process is and will be important. We applaud the 
determination of all European Allies to take the necessary steps to 
strengthen their defense capabilities. The EU's headline and capability 
goals and the objectives arising from NATO's DCI will be mutually 
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reinforcing, using - subject to the necessary decisions - existing defense 
planning procedures including, as appropriate, those available in NATO 
and the Planning and Review Process of the PfP, noting that in addition 
EU Ministers will develop a method of consultation and a regular review 
of progress made. 
b. We reiterate our readiness to define and adopt, in accordance with our 
decisions taken in Washington, the necessary arrangements for European 
Union ready access to separable but not separate NATO collective assets 
and capabilities, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not 
engaged militarily as an Alliance, respecting the requirements of NATO 
operations and the coherence of its command structure. 
c. We note the decision of the EU to set up, in future, appropriate structures 
to ensure the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with 
European NATO members which are not members of the EU on issues 
related to European security and defense policy and crisis management. In 
this respect, we underline, as we did at the Washington Summit, the 
importance of finding solutions satisfactory to all Allies, for the necessary 
involvement of non-EU European Allies in these structures. 
We note that the non-EU European NATO members will participate, if 
they so wish, in the event of an operation involving the use of NATO 
assets and capabilities, and that they will be invited, upon decision by the 
EU, to take part in other EU-led Operations. We see these EU decisions as 
important steps to achieve the goals envisaged by our Heads of State and 
Government at the Washington Summit. Participation of non-EU 
European Allies will enhance the effectiveness of EU-led military 
operations and will contribute directly to the effectiveness and vitality of 
the European pillar of NATO. 
d. We recognize the European Union's decision to establish permanent 
political and military structures and interim bodies, and its commitment to 
develop, under the Portuguese Presidency, modalities for full consultation, 
cooperation and transparency between NATO and the EU. We note that 
this, as with all the tasks entrusted to the Portuguese Presidency, is to be 
carried forward as a matter of priority. We reciprocate the EU's intention 
to develop appropriate modalities for a close and confident relationship 
between the two organizations. We welcome as a first step the informal 
contacts between the NATO Secretary General and the EU High 
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
21. We welcome the participation in our discussions of Dr. Javier Solana. As 
Secretary General of the Western European Union, his presence symbolizes the ' 
close relationship that has developed between NATO and the WEU. The Alliance 
continues to work with the WEU to complete and implement arrangements to 
facilitate cooperation between the two organizations in the event of a WEU-led 
military operation using NATO assets and capabilities. We look forward to 
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exercising these arrangements in a crisis management exercise between NATO 
and the WEU scheduled for February 2G00. 
22. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to proceed with its work as set out at 
the Washington Summit, taking into account the developments described above, 
and report to us at our next meeting. 
23. The Alliance reaffirms its commitment to remain open to new members. The 
Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing 
and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as 
NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall 
political and strategic interests of the Alliance and the inclusion would enhance 
overall European security and stability. The three new members will not be the 
last. 
At the Washington Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government approved a 
Membership Action Plan (MAP) to reinforce NATO's commitment to the 
openness of the Alliance. We have received today a report on the implementation 
of the MAP to date. We are pleased that the MAP process has made an effective 
start and met with a positive response of the nine aspiring countries. Aspirants 
have submitted annual national program which enable the Alliance to provide 
them with direct advice, feedback and assistance on their preparations for possible 
future membership. 
24. We encourage all aspirants to set themselves realistic, prioritized goals and 
timelines and to allocate the necessary resources to them. We stand ready to 
assist the aspirants in their efforts to meet the goals they have set. To this end, we 
will develop with them Planning Targets in the defense/military field and tailored 
PfP Individual Partnership Program. Meetings of the Council will take place next 
Spring with each aspirant to examine progress made. We will keep the 
enlargement process, including implementation of the MAP, under continual 
review. We expect the annual consolidated progress report on activities under the 
MAP at our next Ministerial. 
25. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council remains the key forum for regular 
consultation on security and defense related issues between the Alliance and its 
Partners. We welcome the expansion of activities within the EAPC/PfP 
framework to promote practical cooperation, including regional cooperation 
notably in South-East Europe, as well as in the Caucasus and Central Asia. 
Enhanced cooperation in support of, inter alia, peacekeeping, global humanitarian 
mine action and addressing the challenges of small arms and light weapons 
underline the role of the EAPC as a vital and dynamic institution in enhancing 
security in the Euro-Atlantic area. 
26. We are pleased with the progress made in implementing the Washington Summit 
decision to further enhance the Partnership for Peace and make it more 
operational. We welcome the approval of the first Ministerial Guidance of the 
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PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) and the development of Partnership 
goals as a substantial step forward in bringing the force planning processes of 
Partners closer to those of Allies. We also welcome the progress that has been 
made in involving Partners as troop contributing nations in consultations, 
planning, conduct and political oversight of the present operations in the Balkans, 
in accordance with the Political-Military Framework (PMF) for NATO-led PfP 
operations. We endorse the Operational Capabilities Concept which will 
reinforce PfP's operational capabilities and improve the capability and 
interoperability of Partner forces, as well as enhance the Alliance's overall ability 
to put together tailored force packages to mount and sustainiuture NATO-led PfP 
operations along the lines of SFOR and KFOR. The Concept will continue to 
evolve. We appreciate the substantial progress achieved so far on the Training 
and Education Enhancement Program. We look forward to a report by the 
Council in Permanent Session on progress made on these important initiatives at 
our Spring 2000 meeting. 
27. We welcome the recent signing by Ireland of the PfP Framework Document and 
we look forward to close cooperation with Ireland in the PfP and EAPC. 
28. We continue to attach importance to consultations and practical cooperation with 
Russia. Our aim remains to establish a strong, stable and enduring partnership 
within the framework of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. 
29. We note the progress made in recent consultations in the PJC framework on 
issues relating to the operation in Kosovo. We note with satisfaction the valuable 
experience of practical cooperation between NATO and Russian forces both in 
SFOR and KFOR. 
30. We encourage Russia to resume cooperation on the broad range of issues foreseen 
in the Founding Act and to engage actively in the EAPC and the Partnership for 
Peace. At the same time, we emphasize that the further development of our 
cooperation depends on Russia's respect for international norms and obligations. 
31. We are deeply concerned about the conflict in Chechnya, continuing reports of 
civilian casualties there and the plight of displaced persons. We condemn, in 
particular, Russian threats against unarmed civilians, such as those in Grozny. 
We acknowledge the right of Russia to preserve its territorial integrity and to 
protect its citizens against terrorism and lawlessness. We condemn terrorism in 
all its manifestations but believe that Russia's pursuit of a purely military solution 
to the conflict is undermining its legitimate objectives. The continuing 
disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force against the civilian population is 
incompatible with the commitments Russia has undertaken within the OSCE and 
its obligations as a member of the United Nations and the Council of Europe. In 
this context, we also recall the principles enshrined in the NATO-Russia 
Founding Act. We therefore urge Russia to exercise the fullest restraint, to refrain 
from the use of force against civilians and protect their human rights, to facilitate 
the provision of humanitarian aid to those in need, and to co-operate fully with 
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international relief agencies and to ensure security for their operations. Bearing in 
mind the importance of regional stability and respect for the territorial integrity 
and sovereignty of neighboring states, we are deeply concerned about the impact 
of the crisis of the entire Caucasus region and stress the need to avoid steps that 
would further undermine regional security. 
We urge Russia to open all avenues for a political solution to the conflict. To this 
end, it is essential that the Russian government and Chechen representatives take 
meaningful steps toward a renewed dialogue. We also urge the Chechen 
authorities to condemn terrorism and to take action against it. We expect Russia 
to respect the commitments made in Istanbul and to make good use of today's 
visit by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office to the region in order to facilitate a 
political process to end the conflict. 
32. We welcome the progressive development of the NATO-Ukraine distinctive 
partnership in accordance with the Charter signed in Madrid in 1997. We are 
pleased that this partnership is providing a framework for cooperative initiatives 
such as the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv, which is 
actively engaged with Ukrainian media, universities and think-tanks. We also 
note that a NATO Liaison Office has been operational in Kyiv since April, and is 
providing a valuable contribution to facilitating Ukraine's full participation in the 
Partnership for Peace program and more generally, to enhancing cooperation 
between NATO and Ukrainian authorities. 
33. We continue to support the efforts of the Joint Working Group on Defense 
Reform and remain prepared to provide advice, as appropriate, to assist Ukraine 
with the transformation of its defense establishment. In the economic area, we 
welcome the initiation of a program for the retraining of retired military officers. 
Cooperation is also developing in the fields of civil emergency planning, air-
traffic management, armaments-related partnership activities, defense research 
and technology, and science. We reiterate our view that a speedy ratification of 
the Status of Forces Agreement by Ukraine will further the goals of our 
cooperation. 
34. We encourage Ukraine to move forward with its democratic and economic 
reforms, and reaffirm NATO's support for Ukraine's efforts to this end. In this 
context, we welcome Ukraine's commitment to exploit the full potential of the 
NATO-Ukraine Charter and express our appreciation for Ukraine's concrete 
contribution to peace and stability in the Balkans, in particular through its 
participation in KFOR. We look forward to today's meeting of the NATO-
Ukraine Commission in Foreign Ministers'session. 
35. The Mediterranean Dialogue is an integral part of the Alliance's cooperative 
approach to security since security in the whole of Europe is closely linked to 
security and stability in the Mediterranean. We are pleased with the progress 
achieved in strengthening the Mediterranean Dialogue as agreed at the 
Washington Summit. The last round of political consultations with the six 
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Mediterranean Dialogue countries held in October and November, offered an 
opportunity for sharing views on the implementation and future development of 
the Dialogue, including the Work Program for 2000. We recognize the interest of 
our Mediterranean partners in developing the Dialogue, including through a 
strengthened cooperation in areas where NATO can bring added value. 
36. We acknowledge the role played by the recently-designated Contact Point 
Embassies and we encourage the Mediterranean Cooperation Group to continue 
its.efforts to progressively develop the Dialogue. Visits by NATO representatives 
have improved the prospects for closer contacts and cooperation. We welcome 
and encourage Allied nations and Mediterranean Dialogue countries to organize 
events such as the Rome Conference in 1997 and the Valencia Conference in 
1999, as positive steps to strengthen mutual regional understanding. We direct 
the Council in Permanent Session to report at our next meeting on the political 
and practical cooperation in the Dialogue agreed in Washington. 
37. We welcome the adoption of the OSCE Istanbul Charter on European Security, in 
particular the emphasis in the Charter on closer cooperation among international 
organizations; We also welcome the adoption of the Platform for Cooperative 
Security. The adoption of the Vienna Document 1999 on Confidence and 
Security Building Measures constitutes an important step towards increased 
transparency in military matters among OSCE participating states. We look 
forward to further intensifying cooperation between NATO and OSCE, notably in 
the areas of conflict prevention, peacekeeping, crisis management and post-
conflict rehabilitation. 
38. We reaffirm that arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to 
play an important role in the achievement of NATO's security objectives. 
39. The Agreement on the Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe, signed at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul on 19 November, will ensure the 
continuing viability of the CFE Treaty as a cornerstone of European security and 
stability. The Allies made comprehensive proposals which served as an important 
basis for the negotiations, in particular for the introduction of a system of 
nationally based equipment limits and improvements to the Treaty provisions 
concerning stability, transparency and predictability. The Adapted Treaty will 
enhance security throughout Europe, not least as it introduces a more constraining 
structure of National and Territorial Ceilings, while permitting sufficient 
deployment flexibility for routine training purposes and effective crisis 
management, thereby ensuring NATO's ability to fulfill its responsibilities. We 
are pleased that the Adapted Treaty will permit accession by new States Parties 
and strengthen Treaty requirements concerning host nation consent to the 
presence of foreign forces. 
40. We welcome the important political commitments contained in the CFE Final 
Act, in particular the bilateral agreements reached by Russia and Georgia, and 
Russia and Moldova, on withdrawal of Russian Forces. But it is essential that the 
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CFE Treaty remains effective and credible. NATO countries are concerned about 
continued Russian non-compliance with the Treaty's Article V («flank») limits. 
We note Russia's commitment to comply with all the Treaty's provisions and 
limitations. We also note Russia's assurances that its exceeding of CFE limits 
will be of a temporary nature. NATO Allies expect Russia to honor its pledge to 
comply with CFE limits as soon as possible and, in the meantime, to provide 
maximum transparency regarding its forces and weapons deployed in the North 
Caucasus, in accordance with the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document. Entry 
into Force of the Adapted Treaty can only be envisaged in the context of 
compliance by all States Parties with the Treaty's limitations. It is on this basis 
that we will work towards bringing the Adapted Treaty into force. Pending the 
completion of this process, the continued implementation of the existing Treaty 
and its associated documents remains crucial. 
41. The Alliance attaches importance to preserving strategic stability. In this respect, 
we call on Russia to ratify the START II Treaty without delay. This would pave 
the way for considerable reductions of nuclear arsenals and would allow 
negotiations on a START III Treaty aiming at further far-reaching reductions on 
nuclear weapons stockpiles. We underscore the importance of achieving a 
successful conclusion to the upcoming Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review 
Conference in Spring 2000. In this context, we reiterate our full support of all 
efforts towards universal adherence, full implementation and further 
strengthening the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime 
and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. We reaffirm 
our commitment to efforts aimed at reducing nuclear weapons. 
We remain committed to an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty and call upon all countries to accede to and implement the Treaty as soon 
as possible. We call for the early start of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-
off Treaty. 
42. The prevention of the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery remains 
our primary aim. We remain committed to preventing proliferation and reversing 
it where it has occurred through diplomatic means. We recognize that 
proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means 
of delivery, which pose a potential threat to the Allies' populations, territory and 
forces, can continue to occur despite our preventive efforts and can pose a direct 
military threat to those populations, territories and forces. 
We continue to attach the utmost importance to full implementation and rigorous 
verification of international disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. We note 
with satisfaction that the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention is 
proceeding well and welcome the progress made in the negotiations in Geneva on 
a legally binding Protocol to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention by 
ensuring effective verification measures to enhance compliance and promote 
transparency. We urge that additional efforts be made to complete the remaining 
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work as soon as possible before the Fifth Review Conference of the BWC in 
2001. 
43. We welcome the progress made by the Alliance in implementing the Initiative on 
Weapons of Mass Destruction. NATO's new WMD Centre, which we expect to 
be operational in early 2000, will provide an effective additional means to address 
both the political and defense challenges of the proliferation of NBC weapons and 
their means of delivery, and will promote more active and regular intra-Alliance 
consultations and cooperation on this important issue. Significant progress has 
been made in setting in place an enhanced WMD intelligence database and 
information repository, which will aim at improving the quality and increasing the 
quantity of intelligence and information sharing among Allies to support efforts 
by NATO members to address proliferation issues. We support deepening 
consultations with Russia in these areas within the Permanent Joint Council, as 
well as with Ukraine in the NATO-Ukraine Commission and with other Partners 
in the EAPC, as well as with the Mediterranean Dialogue countries. 
44. At the Washington Summit, our leaders committed the Alliance to consider 
options for confidence and security building measures, verification, non-
proliferation and arms control and disarmament, in the light of overall strategic 
developments and the reduced salience of nuclear weapons. We have, decided to 
set in train this process and have instructed the Council in Permanent Session to 
task the Senior Political Committee, reinforced by political and defense experts as 
appropriate, to review Alliance policy options in support of confidence and 
security building measures, verification, non-proliferation, and arms control and 
disarmament, so that a comprehensive and integrated approach to the 
accomplishment of the remit agreed at the Washington Summit is ensured. The 
responsible NATO bodies will contribute to this review. We have directed the 
Council in Permanent Session to submit a report to Ministers for their 
consideration in December 2000. We believe that this process will reinforce the 
Allies' contribution in advancing confidence and security building measures, 
verification, non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament. 
45. In order to enhance the effectiveness of Civil-Military Cooperation, confirmed in 
the Strategic Concept as essential to the Alliance's operational capability, a 
fundamental review of civil emergency planning in NATO is nearing completion. 
We welcome the progress made. A close working relationship between the civil 
and military communities will contribute to a more effective use of Allied and 
Partner civilian resources in Alliance activities such as peace support operations. 
We look forward to the completion of this review at an early date. We will 
continue and consolidate the excellent cooperation with Partners in this field, 
including through the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Co-ordination Centre, 
which played an important role in contributing to the relief of the humanitarian 
crisis in and around Kosovo, and in supporting Allied national authorities 
following recent natural disasters. 
46. Terrorism constitutes a serious threat to peace, security and stability that can 
threaten the territorial integrity of States. We reiterate our condemnation of 
terrorism and reaffirm our determination to combat it in accordance with our 
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international commitments and national legislation. The terrorist threat against 
deployed NATO forces and NATO installations requires the consideration and 
development of appropriate measures for their continued protection taking full 
account of host nation responsibilities. 
47. At the Washington Summit our leaders took the steps to ensure that our Alliance 
will remain the bedrock of our collective defense, and continue to play a key role 
in the development of a secure and stable peace in the Euro-Atlantic area. Today, 
as we enter the 21st century, we can state with confidence that NATO is ready to 
face the challenges of the future. 
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APPENDIX E 
Press Communique M-NAC-2 (2000) 124 held at NATO HQ Brussels 15 Dec 2000 
Final Communique 
Issued at the Ministerial Meeting 
of the North Atlantic Council 
1. At our meeting, we took stock of the progress made in NATO's ongoing efforts to 
bring lasting peace and stability to South-East Europe, and gave guidance for 
further implementation of the Washington Summit decisions. 
2. We reaffirm NATO's strong commitment to the achievement of security, stability, 
peace, democracy and respect for human rights in South-East Europe and will 
continue to pursue this objective vigorously, primarily through the NATO-led 
peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo. We 
welcome the progress achieved in our relations with Croatia and the significant 
changes which have taken place in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). 
These encouraging changes offer new prospects of lasting stability in the region 
and further progress towards regional integration. They also bring closer the day 
when all countries in the region take their place in the Euro-Atlantic structures. 
3. We pay tribute to the men and women of all nations serving in SFOR and KFOR 
for their professionalism and dedication to the cause of peace and stability. We 
express our deep sympathy to the families of those who have lost their lives or 
been injured in the course of their mission. We are grateful to NATO's Partners 
and other nations for the substantial contributions they are making to this effort. 
We reiterate our appreciation for the ongoing efforts of Albania and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in supporting KFOR. 
4. We reiterate our support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all 
countries in the region. We emphasize our determination to promote long-term 
stability based on regional reconciliation, good neighborliness, confidence-
building measures, regional cooperation, a lasting resolution to the problem of 
refugees and displaced persons, and cooperation with the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 
5. We welcome the results of the Summit meeting between the European Union and 
the countries of the Stabilization and Association Process held in Zagreb on 24 
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November 2000. This meeting was an important step on the way towards 
reconciliation, increased regional cooperation and long-term stabilization. We 
also welcome in this regard the informal Summit of the South-East Europe 
Cooperation Process organized in Skopje on 25 October with the participation of 
all South-East Europe countries, which was also the first meeting attended at 
summit level by the new FRY democratic authorities. 
6. We welcome the democratic changes that have taken place in the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia after September's parliamentary and presidential 
elections. We warmly welcome the admission of the FRY to the United Nations, 
the OSCE and other international fora. We also welcome the FRY's admission to 
the Stability Pact for South-East Europe, as well as the normalization of its 
diplomatic relationships with Allies. We support the democratic aspirations of the 
people of the FRY and the efforts of President Kostunica to lead his country 
towards the development of democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law 
and full international participation. We look forward to the forthcoming 
parliamentary elections in Serbia and hope that they will consolidate the 
democratic process. 
7. The democratic changes in the FRY will pave the way for increased stability 
across the region and offer new opportunities for regional cooperation. We 
welcome the FRY's willingness to improve its relations with its neighbors, and to 
co-operate towards the full implementation of the General Framework Agreement 
for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1244. We note the FRY's more cooperative stance towards the ICTY 
and look forward to further steps in this direction. We welcome the lessening of 
tension between Serbia and Montenegro and the ongoing discussions on their 
future constitutional relationship within the FRY. 
8. Recent acts of violence by insurgent elements in the Presevo Valley and the 
Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) adjacent to the internal boundary between Kosovo 
and Serbia, are of concern to NATO and KFOR. We commend the efforts of 
KFOR to prohibit support from Kosovo for these elements. We condemn the 
violence caused by extremists and call on the perpetrators to cease their illegal 
activity forthwith. Any extremist activity and the possibility of an escalation of 
violence present a continuing threat to stability in the region, especially for 
neighboring countries. We note the commitment by the present FRY authorities 
to abide by the Military-Technical Agreement (MTA), and to use the Joint 
Implementation Commission to address this sensitive area, and recognize their 
current policy of restraint. We express our strong support for the steps taken by 
COMKFOR to increase control and enhance security, and welcome the recent 
positive correspondence between President Kostunica and the Secretary General. 
9. We reaffirm our commitment to the full implementation of UNSCR 1244. We are 
determined to continue working towards a peaceful, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural 
and democratic Kosovo where all its people, irrespective of ethnic origin or 
religion, can live in peace and security and enjoy universal human rights and 
freedoms on an equal basis, including through participation in democratic 
institutions. We express our strong support for the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the Special Representative of 
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the Secretary General (SRSG), and commend the excellent cooperation between 
KFOR and UNMIK in implementing UNSCR 1244. We thank Dr. Bernard 
Rouchner for his efforts as SRSG, and welcome the appointment of Mr. Hans 
Haekkerup, the Minister of Defense of Denmark, to take up the position in 
January. 
10. The municipal elections in late October were a milestone for democratic 
development in Kosovo. We applaud the conduct of these elections and the close 
cooperation between KFOR and UNMIK in supporting the OSCE's leading role 
in the process. These elections provide an important foundation for the further 
development of provisional, democratic self-governing institutions, in accordance 
with UNSCR 1244. 
11. We fully support the efforts of the SRSG to establish local democratic, self-
governing institutions in Kosovo. We call upon the new representatives on the 
Kosovo municipal councils to carry out their duties responsibly, in close 
cooperation with the international community. We encourage all the people of 
Kosovo to participate fully in this process. 
12. The protection and security of all the people of Kosovo remain a priority. KFOR 
will continue to play a key role in ensuring public security in Kosovo and to carry 
out its duties in a robust and even-handed manner. In this connection, we strongly 
commend KFOR's continued efforts regarding the seizure and destruction of 
illegal arms. We note that substantial progress has been made in reducing 
violence in Kosovo. Violence from any quarter, whether ethnically, politically or 
criminally motivated, is unacceptable. In particular, we condemn the recent 
bombing of the FRY liaison office in Pristina and the politically motivated 
assassination of Mr. Xhemajl Mustafa, Mr. Ibrahim Rugova's adviser. We 
remain concerned about the high level of organized crime which is a continuing 
threat to the people of Kosovo and neighboring countries. We call upon all 
Kosovo inhabitants to support the significant efforts being made by KFOR and 
UNMIK to strengthen the rule of law. We welcome the increase in numbers of 
UNMIK police, who are now deployed throughout the province, and stress the 
importance of maintaining a high level of support to UNMIK in this area. We 
also commend the efforts of the OSCE in training and establishing the Kosovo 
Police Service (KPS). We support the efforts of the international community to 
establish a functioning judicial system in Kosovo, but acknowledge that much 
work remains to be done in this respect. 
13. The release of all Kosovar Albanians detained in Serbia without proper grounds is 
a matter of urgency, as is accurate accounting for all missing persons, including in 
Kosovo. We are pleased to note that UNMIK and the FRY have initiated 
constructive talks to help resolve these issues. In this respect, we welcome 
especially the release of human rights campaigner Flora Brovina as a step in the 
right direction. We also underscore the right of all displaced persons and 
refugees, including Kosovo Serb and other ethnic minorities, to return to their 
homes, under secure and safe conditions. We call upon all communities in 
Kosovo to work towards this goal in cooperation with KFOR and UNMIK. 
14. We note the progress that has been made in establishing the Kosovo Protection 
Corps (KPC), and the reduced number of non-compliance cases. We are aware 
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that improvements are still needed, especially with regard to full compliance, and 
will support efforts to ensure that the KPC has the means and proper tasking to 
fulfill its designated civilian role. KFOR will continue to exercise close 
supervision over the KPC. 
15. We welcome the decision of our Defense Ministers to maintain KFOR's overall 
force levels at present and that the Council in Permanent Session should conduct a 
further review of KFOR's role and missions. 
16. We remain firmly committed to the full implementation of the General 
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We fully support 
the objectives of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) as set out in its 
Ministerial Meeting held in Brussels in May 2000, and its determination to 
integrate Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single, multi-ethnic, democratic state into 
Euro-Atlantic structures. Following the recent elections, we hope to see the 
incoming executive and legislative authorities, at state as well as entity level, in 
place and functioning effectively as soon as possible. We will continue to work 
closely, in particular through SFOR, with the High Representative and with other 
organizations, such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the 
International Police Task Force (IPTF) and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 
17. Five years after the conclusion of the Dayton Peace Agreement and despite the 
sustained efforts and resources of the international community, it is clear to us 
that greater and more rapid progress needs to be made in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
towards a self-sustaining, multi-ethnic democracy. The responsibility for 
achieving this lies with the leaders of communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
who have too often been unwilling to look beyond their ethnic allegiances. 
18. We welcome the successful conduct of the general elections in November under 
the supervision of the OSCE. We are encouraged by the increased support for 
moderate parties, while the continuing appeal of hard-line nationalist parties 
remains a cause for concern. We call on the newly elected leaders of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to commit themselves to the full implementation of the Dayton 
Peace Accords, taking on greater responsibility for and ownership of the process. 
In particular, we encourage them to redouble their efforts to improve the 
functioning of state level institutions. 
19. We welcome the progress made so far in increased levels of refugee returns, civil 
reconstruction, reductions in Entity military manpower and defense expenditures, 
the inauguration of the State Border Service and the continued compliance with 
the establishment of the Brcko district and its demilitarization. Nonetheless, 
important challenges remain. In particular, further progress must be achieved in 
market reform, economic re-construction and the creation of a self-sustaining 
economy and a single economic space; the adjudication of property claims 
enabling the return of refugees and displaced persons especially to areas in which 
their ethnic groups are in the minority; improving the effectiveness of all state 
level institutions and cooperation between Entities; transferring to the ICTY 
persons indicted for war crimes; the fight against corruption, organized crime and 
illegal secret services; judicial and police reform; and the full functioning of the 
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State Border Service. We support the High Representative in his use of the 
authority accorded to him to advance this agenda. . • 
20. We urge the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina to implement the objectives of 
Annex I B of the Dayton Peace Agreement concerning confidence-building and 
security measures. We encourage the Presidency to give priority, through the 
Standing Committee on Military Matters (S'CMM), to the relevant military issues 
addressed by the Peace Implementation Council in May 2000, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina needs armed forces with a unified command and control capable of 
joint deployment and joint action under international and regional security 
organizations. We welcome the additional 15% reduction in Entity military 
manpower and defense expenditures which will be accomplished by the end of 
this year and call for rapid progress in further reducing and restructuring the 
Entities' armed forces, pursuant to development and implementation of a common 
defense policy. We support SFOR's efforts in this regard and its efforts to 
strengthen the SCMM. We reaffirm our commitment to further contribute to 
enhancing stability and confidence in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to strengthen 
cooperation between the Entities' armed forces. We call upon the countries 
neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina to support the full implementation of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement, in particular those countries which are signatories of 
this Agreement. 
21. We endorse SFOR's continuing close working relationship with the civilian 
agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We reaffirm that SFOR will continue to 
support the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, while 
stressing that the Entities continue to carry primary responsibility for bringing to 
justice persons indicted for war crimes. 
22. We welcome the conclusions of our Defense Ministers who reviewed SFOR's 
force levels and structure and concluded that they should be maintained for the 
present. They directed our Permanent Representatives to provide advice on a 
medium-term strategy, including a full range of options for the future size and 
structure of SFOR, for consideration at their next meeting. We note, inter alia, the 
need to fully resource the Multinational Specialized Units to agreed levels. 
23. We received the Consolidated Progress Report on the Implementation of the 
Alliance's South-East Europe Initiative (SEEI). We noted with satisfaction the 
achievements to date of the SEEI, launched at the Washington Summit, which 
supports and encourages regional cooperation and helps individual countries in 
their efforts to draw closer to Euro-Atlantic institutions. NATO's efforts are 
aimed at enabling the countries of the region to work together to ensure their own 
security and thus support and complement the objectives of the Stability Pact for 
South-East Europe. We welcome the progress achieved by the countries of the 
region in implementing the specific activities in the framework of NATO's SEEI, 
including the South East Europe Security Cooperation Steering Group 
(SEEGROUP) and the Regional Common Assessment Paper on Regional 
Security Challenges (SEECAP). Through such initiatives, the SEEI has also been 
making a significant contribution to the Stability Pact, particularly to its Working 
Table on security issues. 
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24. We applaud the cooperation between the Alliance, the World Bank, Bulgaria, 
Croatia and Romania, facilitated through the Stability Pact, to retrain and 
reintegrate former military officers into the civilian economy. The Alliance is 
ready to assist in drawing up a similar program for Albania. We look forward to 
contributing to the Stability Pact effort to develop a South-East Europe regional 
civil-military emergency response capability through its Disaster Prevention and 
Preparedness Initiative. 
25. We look forward to a further progress report from the Council in Permanent 
Session on implementation of the SEEI and its contribution to the Stability Pact at 
our next regular meeting in Spring 2001. 
26. We reviewed progress achieved to date in implementing the Defense Capabilities 
Initiative (DO), and endorse the statement by our Defense Ministers on this 
subject. DCI will provide the forces and capabilities the Alliance urgently 
requires to meet the security challenges of the 21st century by ensuring the 
effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full spectrum of 
Alliance missions. DCI's purpose is to facilitate the Alliance's movement 
towards forces that are more interoperable, more mobile, readily deployable and 
highly capable. Furthering the objectives of DCI continues to require sustained 
commitment - both at NATO and in capitals. We believe that we have reached an 
important stage in implementing the DCI. We remain committed to providing 
sufficient resources to ensure its implementation. We are also committed to 
making the most effective use of resources and to finding innovative approaches 
to overcoming shortfalls in capabilities, taking advantage of national contributions 
and possible cooperative and collective arrangements and mechanisms, including 
multinational, joint and common funding. Ultimately, however, the 
implementation of DCI will depend on the adequacy of national defense budgets. 
We endorse the decision of our Defense Ministers to extend until 2002 the 
mandate of the High Level Steering Group, which is charged with overseeing the 
implementation of the DCI, in order to maintain the necessary high level 
engagement by nations in the initiative. 
27. The DCI will also promote greater interoperability among Alliance forces and, 
where applicable, between Allied and Partner forces. The efforts of the Alliance 
and Allied nations to implement DCI and the efforts of the EU to enhance 
European capabilities are mutually reinforcing. Therefore, implementation of 
DCI will also strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance and improve the 
capability of European Allies to undertake EU-led operations where the Alliance 
as a whole is not engaged. Because Partners have an important part to play in 
future NATO-led operations, we welcome their current engagement in elements 
of the DCI. 
28. We took stock of the progress made to date on the development of the European 
Security and Defense Identity in accordance with the decisions taken at the 
Washington Summit and subsequent Ministerial meetings. We reaffirmed our 
determination to reinforce NATO's European pillar and remain committed to a 
balanced and dynamic transatlantic partnership. We share the goal endorsed by 
EU Member States at the Nice European Council for a genuine strategic 
partnership in Crisis management between NATO and the EU. The Alliance will 
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remain the foundation for the collective defense of its members and continue 
actively to play its important role in crisis management as set out in the Strategic 
Concept. The partnership between NATO and the EU and the development of a 
capable and effective ESDI, in accordance with the principles set out at the 
Washington Summit and subsequent Ministerial meetings, will strengthen the 
Alliance through which we remain ready to pursue common security objectives 
wherever possible. 
29. We welcome the intensification of the dialogue between the Alliance and the 
European Union since our last meeting in Florence. In this context, we look 
forward to the working dinner between Foreign Ministers of NATO and the 
European Union later today, which is an important step towards establishing a 
close, confident and mutually beneficial relationship between the two 
organizations. We have made progress in the NATO-EU ad hoc working groups 
which have met to discuss security issues, permanent arrangements for 
consultation and cooperation, modalities for EU access to NATO assets and 
capabilities, and capability goals - taking into account all relevant matters, 
including those related to participation. Together with the two meetings of the 
North Atlantic Council and the EU interim Political and Security Committee in 
September and November, they have enhanced the understanding of the two 
organizations and their members on how they might most effectively cooperate in 
the future. We look forward to their future work as well as to future meetings of 
the North Atlantic Council and the Political and Security Committee with a view 
to developing all the elements of the envisaged NATO-EU relations. We also 
welcome the establishment of an interim security agreement between the two 
organizations and note NATO's readiness to conclude a permanent security 
agreement with the European Union as a matter of priority. 
30. The European Allies are committed to further strengthening their military 
capabilities and to reinforcing the Alliance's European pillar. This will enhance 
their ability to contribute both to the Alliance's missions and to EU-led operations 
for Petersburg tasks where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. We note that 
this process does not imply the creation of a European army and that the 
commitment of national resources for EU-led operations will be based on 
sovereign decisions. We welcome the efforts made in the EU towards meeting its 
Headline Goal by 2003 as set out at the Helsinki European Council, thus 
contributing to the improvement and strengthening of European military 
capabilities. Alliance experts, on the basis of a Council decision, have 
contributed military and technical advice to the work of EU experts on a 
catalogue of forces and capabilities for the EU Headline Goal. We note the EU's 
acknowledgement of the value of this input. NATO stands ready to provide, 
subject to the necessary decisions, further expert advice upon request by the EU. 
We welcome the pledges made at the recent EU Capabilities Commitment 
Conference, noting the EU's appreciation of the significant additional 
contributions offered by non-EU European Allies to the pool of forces available 
for EU-led operations. Such contributions, as expressed on 21 November 2000 at 
the meeting between the EU and the non-EU European Allies, are important and 
will enhance the range of capabilities potentially available to the EU. We note the 
212 
EU's recognition of the need for further capability improvements. The Alliance's 
Defense Capabilities Initiative is also supporting the enhancement of European 
capabilities. The objectives arising from NATO's DCI and the EU's Headline 
Goal are mutually reinforcing. 
31. We note and welcome the proposals made by the European Council at Nice for 
permanent arrangements to ensure full transparency, consultation and cooperation 
between NATO and the EU. We agree that consultations and cooperation will be 
developed between the two organizations on questions of common interest 
relating to security, defense and crisis management, so that crises can be met with 
the most appropriate military response and effective crisis management ensured. 
We look forward to the early establishment of such mutually satisfactory 
arrangements based on the principles enunciated in Washington and at subsequent 
Ministerial meetings, which will be taken into account in the framework 
agreement establishing these arrangements. These arrangements are key to a 
close, confident and transparent relationship between the two organizations as 
foreseen at the Washington Summit. 
We welcome the intention of the European Union that this dialogue should be 
pursued through a regular pattern of meetings at Ministerial, North Atlantic 
Council/Political and Security Committee, Military Committee and expert level as 
well as through contacts with Secretariats to ensure consultation, cooperation and 
transparency. We endorse the view of the EU that in the emergency phase of a 
crisis contacts and meetings will be stepped up. In the view of the Alliance, 
meetings between the North Atlantic Council and the Political and Security 
Committee outside times of crisis should be held not less than three times, and 
Ministerial meetings once, per EU Presidency; either organization may request 
additional meetings as necessary. 
We welcome the Nice provisions on invitations for the NATO Secretary General, 
Chairman of the Military Committee and DSACEUR, in accordance with his 
terms of reference, to EU meetings. For our part, on the basis of reciprocity, we 
will invite the EU Presidency and Secretary General/High Representative to 
NATO meetings. The Chairman of the EU Military Committee or his 
representative will similarly be invited to meetings of the NATO Military 
Committee. 
The Alliance agrees that these proposals constitute the basis for the permanent 
NATO/EU agreement. We stand ready to work to finalize this agreement without 
delay. 
32. We underline, as we did at the Washington Summit and subsequent Ministerial 
meetings, the importance of finding solutions satisfactory to all Allies to the issue 
of participation. We note the provisions agreed by the European Council at Nice 
for dialogue, consultation and cooperation with non-EU European Allies on issues 
related to security and defense policy and crisis management and as well as the 
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modalities for participation in EU-led military operations. We welcome the 
commitment to intensify consultation in times of crisis, which will also enable 
non-EU European Allies to raise their concerns when they consider their security 
interests might be involved. It is particularly important in this context that non-
EU European Allies can request meetings with the European Union and submit 
proposals for agenda items. 
Allies look forward to the broad and effective practical implementation of these 
arrangements, in particular for consultation and cooperation with the EU Political 
and Security Committee and EU Military Committee and, as appropriate, with the 
EU military staff, so as to ensure that the Allies concerned derive maximum 
benefit from them and to enable the Allies concerned to contribute effectively. In 
this context, in accordance with the Washington Treaty, we stress the importance 
we attach to respecting the security interests of all Allies and the obligations 
which they have to each other as Allies. 
We also welcome the EU's decision at Nice on initial proposals to develop 
dialogue, cooperation and consultation with Canada, including a commitment to 
intensify consultation in times of crisis, particularly when the EU is considering 
an operation using NATO assets and capabilities. 
33. Taking into account the evolution of relevant arrangements in the EU, work on 
ESDI is continuing within the Alliance as directed at the Washington Summit and 
agreed at subsequent Ministerial meetings. It has proceeded on the principle that 
nothing will be agreed until everything is agreed - the participation issue is also 
relevant in this context. On this basis, and consistent with the decisions taken at 
Washington and subsequent Ministerial meetings, work has progressed on the 
various aspects of the Washington agenda. Subject to this, we intend to put in 
place arrangements for: assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to 
contribute to military planning for EU-led operations; the presumption of 
availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for 
use in EU-led operations; the identification of a range of European command 
options for EU-led operations, further developing the role of DSACEUR in order 
for him to assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities; and the 
further adaptation of the Alliance's defense planning system, taking account of J 
relevant activities in and proposals from the European Union. Allies will be 
consulted on the EU's proposed use of assets and capabilities, prior to the 
decision to release these assets and capabilities, and kept informed during the 
operation. 
34. Important work remains to be done which we will pursue intensively. We direct 
the Council in Permanent Session to continue work on the implementation of the 
ESDI decisions on the basis of the agenda above, and to report to us at our next 
meeting. 
35. We note the decisions taken at the Ministerial meeting of the WEU held in 
Marseille in November, particular that WEU/NATO routine consultations 
mechanisms will be suspended, except for those that still need to be applied 
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during the transition period, in particular for the joint exercise study next year, 
JES 2001, to which we look forward. We appreciate the WEU's important 
contribution to the development of the European security and defense 
architecture. We have valued the close cooperation between NATO and the WEU 
and pay tribute to the work of the WEU and NATO staffs in support of it. 
36. Recalling the decisions taken at the Washington Summit, we reaffirm the 
Alliance's commitment to remain open to new members. The Alliance expects to 
extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume 
the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that 
the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic 
interests of the Alliance and that the inclusion would enhance overall European 
security and stability. No European democratic country whose admission would 
fulfill the objectives of the Washington Treaty will be excluded from 
consideration regardless of its geographic location, each being considered on its 
own merits. 
37. The Membership Action Plan (MAP) process underlines NATO's commitment to 
its Open Door policy by assisting the nine aspiring countries in their own efforts 
to prepare for possible future membership. We welcome the streamlining of this 
process, which we have undertaken in consultation with aspirants, to improve its 
efficiency and effectiveness. In the second annual cycle of the MAP we continue 
to provide advice, feedback and assistance to the aspiring countries on their 
preparations for possible future membership. We noted a report on the 
implementation of the second annual cycle to date. We welcome the aspirants' 
continuing strong commitment to reform, including to defense reform and the 
modernization of their armed forces as expressed by their Defense Ministers, and 
encourage them to build on the progress achieved so far. The aspirants should 
continue to pursue vigorously the challenging goals they have set themselves, 
ensuring that clear priorities are established and sufficient resources allocated to 
them. 
38. We look forward to receiving a Consolidated Progress Report on the results of the 
second annual cycle of the MAP at our next meeting, as part of our ongoing 
review of the enlargement process, including the implementation of the 
Membership Action Plan. Heads of State and Government will review this 
process at the next Summit to be held no later than 2002. 
39. We continue to place high priority on the strengthening of our partnership with all 
members of the Euro-Atlantic community through the EAPC and the Partnership 
for Peace. We believe that Partnership is pivotal to the role of the Alliance in 
promoting security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region and contributes to the 
enhancement of the Alliance's capabilities in crisis management. We welcome 
the activities within the EAPC/PfP framework to enhance transparency, 
confidence and cooperation among all members of the Euro-Atlantic Community 
and we remain firmly committed to the continued development of the EAPC as a 
key forum for political consultation and practical cooperation on Euro-Atlantic 
security issues. 
40. We note with satisfaction the many EAPC/PfP activities to promote practical 
regional cooperation in South-East Europe, as well as in the Caucasus and Central 
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Asia. We value the role of the Regional Ad Hoc Working Groups on South-East 
Europe and the Caucasus in promoting and supporting regional cooperation. We 
welcome continued efforts in the EAPC/PfP framework to support broader efforts 
underway to address the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and in 
support of global humanitarian mine action and the promotion of International 
Humanitarian Law, among other EAPC priority areas. In particular, we welcome 
the recent establishment of a PfP Trust Fund on Anti-Personnel Landmine 
Stockpile Destruction and look forward to periodic reports on its activities. We 
support steps to strengthen the EAPC/PfP cooperation in promoting conflict 
prevention and crisis management, which will complement the work of other 
relevant institutions. We also support initiatives for further developing 
cooperation on information and outreach opportunities and welcome Partners' 
continuing interest in cooperation in civil emergency preparedness. 
41. We noted reports on the Enhanced and More Operational Partnership, and the 
implementation of the Operational Capabilities Concept. We value highly the 
continuing progress in making the Partnership for Peace more operational and 
look forward to reviewing progress on these initiatives at our next meeting. We 
look forward to exploring with our Partners how we can help support their efforts 
to reorganize and restructure their defense establishments and armed forces, and 
will continue to make full use of the existing clearing house mechanisms to help 
Partners ensure optimum use of scarce resources in these reform efforts. We 
remain strongly committed to the full implementation of the Political-Military 
Framework for NATO-led PfP operations. Within this Framework, we attach 
great importance to enhancing Partners' roles in the political guidance and 
oversight, planning, and command arrangements for NATO-led crisis response 
operations. We look forward to receiving at our next meeting a report by the 
Council in Permanent Session on progress achieved in implementing the Political-
Military Framework. 
42. We remain committed to building a strong, stable and enduring partnership with 
the Russian Federation in accordance with the NATO-Russia Founding Act, on 
the basis of the principles of transparency and reciprocity. We welcome the 
progress made in resuming consultations and cooperation on a broad range of 
issues in the framework of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC). 
43. We attach great importance to the continued dialogue and cooperation in the 
framework of the PJC on issues relating to the operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, 
building on the valuable experience of practical cooperation with Russian forces 
in both SFOR and KFOR. 
44. We value our ongoing consultations and cooperation with Russia in the 
framework of the PJC on such issues as strategy, defense policy and military 
doctrines, infrastructure development program, nuclear weapons, non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, theatre 
missile defense, air defense, and other disarmament and arms control issues, 
including CFE and Open Skies, scientific and environmental issues, civil 
emergency preparedness, and the retraining of discharged military personnel. In 
particular, we look forward to implementing the program of cooperation between 
NATO and Russia on search and rescue at sea agreed by PJC Defense Ministers 
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on 5 December 2000 and to the early signature of a Memorandum of 
Understanding with Russia on environmental protection. We welcome the 
progressive resumption of Russian participation in the EAPC and would welcome 
active Russian participation in PfP. 
45. We welcome the exchange of letters on the establishment of a NATO Information 
Office in Moscow and" look forward to developing NATO's information activities 
in Russia. We attach great importance to the further development of military-to-
military cooperation and are pursuing our negotiations with Russia with a view to 
opening a NATO Military Liaison Mission in Moscow in the near future, as called 
for in the Founding Act. 
46. In connection with the situation in North Caucasus, we reaffirm that a mutually 
satisfactory, just and durable solution to the conflict in Chechnya is urgent and 
essential and that the parties must take steps to begin a dialogue that can lead to a 
settlement. While acknowledging the right of Russia to preserve its territorial 
integrity and its right and responsibility to protect all its citizens against 
criminality and terrorism which we condemn in all its forms, we urge Russia to 
respect its international obligations as a member of the UN, the OSCE, the 
Council of Europe, as well as the relevant principles enshrined in the Founding 
Act. We call on the Chechen side to co-operate in good faith in seeking a solution 
to the conflict, to condemn terrorism and to take action against it. 
47. We urge the Russian government to expedite the OSCE Assistance Group's return 
to Chechnya under its existing mandate. We deplore the continued loss of life 
and material damage inflicted upon the civilian population; this calls for prompt 
and independent investigation of violations of human rights and breaches of 
international law. We recall the importance we attach to the efforts of 
humanitarian assistance organizations to relieve the suffering of the displaced and 
call on Russia to support them fully. 
48. We value our relationship with an independent, democratic and stable Ukraine 
and Ukraine's contribution to ensuring stability in Central and Eastern Europe and 
the continent as a whole. We are satisfied with the successful implementation of 
cooperative and consultative activities under the NATO-Ukraine Work Plan, 
which has contributed to a steady deepening of the distinctive partnership. We 
are determined to build on these achievements in 2001 and to ensure further 
implementation of the NATO-Ukraine Charter. 
49. We are pleased with Ukraine's enhanced participation in PfP, both in its military 
and non-military aspects. We will continue to support the implementation of 
Ukraine's defense reform and welcome the enhanced role and new initiatives of 
the Joint Working Group on Defense Reform. We encourage Ukraine to pursue 
these efforts, and in that regard we welcome the approval of Ukraine's state 
program for the reform of the armed forces, and the recent Presidential Decree on 
its implementation. We reiterate pur appreciation for Ukraine's continuing 
contribution to KFOR, which is an expression of Ukraine's commitment to our 
joint effort to build peace and stability in the region. Our cooperation in KFOR 
also contributes to improving interoperability between Ukraine's forces and those 
of the Allies. We welcome the ratification by the Verkhovna Rada of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. 
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50. We continue to attach particular importance to the NATO Liaison Office, which 
plays a key role in enhancing Ukraine's participation in PfP. We also value the 
important role of the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv, as a 
means to increase public awareness of our distinctive partnership and to 
consolidate it. 
51. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue is an essential part of the Alliance's cooperative 
approach to security, since security in the whole of Europe is closely linked to 
security and stability in the Mediterranean. We are pleased with the progress 
achieved so far with respect to the implementation of decisions on enhancing the 
Mediterranean Dialogue taken at the Washington Summit, and look forward to 
cooperation in the field of search and rescue, maritime safety, medical evacuation 
and humanitarian relief. We reaffirm the progressive nature of the Dialogue, and 
will continue to consider ways to strengthen the political and practical dimensions 
of our cooperative relations with all the Mediterranean partners in accordance 
with the Washington Summit decisions, in areas where NATO can bring an added 
value and where partners have expressed interest. We direct the Council in 
Permanent Session to report at our next meeting on the political and practical 
cooperation in the Dialogue. We hope that the Mediterranean Dialogue 
conference originally planned to take place in November will be rescheduled as 
soon as possible. 
52. Although the Alliance is not involved in the Middle East Peace Process, we 
strongly support it and urge all participants to remain firmly committed to it. 
53. We applaud the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. We 
welcome the significant role played by the OSCE in the Euro-Atlantic area, 
notably in South-East Europe. We encourage the speedy implementation of the 
commitments undertaken and the initiatives launched at the Istanbul Summit for 
strengthening the OSCE's operational capability, thus improving its crisis 
management capacity. We recall NATO's support for the Platform for 
Cooperative Security, in which the OSCE declared its intention to work with 
other institutions. We welcome the substantial progress made in the 
implementation of the Platform, particularly the enhanced contacts and 
cooperation between NATO and the OSCE on matters of common interest. 
54. We welcome the work of the OSCE in assisting in the implementation of the 
Dayton/Paris Peace Accords and its contribution to the creation of a framework 
for peace and stability in South Eastern Europe. We call upon the States 
participating in the negotiations on regional stability under the Accords to make 
use of the fresh impetus generated by the participation of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia in the OSCE, with the aim of concluding their work by the agreed 
deadline. NATO stands ready to support the implementation of such an 
agreement within the framework of the Stability Pact for South-East Europe. 
55. Recalling the Alliance's longstanding commitment to the goals of arms control, 
disarmament and non-proliferation, we welcome the comprehensive report on 
options for confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), verification, 
non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament called for by our Heads of 
State and Government in Washington. We task the Council in Permanent Session 
to pursue vigorously implementation of the recommendations contained in this 
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report* including with Russia through the PJC. A public report has been released 
as a NATO document. 
56. On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the signing of the CFE Treaty we 
recognize the vital contribution the Treaty makes to the stability and security of 
Europe. The overall implementation of the Treaty since its entry into force in 
1992 has brought positive results including significantly reduced holdings of 
Treaty-limited equipment, enhanced transparency and predictability. However, 
there continue to be both substantive and technical concerns with specific aspects 
of CFE implementation, which must be addressed. As we approach the next CFE 
V review conference in 2001, we will seek intensified efforts to resolve these issues. 
Pending the completion of the process of ratifying the Adapted Treaty, the full 
and continued implementation of the Treaty and its associated documents remains 
crucial. 
57. Early entry into force of the Adapted CFE Treaty, which was signed last year by 
Heads of State and Government at the Istanbul OSCE Summit, will ensure CFE's 
continuing viability as a cornerstone of European security and stability. We are 
committed to that end and are pleased that the Adapted Treaty will permit 
accession by new States Parties. However, as we have made clear ever since 
Istanbul, we believe ratification by our governments can only be envisaged in the 
context of compliance by all States Parties with the Treaty's agreed levels of 
armaments and equipment and consistent with the commitments contained in the 
CFE Final Act. In this regard we welcome President Putin's recent reaffirmation 
of Russia's intention to fulfill all CFE Treaty obligations and commitments. We 
expect concrete results consistent with that assurance. We remain particularly 
concerned about the continued high levels of Russian Treaty-limited equipment in 
relation to the Treaty's Article V ("Flank") limits. We continue to attach special 
importance to early and complete fulfillment of Russia's assurances of 1 
November 1999, that its current equipment levels in the North Caucasus are of a 
temporary nature and will be reduced to CFE limits as soon as possible, in 
conditions of maximum transparency and in a manner consistent with agreed 
counting rules and procedures. 
58. We look for no less timely and effective fulfillment of the CFE Final Act 
commitments requiring the reduction and withdrawal of Russian military forces 
from Georgia and Moldova in accordance with the timelines agreed at Istanbul. 
We welcome progress thus far in Georgia, but note the importance of full Russian 
withdrawal of excess Treaty-limited equipment by the end of this year, and of 
actual closure of designated Russian military bases by the middle of next year. 
However, there has been little tangible progress in implementation of the 
unconditional commitment to complete withdrawal of Russian forces from the 
territory of Moldova. To-, meet the deadlines set at Istanbul, the pace of 
withdrawal should be accelerated. We applaud and support the efforts of 
individual Allies and OSCE Partners to facilitate these activities through financial ~ 
and other assistance. 
59. We continue to attach great importance to the ratification of the Open Skies 
Treaty and call on Russia and Belarus to ratify the Treaty to allow it to enter into 
force as soon as possible. Joint trial observation flights conducted by Signatories, 
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including Russia, have demonstrated the potential of the Open Skies Treaty for 
enhancing security and confidence. 
60. The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their 
means of delivery continues to be a matter of serious concern for the Alliance as it 
poses risks to international and regional security and can pose a direct military 
threat to Allies' populations, territory and forces. The principal non-proliferation 
goal of the Alliance and its members is unchanged: to prevent proliferation from 
occurring, or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means. In this 
context we continue to place great importance on non-proliferation regimes, 
international arms control and disarmament, and export control regimes as means 
to prevent proliferation. • • ' . 
61. Our response to the NBC threat should be consistent with the indivisibility of 
Allied security. We reaffirm that the Alliance's defense posture must have the 
capability to address appropriately and effectively the risks associated with the 
proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery. We note continued 
work in NATO inter alia on Theatre Missile Defense for point and area defense, 
in particular on the feasibility study on a possible system for the defense of 
deployed NATO forces. We will continue consultations in the Alliance on TMD 
issues. 
62. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of the nuclear non-
proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear 
disarmament. Alliance nations have dramatically reduced nuclear weapons and 
delivery systems, and reaffirm their commitment to work for the further reduction 
of nuclear weapons globally. We confirm our full support and commitment to the 
implementation of the conclusions of the NPT Review Conference which agreed 
on the importance of universal adherence to and compliance with the NPT, and 
reaffirmed the commitment of all States Parties to disarmament, safeguards and 
peaceful nuclear cooperation. 
63. Last May we welcomed Russian ratification of the START II Treaty. We 
continue to attach greatest importance to an early entry into force of that Treaty 
and of an early conclusion of a START III agreement, while preserving and 
strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and a basis 
for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons. Given the need to reduce 
the uncertainties surrounding substrategic nuclear weapons in Russia, we believe 
that a reaffirmation - and perhaps codification - of the 1991/92 Presidential 
Initiatives might be a first, but not exhaustive, step in this direction. We remain 
committed to an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) and, in the meanwhile, urge all states to refrain from any acts 
which would defeat its object and purpose. Similarly, we remain committed to 
the immediate commencement, in the Conference on Disarmament, of 
negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in accordance with the Mandate 
of the Special Coordinator. 
64. We continue to emphasize the importance of universal accession and adherence 
to, as well as full compliance with, the Chemical Weapons Convention. We 
continue to regard as a matter of priority the conclusion of negotiations on 
appropriate measures, including possible verification measures and proposals to 
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strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWG), to be 
included as appropriate in a legally binding instrument. We reiterate our 
commitment to efforts to achieve such an instrument as soon as possible before 
the 5th Review Conference of the BTWC in 2001. We remain strongly 
committed to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) as an important 
element in our efforts to counter the proliferation of means for delivering weapons 
of mass destruction. During the past year, the MTCR partners have focused 
increasingly on new ideas for addressing the ongoing global missile threat and 
responses to face the challenge posed by indigenous missile program and exports. 
We will encourage countries that are not part of the MTCR to subscribe to and 
adopt its principles, commitments, confidence-building measures and incentives. 
We support ongoing efforts to achieve a code of conduct against ballistic missile 
proliferation on the basis of these ideas. ' 
65. We have continued consultations on the United States consideration of a limited 
National Missile Defense system. We took note of President Clinton's decision 
not to take steps now to begin deployment of such a system. As the President 
noted, the view of NATO Allies was a critical consideration in that decision. 
NATO will continue its consultations on this issue. 
66. We are pleased that the implementation of the WMD Initiative is proceeding well 
and that the newly established WMD Centre is already contributing to improve 
co-ordination of all WMD-related activities at NATO Headquarters, including the 
strengthening of our commitments to arms control and non-proliferation. 
67. The Alliance is currently engaged in very productive consultations with Russia 
under the Permanent Joint Council on proliferation-related matters, and we are 
continuing to prepare for discussions with Ukraine in the NATO-Ukraine 
Commission, with Partners under the EAPC/PfP framework and with 
Mediterranean Dialogue countries. 
68. We deplore the recent terrorist attacks against nationals of several NATO 
countries and deeply regret the tragic loss of life. Terrorism constitutes a threat to 
internal and international security, to peaceful relations between States and to 
their territorial integrity, to the development and functioning of democratic 
institutions throughout the world and to the enjoyment of human rights and civil 
liberties. We strongly condemn this scourge in all its manifestations, and reiterate 
our strong determination to combat it in full compliance with all our international 
commitments and national legislation. 
69. The Alliance has completed the review of the role of civil emergency planning in 
NATO and agreed the political direction for the future. It is currently translating 
that direction into structures and procedures. The direction identified five roles 
for Civil emergency planning, taking into account the results of the Washington 
Summit, particularly the Alliance's new Strategic Concept, experience in Bosnia 
and Kosovo and the advice of the NATO Military Authorities. These are: civil 
support for Alliance military operations under Article 5; civil support for non-
Article 5 crisis response operations; support to national authorities in civil 
emergencies, including disaster response; support for national authorities in the 
protection of populations against the effects of weapons of mass destruction; and 
cooperation with Partners. We recognize the important part played by the Euro-
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Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre as a means of coordinating 
EAPC countries' humanitarian assistance in times of disaster, bearing in mind the 
leading role of the United Nations. Especially with a view to ensuring the 
effective conduct of non-Article 5 crisis response operations, NATO civil 
emergency planning will need increasingly to be coordinated with the work of the 
United Nations, which has the primary responsibility for humanitarian relief, and 
with other international organizations. Partners will be actively involved in this 
work and will have a valuable contribution to make to its success. 
70. We endorse the welcome of our Defense Ministers for the continuing work and 
progress made to improve the resource management of the Alliance's military 
common funded budgets. 
71. A separate review with the objective of securing greater transparency and 
efficiency is also required for the NATO Civil Budget. We task the Council in 
Permanent Session to make recommendations for further consideration at our next 
meeting. 
72. We decided to hold the next NATO Summit in Prague and tasked the Council in 
Permanent Session to identify an appropriate date. 
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APPENDIX F 
Press Communique M-NAC-2 (2001) 158 held at NATO HQ Brussels 6 Dec 2001 
Final Communique 
Issued at the Ministerial Meeting 
of the North Atlantic Council 
1. The terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 resulted in the 
invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in the history 
of the Alliance. We deplore the loss of life which affected so many NATO 
members and partner countries. Today, we have issued a separate statement 
addressing NATO's response to terrorism and contribution to the campaign 
against this scourge. Against this background, we have taken stock of NATO's 
broad agenda, and given further guidance on its implementation in the run-up to 
the meeting of our Heads of State and Government in Prague next November. 
2. Today we commit ourselves to forge a new relationship with Russia, enhancing 
our ability to work together in areas of common interest. We reaffirm that a 
confident and cooperative partnership between the Allies and Russia, based on 
shared democratic values and the shared commitment to a stable, peaceful and 
undivided Europe, as enshrined in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, is essential 
for stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. We have decided to give new 
impetus and substance to our partnership, with the goal of creating, with Russia, a 
new NATO-Russia Council, to identify and pursue opportunities for joint action 
at 20. To that end, we have tasked the North Atlantic Council in Permanent 
Session to explore and develop, in the coming months, building on the Founding 
Act, new, effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, joint decision, and 
coordinated/joint action. We intend that such cooperative mechanisms will be in 
place for, or prior to, our next meeting in Reykjavik in May 2002. NATO's 
fundamental objectives remain as set out in the Washington Treaty, under which 
provisions NATO will maintain its prerogative of independent decision and action 
at 19 on all issues consistent with its obligations and responsibilities. 
3. We are pleased that Russia stands with us in the struggle against terrorism, and 
believe this will contribute significantly to our common goal of a strong, stable 
and enduring NATO-Russia partnership. We are intensifying our cooperation in 
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this and other areas, including non-proliferation, export control and arms control 
matters, arms transparency and confidence building measures, missile defense, 
search and rescue at sea, and military-to-military cooperation, which represents a 
major step towards a qualitatively new relationship. We support Russia's right to 
protect her territorial integrity, and recognize her right to protect all citizens 
against terrorism and criminality. We welcome the initial steps Russia has taken 
towards establishing a political dialogue over the conflict in Chechnya. We urge 
Russia to build on these steps to find a prompt and lasting political and peaceful 
resolution to the conflict and to respect and protect the human and legal rights of 
the population. We call on the Chechen side to cooperate in good faith in seeking 
a political solution to the conflict, to condemn terrorism and to take actions 
against it. 
4. At their Prague Summit in November next year, our Heads of State and 
Government will launch the next round of NATO enlargement. We encourage 
the nine aspirant countries to continue focused efforts to prepare for possible 
future membership, making full use of the opportunities offered through our 
Membership Action Plan (MAP). We look forward to receiving a Consolidated 
Progress Report on activities under the MAP in 2001-2002 at our meeting next 
Spring. We will continue the MAP process beyond the current cycle. While 
aspirants continue their preparations, NATO is undertaking its own internal 
preparations for the admission of new members. We direct the Council in 
Permanent Session to report at our next meeting on the issues that need to be 
examined in order to prepare comprehensive recommendations for decisions by 
our Heads of State and Government at the Prague Summit. 
5. We reaffirm our commitment to a peaceful, stable and democratic South-East 
Europe, and our determination to oppose all violence, whether ethnically, 
politically or criminally motivated. We reiterate our support for the territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of all the countries in South-East Europe. Working 
together with our Partners in SFOR and KFOR and with other international 
institutions, we will continue to promote regional reconciliation and cooperation, 
good neighborliness, stable and secure borders, protection of rights of members of 
all ethnic groups and minorities, confidence-building measures, a lasting solution 
to the problem of refugees and displaced persons, and full cooperation with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). All persons 
indicted for war crimes by the ICTY must be brought to justice in The Hague. 
6. Later this month, our Defense colleagues will review the status of NATO's 
operations in the Balkans and possibilities for rationalization and an enhanced 
regional approach, recognizing the need for continued close consultation with 
other international organizations involved. Our overall efforts have the ultimate 
aim of providing the foundation for self-sustaining peace and democracy in the 
region that no longer require the presence of international military forces. 
7. Over the past year, the Alliance has played a particularly active role in promoting 
stability and security in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in close 
cooperation with the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In this context, we commend the neighboring 
states, especially Albania, for their constructive approach. We welcome the 
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voluntary disarmament and disbanding of the so-called NLA, the Parliament's 
adoption of changes to the country's constitution, and the amnesty declared by 
President Trajkovski. We reaffirm our condemnation of the use of violence for 
political ends. We urge all parties involved to implement the Framework 
Agreement in full, and to continue to cooperate with the international community. 
We reiterate our support for the territorial integrity of the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia. The Alliance stands ready to continue to contribute to 
security by providing support for the EU and OSCE monitors for a further three-
month period, as part of its contribution to peace and stability in the country. 
8. We remain firmly committed to the full implementation of the General 
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and call on all 
political leaders in this country to continue to renounce separatism and violence, 
to support democratic institutions and to take on greater responsibility for and 
ownership of the process of implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement. We 
strongly endorse the respective efforts of SFOR and the ICTY to detain and bring 
to trial persons indicted for war crimes. In this context, we reiterate that the 
Entities carry primary responsibility for bringing to justice persons indicted for 
war crimes, and urge them to cooperate more effectively with SFOR to this end. 
9. We welcome the Kosovo-wide elections of 17 November, in which all 
communities participated in significant numbers, as an important step towards a 
peaceful, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and democratic Kosovo, where all its 
people, irrespective of ethnic origin or religion, can live in peace and security and 
enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis, including through 
participation in democratic institutions. We encourage the newly elected leaders 
to exercise their new functions in strict compliance with United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1244 and the constitutional framework for provisional self-
government and in full cooperation with UNMIK and KFOR. We also call on 
them to establish effective cooperation with the authorities of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). 
10. We welcome Belgrade's constructive support for the participation of the Kosovo 
Serb community in the recent Kosovo elections. We note with satisfaction the 
continuing progress towards reconciliation between the parties in Southern Serbia 
and will continue to pay close attention to the situation in that region. We 
welcome the steady improvement of our relations with the FRY and look forward 
to their further development. We reiterate our support for a democratic 
Montenegro within a democratic FRY. 
11. In celebrating the tenth anniversary of NATO's policy of Partnership and 
Cooperation, we recognize the crucial contribution NATO's Partner countries are 
making to the Alliance's efforts to foster peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic 
region. We value, in particular, their contributions to our peacekeeping 
-.' operations in the Balkans. We also appreciate the solidarity and support which 
our Partners, and in particular those in Central Asia and the Caucasus, have 
demonstrated in the international campaign against terrorism. We want to further 
broaden and strengthen cooperation in the framework of the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP). We encourage 
all our Partners to seek a more active relationship with the Alliance. We also 
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want to broaden and strengthen cooperation with our Mediterranean partners, and 
invite them to intensify their dialogue with us on security matters of common 
concern. 
12. We continue to attach great importance to further developing and enhancing the 
NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership. In this context, we encourage Ukraine to 
continue to take concrete steps to take its reform process forward and stand ready 
to assist it in this regard. We also wish to emphasize the importance of meeting 
our joint commitments and fulfilling our shared responsibilities in the Balkans. 
13. We reaffirm our commitment to achieving a close, transparent and, coherent 
NATO-EU relationship. Our joint efforts in the Balkans have furthered the 
achievement of peace and stability in that region and shown that close cooperation 
brings considerable benefits. The events of 11 September have underlined the 
importance of enhanced cooperation between the two organizations on questions 
of common interest relating to security, defense, and crisis management, so that 
crises would be met with the most appropriate military response and effective 
crisis management ensured. Important work remains to be done on the 
arrangements for NATO support to EU-led operations, in accordance with the 
decisions taken at the 1999 NATO Washington Summit and subsequent 
Ministerial meetings. We remain determined to make progress on all the various 
aspects of our relationship, noting the need to find solutions satisfactory to all 
Allies on the issue of participation by non-EU European Allies. We note the 
commitment of the EU to finalize the modalities for consultation with Canada and 
for its participation in EU-led operations. 
14. Events on and since 11 September show that our security is challenged in a 
variety of different, sometimes unpredictable, ways. Through our Defense 
Capabilities Initiative, we want to ensure that Alliance forces have the best 
possible capabilities to meet these challenges and are able to work together 
seamlessly. Enhancing European capabilities is central to this process. 
15. We reaffirm that the Alliance must have the capability to defend appropriately 
and effectively against the threats that the proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction and their means of delivery can pose. Our response should be 
consistent with the indivisibility of Allied security. We will continue to work 
together to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet these challenges, 
adopting an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts. In this context, the 
Alliance's policy of support for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation 
will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security 
objectives. The Alliance stresses the importance of abiding by and strengthening 
existing multilateral non-proliferation and export control regimes and 
international arms control and disarmament accords. We will continue to actively 
contribute to the development of agreements and measures in this field and pursue 
further arms reductions, transparency and confidence-building. We reaffirm our 
determination to contribute to the implementation of the conclusions of the 2000 
Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and will work towards a successful 
outcome of the upcoming review. We also support ongoing efforts to achieve an 
International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation before the 
end of 2002. Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament along with 
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deterrence and defense play an essential role in enhancing security against these 
new threats and challenges. In this context, the role that missile defense could 
play is being actively considered as we continue our consultations with the United 
States on this issue. In this regard, we welcome continued work at NATO on 
theatre missile defense. 
16. Recalling the results of the second CFE Review Conference, Allies welcome 
Russia's planned reductions of its excess equipment in the North Caucasus to 
agreed levels, which must be transparent and verifiable, and progress in the 
reduction and withdrawal of Russian equipment from Moldova. We call for swift 
resolution of remaining issues between Russia and Georgia. Allies can envisage 
ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty only in the context of full compliance by 
all States Parties with agreed Treaty limits and consistent with the commitments 
in the CFE Final Act. We look forward to the entry into force of the Open Skies 
Treaty on 1 January 2002. 
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1. Since 11 September, NATO has acted on its core commitments to deter and 
defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state, as 
provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. Our countries are 
contributing, as individual Allies, to the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan. 
The Alliance and its members are playing their full part in the current campaign 
against terror, confirming NATO's key role in ensuring Euro-Atlantic security, 
including in the face of new threats. The Alliance, which embodies the 
transatlantic link that binds North America and Europe in a unique defense and 
security partnership, must, and will continue to adapt itself, to be better able to 
perform its fundamental security tasks and to strengthen security right across the 
Euro-Atlantic area. We will intensify our consultations on this process of 
adaptation, looking to the meeting of our Heads of State and Government in 
Prague in November to mark a decisive step forward in achieving this objective. 
2. In preparation for the Prague Summit, we have today given guidance on the 
development of vital new capabilities, on the process of NATO enlargement, on 
the creation of a new security relationship with Russia, as well as on the 
development of our relationships with Ukraine and all other Partners. We have 
also re-affirmed NATO's commitment to a peaceful, stable and democratic South-
East Europe, and to the development of close and effective relations between 
NATO and the European Union. 
31 We reiterate our determination to combat the threat of terrorism for as long as 
necessary. There is no justification whatsoever for terrorist actions. In keeping 
with our obligations under the Washington Treaty we will continue to strengthen 
our national and collective capacities to protect our populations, territory and 
forces from any armed attack, including terrorist attack, directed from abroad. 
286
 In 2002 only one Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council was held rather than two annually 
meetings held by the Council. The meeting for 2002 was held in May. 
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We recognized this challenge in the Strategic Concept adopted at the 1999 
Washington Summit, where we made clear that any armed attack on the territory 
of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty and where we singled out terrorism as a risk to the security 
interests of the Alliance. Meeting this challenge is fundamental to our security. 
Actions taken to meet this challenge will be in accordance with our decisions and 
in full compliance with all our commitments under international law and relevant 
provisions of the United Nations Charter and national legislation. 
4. Our countries are also working together to deal with the threat posed by possible 
use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including their possible use by 
terrorists, and the means of their delivery. Disarmament, arms control and non-
proliferation make an essential contribution to preventing the use of WMD, along 
with deterrence and defense. The Alliance is working on proposals to develop 
critical defenses against biological and chemical weapons. We also attach 
importance to reinforcing the role of the NATO WMD Centre within the 
International Staff. We will also enhance our ability, through working on all 
possible options, to provide support, when requested, to national authorities for 
the protection of civilian populations against the effects of any terrorist attack, 
and are cooperating with our Partners in this field, taking into account the various 
proposals and initiatives put forward. We are exploring the scope for enhancing 
cooperation with the European Union in this field. Together with our Defense 
colleagues, we are developing a package of proposals to be in place for the Prague 
Summit, to strengthen these capacities. 
5. To carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that 
can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance 
and time, and achieve their objectives. This will require the development of new 
and balanced capabilities within the Alliance, including strategic lift and modern 
strike capabilities, so that NATO can more effectively respond collectively to any 
threat of aggression against a member state. We look forward to decisions by 
Defense Ministers on specific recommendations for the development of new 
capabilities, for approval by Heads of State, and Government at the Prague 
Summit. 
6. At their Prague Summit in November this year, our Heads of State and 
Government will launch the next round of NATO enlargement. This will confirm 
the Alliance's commitment to remain open to new members, and enhance security 
in the Euro-Atlantic area. We received today a Consolidated Progress Report on 
the results of the third cycle of the Membership Action Plan (MAP). We 
congratulate all aspirants on the significant progress they have made thus far 
towards achieving their objectives in the MAP. Heads of State and Government 
will expect invitees to have demonstrated a commitment to the basic principles 
and values set out in the Washington Treaty, the capability to contribute to 
collective defense and the Alliance's full range of missions, a firm commitment to 
contribute to stability and security, especially in regions of crisis and conflict, and 
to be willing and able to assume the responsibilities of membership. We 
encourage all aspirants to intensify their efforts in the coming months and to 
continue them not only up to Prague but also in the years ahead. 
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7. We commit ourselves to continuing to work with the aspirants to help them make 
sufficient progress to be invited to begin accession negotiations at Prague. The 
2002-2003 cycle of the MAP, which we launched today to conclude in Spring 
2003, will include all the present participants, and be tailored to their individual 
requirements. We look forward to submission of individual Annual National 
Programs in the Autumn. After Prague, the MAP will continue to serve both 
aspirants and those countries invited to begin accession talks with the Alliance. 
8. As at Madrid, our goal is that all invitees should accede on a common date before 
the next Summit. After Prague, we will expect invited countries to continue to 
participate in the MAP. The accession process will take into account work 
conducted under the MAP, and the MAP will be used to help the integration of 
invitees into Alliance structures. During accession talks and on the basis of an 
invitee's Annual National Program, the NATO Expert Team, on the basis of 
political guidance to be elaborated, will discuss with individual invitees specific 
issues and reforms upon which further progress will be expected before and after 
accession in order to enhance their contribution to the Alliance. These will be 
drawn from existing MAP objectives, Partnership Goals and other issues 
identified by Allies and those associated with military integration identified by the 
NATO Military Authorities. A timetable for the completion of these reforms 
should be established, including for those that are unlikely to be realized until 
after accession. This timetable should be reflected within a revised Annual 
National Program. We look forward to the commitments that invitees will make 
as part of this process. We look forward to signing the individual accession 
protocols not later than our meeting in Spring of 2003. Invitees will participate in 
subsequent MAP cycles until the ratification process has been completed. 
9. We commend Croatia on the progress it has made in its reform efforts, making 
full use of the options offered by Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Intensified Dialogue. We expect Croatia to 
continue to contribute to stability in the Balkans. We welcome Croatia's 
participation in the MAP and invite Croatia to present its first Annual National 
Program in the Autumn and look forward to reviewing Croatia's progress at our 
meeting next Spring. 
10. NATO is undertaking internal preparations to ensure its readiness to accept new 
members. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to prepare a 
comprehensive report on the relevant factors associated with decisions on 
enlargement for consideration by Heads of State and Government in Prague. This 
work will be conducted in keeping with political guidance provided by the 
Council and will not create any preconditions or decisions on new members. 
11. We welcome the decisive and substantial deepening of the NATO-Russia 
relationship, which marks an historic step towards the Alliance's long-standing 
goal of building a secure, cooperative and democratic Euro-Atlantic area. We 
look forward to the approval this afternoon by the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint 
Council of the document on the creation of the NATO-Russia Council, where 
NATO member states and Russia will work as equal partners in areas of common 
interest, while preserving NATO's prerogative to act independently. The 
document will be adopted and signed at the inaugural session of the Council, to be 
'230 '. ) 
held at a Summit meeting of Heads of State and Government in Rome on 28 May. 
We are confident that the creation of the Council will lend new impetus and 
substance to our partnership with Russia, and make a substantial contribution to 
our common goal of a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, as enshrined in the 
NATO-Russia Founding Act. A NATO-Russia Council meeting at the level of 
Heads of State and Government in Prague would offer an opportunity to take 
stock of our new relationship. 
12. We support Russia's right to protect her territorial integrity, and recognize her 
responsibility to protect all her citizens against terrorism and criminality. We 
urge Russia to find a prompt and lasting political and peaceful resolution to the 
conflict in Chechnya, and to respect and protect the human and legal rights of the 
population. We call on the Chechen side to cooperate in good faith in seeking a 
political solution to the conflict, to condemn terrorism and to take action against 
it. 
13. We note Ukraine's strong determination to pursue full Euro-Atlantic integration. 
We continue to encourage Ukraine to implement the reforms required to achieve 
this Objective and stand ready to continue to assist it in this regard. In that 
context, we have decided to give new impetus and substance to our partnership 
with Ukraine. To that end, we have tasked the Council in Permanent Session to 
develop new mechanisms and modalities that build on the Charter on a Distinctive 
Partnership and bring our relationship to a qualitatively new level. We expect to 
deepen and expand our relationship, including through intensified consultations 
and cooperation on political, economic and defense issues. In this context, Allies 
look forward to a meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, at the level of 
Heads of State and Government, at the Prague Summit. 
14. Since 11 September, the important contribution made by NATO's Partnerships to 
Euro-Atlantic security has been confirmed and reinforced. We look forward to a 
new, more substantive relationship with Partners, which intensifies our 
cooperation in responding to new security challenges, including terrorism. In 
light of the changing security environment, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
and Partnership for Peace are adapting to remain valuable and effective. We have 
tasked the Council in Permanent Session to continue reviewing our Partnerships, 
with a view to presenting bur Heads of State and Government at Prague with 
concrete proposals for further developing the EAPC and PfP to better serve Allies 
and Partners in addressing the challenges of the 21st century. We look forward to 
the meeting of the EAPC at the level of Heads of State and Government in 
Prague. 
15. We have decided to upgrade the political and practical dimensions of our 
Mediterranean Dialogue, including by consulting with Mediterranean partners on 
security matters of common concern, including terrorism-related issues, as 
appropriate. These efforts will aim to bring our Mediterranean partners even 
closer to NATO, and give fresh impetus to the Dialogue by the Prague Summit. 
16. We reaffirm our commitment to achieving a close, transparent and coherent 
NATO-EU relationship. Our joint efforts in the Balkans have furthered the 
achievement of peace and stability in that region and shown that close cooperation 
brings considerable benefits. The events of 11 September have underlined the 
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importance of enhanced cooperation between the two organizations on questions 
of common interest relating to security, defense, and crisis management, so that 
crises would be met with the most appropriate military response and effective 
crisis management ensured. Important work remains to be done on the 
arrangements for NATO support to EU-led operations, in accordance with the 
decisions taken at the 1999 NATO Washington Summit and subsequent 
Ministerial meetings. We remain determined to make progress on all the various 
aspects of our relationship, noting the need to find solutions satisfactory to all 
Allies on the issue of participation by non-EU European Allies. We welcome 
recent progress towards finalizing EU modalities for consultation with Canada 
and for its participation in EU-led operations. 
17. We reiterate our commitment to a peaceful, stable, and democratic South-East 
Europe, and reaffirm our support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all 
the countries in the region. The continued presence of NATO-led forces 
demonstrates and embodies our determination to oppose all violence whether 
ethnically, politically or criminally motivated, and to strengthen peace, tolerance, 
the rule of law and democratic institutions in the region. Working together with 
our Partners in SFOR and KFOR and with other international institutions, we will 
continue to promote regional reconciliation and cooperation, protection of rights 
of members of all ethnic groups and minorities, confidence-building measures and 
a lasting solution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons. We remain 
actively engaged in the field of border security and smuggling interdiction 
operations and reaffirm the importance of a wider regional approach to these 
issues. 
18. In light of the progress achieved towards a lasting and self-sustaining peace, we 
have reviewed the status of NATO's operations in the Balkans. Our Defense 
colleagues will review the implementation of force restructuring which takes into 
account a more regional approach and aims at rationalizing NATO's military 
presence, as civilian authorities increasingly take up their responsibilities. Full 
cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) remains a priority. All persons indicted for war crimes by the ICTY must 
be brought to justice in The Hague. 
19. We remain determined to further support efforts towards security and stability in 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. NATO continues to contribute to 
security by providing support for the EU and OSCE monitors through the 
presence of Task Force Fox. We are encouraged by, progress in the 
implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and emphasize that the 
passing of remaining legislation related to the Agreement and the holding of free 
and fair general elections in September will together constitute important steps 
towards peace and stability. 
20. We remain committed to a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 
full accordance with the principles of the General Framework Agreement, and call 
on the local authorities in the country to take on greater responsibility for and 
ownership of the process of implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement. We 
strongly endorse the respective efforts of SFOR and the ICTY to detain and bring 
to trial persons indicted for war crimes. In this context, we reiterate that the 
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Entities carry primary responsibility for bringing to justice persons indicted for 
war crimes, and urge them to cooperate more effectively with SFOR to this end. 
We look forward to the general elections this Autumn as an important step 
towards a single, multi-ethnic, and democratic Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
21. We look forward to further developing the Alliance's relations with the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and expect swift implementation of the agreement 
that has been reached between Serbia and Montenegro in redefining their 
relationship. We welcome the FRY's interest in joining PfP and look forward to 
working with the FRY leadership in achieving the progress necessary to enable 
participation in PfP. Full and continued cooperation with ICTY, democratic 
reform and control of the military, as well as full and transparent implementation 
of the Dayton Peace Agreement, are essential to a deeper relationship with the 
Alliance. 
22. With regard to Kosovo, we reaffirm our commitment to the full implementation 
of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, and welcome the 
establishment of provisional institutions of self-government which include 
representatives of all communities. We call on the provisional institutions and 
community leaders to assume their responsibilities and fully cooperate with 
UNMIK, KFOR and the international community to promote a peaceful, multi-
ethnic, multi-cultural and democratic Kosovo. We look forward to the local 
elections in Kosovo this Autumn as another important step towards a peaceful, 
multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and democratic Kosovo, where all its people, 
irrespective of ethnic origin or religion, can live in peace and security and enjoy 
universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis, including through 
participation in democratic institutions. 
23. The Alliance's policy of support for arms control, disarmament and non-
proliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the 
Alliance's security objectives. We will continue to work together to adapt the 
Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet the threats posed by the proliferation 
of WMD and their means of delivery, adopting an appropriate mix of political and 
defense efforts. Our efforts to that end should be consistent with the indivisibility 
of Allied security. The Alliance stresses the importance of abiding by and 
strengthening existing multilateral non-proliferation and export control regimes 
and international arms control and disarmament accords. We will continue to 
actively contribute to the development of agreements and measures in this field 
and pursue further arms reductions, transparency and confidence and security 
building measures. In that context, we welcome the U.S.-Russian agreement to 
sign a treaty to reduce deployed strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 
2,200. We reaffirm our determination to contribute to the implementation of the 
conclusions of the 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference 
and welcome the full discussion of issues at the Preparatory Conference for the 
2005 Review Conference in April 2002. We also support ongoing efforts to 
achieve an International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation 
before the end of 2002. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, along 
with deterrence and defense play an essential role in enhancing security against 
these new threats and challenges. In this context, the role that missile defense 
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could play is being actively considered as we continue our consultations with the 
United States on this issue. In this regard, we welcome continued work at NATO 
on theatre missile defense. 
24. Concerning the CFE Treaty, we welcome the Russian Federation's December 
declaration that it is now within agreed levels of armament and equipment. We 
encourage Russia to enhance its cooperation with NATO to facilitate our efforts 
to verify this claim as soon as possible. However, we can envisage ratification of 
the adapted CFE Treaty only in the context of full compliance by all States Parties 
with agreed Treaty limits and consistent with the commitments contained in the 
CFE Final Act. We urge a swift resolution of outstanding issues relating to 
Istanbul commitments, including on Georgia and Moldova. Recognizing the 
contributions of the CFE Treaty to European security and stability, we recall that 
the entry into force of the adapted CFE Treaty would permit accession by non-
CFE States. We welcome the entry into force of the Open Skies Treaty on 1 
January 2002. 




Press Communique M-NAC-2 (2003) 152 held at NATO HQ Brussels 4 Dec 2003 
Final Communique 
Issued at the Ministerial Meeting 
of the North Atlantic Council 
1. As we meet today, NATO is acting to preserve peace through its operations; 
spreading stability through its partnerships; and reinforcing our community of 
shared values through the most robust round of enlargement in our history. The 
North Atlantic Alliance remains the basis of our collective defense and the 
essential transatlantic forum for security. Today, we took stock of NATO's 
ongoing transformation to meet 21st century threats and challenges to the security 
of our populations, territory and forces, from wherever they may come, and gave 
direction on work still to be done, as we look ahead to our Summit in Istanbul 
next June. 
2. We look forward to welcoming seven new members of the Alliance by the time of 
the Istanbul Summit, which will strengthen security for all in the Euro-Atlantic 
area. We are pleased to be joined today by our colleagues from these countries, 
who associate themselves with this Communique. The formal accession of the 
new members into the Alliance will take place as soon as the ratification process 
is complete. We welcome the significant contribution the Invitees are already 
making to our security and the progress they have made in their reform efforts, 
and we encourage them to continue on this path. 
3. We categorically reject and condemn terrorism in all its forms. We express our 
sympathy to all the victims of terrorism and unwavering solidarity to Allies that 
-., have been targeted by it. NATO is determined to use all means at its disposal and 
to cooperate fully with other international organizations and with its Partners to 
fight this scourge. We welcome the progress on implementing the package of 
measures approved at the Prague Summit to improve NATO's capacity to respond 
to terrorism, and the recent establishment of the Permanent Terrorist Threat 
Intelligence Unit. NATO's Operation Active Endeavour continues to make a 
significant contribution in the Mediterranean to the fight against terrorism, in 
cooperation with the International Maritime Organization; it has helped to 
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maintain security through maritime anti-terrorism surveillance and boarding 
operations in the Eastern Mediterranean and the escort of designated Allied ships 
through the Straits of Gibraltar. 
4. In Afghanistan, the Alliance now leads the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) under its UN mandate. This operation demonstrates our readiness 
to deploy forces wherever the Alliance decides, to ensure our common security. 
Our aim is to assist in the emergence of a united, sovereign country, integrated 
into the international community, including by assisting the Afghan Transitional 
Authority in the maintenance of security and stability and in the electoral process 
according to the Bonn Process. We decided on the progressive expansion of 
ISAF beyond Kabul in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions, 
including through temporary deployments for specific tasks and limited in size 
and duration, provided all military conditions, and requirements for the Kabul 
mission, are met. We will continue to address the scope of such specific tasks. 
/We welcome the German deployment of a pilot Provincial Reconstruction Team 
(PRT), under ISAF, in Kunduz. Expecting that the establishment of additional 
PRTs will follow, we consider that ISAF could move to assume military 
command of such PRTs where consistent with military requirements and 
capabilities. Achievement of these objectives will be subject to consultations with 
and contributions from PRT framework nations and the provision of the required 
assets, including for Kabul International Airport. We will review NATO's 
contribution to stabilization efforts in Afghanistan on a regular basis.; It is 
necessary to ensure close co-ordination and cooperation between ISAF and 
Operation Enduring Freedom, and also with the Afghan National Army. Our 
forces will also have to work closely with the UN Assistance Mission to 
Afghanistan and other international organizations on the ground, including the 
European Union. 
5. We task the Council in Permanent Session to develop for the Istanbul Summit a 
comprehensive strategy for NATO's engagement in Afghanistan, in close 
consultation with other International Organizations and the Afghan Transitional 
Authority. We welcome the appointment of Mr. Hikmet Cetin of Turkey to the 
position of NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan. 
6. The Alliance continues to support Poland in its leadership of a multi-national 
division in Iraq. The North Atlantic Council will review NATO's contribution to 
the stabilization efforts on a regular basis. We welcome the adoption of UN 
Security Council Resolution 1511 on Iraq and are committed to its full 
implementation in order to restore conditions of stability and security in the 
country, and return governing responsibilities and authorities to the people of 
Iraq. In that regard, we welcome the Agreement on Political Process signed in 
Baghdad on 15 November 2003. Peace, stability and reconstruction in Iraq 
remain a high priority. 
7. The security environment in the strategically important region of the Balkans is 
stable but remains fragile. We reaffirm our support for the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of all the countries in the Balkans. We want to see enduring stability 
and peace in the region. 
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8. Our missions in the Balkans continue to evolve. The improved security 
environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina will allow for further reduction of SFOR 
by next Spring. Over the coming months, Allies will assess options for the future 
size and structure of SFOR, to include possible termination of SFOR by the end 
of 2004, transition possibly to a new EU mission within the framework of the 
Berlin+ arrangements and to a new NATO HQ Sarajevo. We task the Council in 
Permanent Session and the NATO Military Authorities to consult with their EU 
counterparts on Bosnia and Herzegovina, in accordance with agreed texts and 
procedures and within the framework of Berlin+. We will consult, as appropriate, 
with all other parties concerned, including the authorities of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. . 
9. In Kosovo, KFOR's presence remains essential. We welcome the proposal of the 
Contact Group to establish a date for review of Kosovo's progress in meeting 
internationally endorsed standards. Further advancement towards a process to 
determine Kosovo's future status, in accordance with UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244, will depend on the outcome of this comprehensive review. We 
encourage all parties to work constructively to meet the agreed standards, and to 
support the efforts of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Mr. 
Harri Holkeri. Direct dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina on practical issues 
of mutual concern remains a key benchmark and an indispensable element of the 
international community's policy of Standards before Status; we encourage 
Belgrade and Pristina to pursue their dialogue in good faith. 
10. We are committed to help the countries of the Balkans integrate fully into Euro-
Atlantic structures. We encourage regional cooperation among the Balkan 
countries. We expect them to assume ownership of, and implement, pressing 
reforms. They must comply fully with their international obligations, including 
full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), in particular bringing to justice all those who are indicted by 
the Tribunal, notably Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, as well as Ante 
Gotovina, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1503, 
11. We call on the Government and all political actors in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia to continue to work toward full implementation of the 
Ohrid Agreement. NATO's support to the European Union's Operation 
Concordia successfully demonstrated the effectiveness of the Berlin+ 
arrangements. NATO has conducted its preliminary lessons learned process and 
we will conduct a lessons learned process with the EU. 
12. We encourage Albania, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
to continue pursuing the reforms necessary to advance their candidacies for 
NATO membership. We want them to succeed and will continue to support their 
reform efforts through the MAP process. We reaffirm that the current round of 
enlargement will not be the last and that NATO's door remains Open. 
13. We recognize the progress made by Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and 
Montenegro in their efforts to join Partnership for Peace (PfP), welcome 
substantive progress on defense reform, and will continue to assist both countries 
in meeting established NATO conditions for PfP membership. We look forward 
to welcoming them into PfP once they have met the conditions set forth by the 
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Alliance, including full cooperation with the ICTYj-in particular to detain and turn 
over persons indicted for war crimes to the Tribunal. We urge both countries to 
envisage the Istanbul Summit as a realistic target by which they could meet the 
outstanding conditions. We will assess the two countries' progress on their 
possible accession to PfP in advance of the Istanbul Summit. 
14. We task the Council in Permanent Session to review and develop NATO's 
Balkans strategy, encompassing political aspects as well as operations, in time for 
the Istanbul Summit. 
15. NATO and the European Union share common strategic interests, and we remain 
strongly committed to enhancing our cooperation. Since our last meeting, 
1
 NATO-EU cooperation has made concrete progress and is developing in a 
constructive manner. We agreed a concerted approach for the Western Balkans. 
We look forward to further substantive cooperation with the EU, including 
through the Berlin+ arrangements. A joint NATO-EU crisis management 
exercise was successfully held in November. NATO-EU consultations and > 
cooperation on questions of common interest relating to security, defense and 
crisis management, such as the fight against terrorism, mutually reinforcing 
capabilities, and civil-emergency planning, were stepped up and will continue to 
be developed. We have tasked the Council in Permanent Session to consider how 
to reinforce, by the time of the Istanbul Summit, the strategic partnership between 
NATO and the EU as agreed between our two organizations, including through 
effective consultations with the EU, respecting the autonomy of the two 
organizations, and in a spirit of transparency. NATO and the EU could also co-
sponsor a seminar on terrorism. 
16. NATO's Partnerships, which contribute greatly to security and stability across the 
Euro-Atlantic area, are of increasing value and importance. During the ten years 
of its existence, Partnership for Peace has been an increasingly effective 
instrument for cooperation in such areas as peace support operations and the fight 
against terrorism. The Istanbul Summit should build on progress made at Prague 
to re-focus PfP to reflect its post-enlargement dimensions and the Alliance's focus 
on new threats. We have therefore tasked the Council in Permanent Session to 
develop proposals to further tailor Partnership to tackle key thematic issues and 
individual Partners' needs and capabilities, to promote defense reform which 
encourages military transformation and interoperability, and to enhance regional 
cooperation and mutual support. In this context the Council will examine whether 
and how selected Partnership activities might be opened, on a case by case basis, 
to other countries which might express an interest in such involvement. These 
new measures should allow for more focused and deeper practical cooperation. 
We agree to promote a special focus on the strategically important regions of the 
Caucasus and Central Asia. 
17. Security in the Euro-Atlantic area is closely linked to security and stability in the 
Mediterranean. We look for additional progress beyond that achieved since the 
Prague Summit in upgrading the Mediterranean Dialogue. We direct the Council 
in Permanent Session to consider ways to further enhance this relationship by 
generating, in consultation with all Mediterranean Dialogue partners, by the time 
of the Istanbul Summit, options to develop a more ambitious and expanded 
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framework for the Mediterranean Dialogue. This initiative will genuinely 
improve cooperation in a number of fields, including on defense reform and 
interoperability, including through PfP-like instruments, and open more 
Partnership activities to the Mediterranean Dialogue partners on a case by. case 
basis. Our efforts will complement and mutually reinforce other Mediterranean 
initiatives, including those of the European Union and the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 
18. The NATO-Russia Council, in which NATO member states and Russia work 
together as equal partners in areas of common interest, continues to make 
valuable contributions to security throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. Our political 
dialogue has developed on key security issues, including Afghanistan and the 
Balkans. Our practical cooperation has reached a new level, including in military-
to-military projects; and, through our focus on improving interoperability, we 
have also laid the groundwork for future military cooperation , including 
potentially in joint peacekeeping operations . We welcome progress made on 
nuclear confidence building measures, and on the safe management of nuclear and 
radiological material. We look forward to approval of an ambitious Work 
Program for 2004. We are committed to building on this progress, and to further 
enhancing the NATO-Russia relationship. 
19. We remain committed to stronger NATO-Ukraine relations under the Charter on a 
Distinctive Partnership and welcome progress made over the past year in the 
implementation of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan and Ukraine's 2003 Annual 
Target Plan. We look forward to concrete implementation of the Annual Target 
Plan in 2004, including the conduct of free and fair Presidential elections, 
improvements to media freedom, strengthening arms export controls, and 
progress on and funding for the Defense Review. We encourage "Ukraine to 
pursue all reforms necessary to its goal of full Euro-Atlantic integration, and we 
will keep under active review all possible options to support Ukraine in these 
efforts. 
20. We are closely following the development of events in Georgia. We call on the 
Georgian authorities to hold free and fair elections, planned for January next year. 
We support the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia. 
The Alliance remains committed to developing Partnership with Georgia through 
using the full range of Partnership instruments. 
21. The Alliance's policy of support for arms control, disarmament and non-
proliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the 
Alliance's security objectives, including preventing the spread and use of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. We stress the 
importance of abiding by, fully implementing and strengthening existing 
international arms control and disarmament accords and multilateral non-
proliferation and export control regimes. Early admission of all invitees into all 
appropriate existing non-proliferation regimes could play a positive role in that 
regard. In particular, we underline our commitment to reinforcing the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, the pre-eminent non-proliferation and disarmament 
mechanism, and ensuring the full compliance with it by all states party to the 
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Treaty, We will also strengthen our common efforts to safeguard nuclear and 
radiological material. 
22. The Alliance supports the aims of the Proliferation Security Initiative to establish 
a more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and. stop 
shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from 
states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with national legal 
authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, including the United 
Nations Security Council. 
23. We remain committed to the protection of civilian populations. We welcome the 
progress made in the implementation of the Civil Emergency Planning Action 
Plan for the Improvement of Civil Preparedness against possible Terrorist Attacks 
against Civilian Populations with Chemical, Biological and Radiological Agents. 
We look forward to its full implementation in order to reinforce national 
preparedness and reaction to civil emergencies. 
24. As we have consistently stated, we remain committed to the CFE Treaty as a 
cornerstone of European security, and reaffirm our attachment to the early entry 
into force of the Adapted Treaty. We recall that fulfillment of the remaining 
Istanbul commitments on Georgia and Moldova will create the conditions for 
Allies and other States Parties to move forward on ratification of the Adapted 
CFE Treaty. We welcome the approach of those non-CFE countries, which have 
stated their intention to request accession to the Adapted CFE Treaty upon its 
entry into force. Their accession would provide an important additional 
contribution to European security and stability. 
25. We urge swift resolution of the outstanding issues between Georgia and Russia as 
set out in their Istanbul Joint Statement of 17 November 1999 and, to this end, 
call upon the parties to resume negotiations at an appropriately senior level. We 
note the progress that was made on withdrawal of Russian military forces from 
Moldova during the first half of 2003. We regret that this progress was not 
sustained and that the 31 December 2003 extended deadline, agreed in the 
framework of the OSCE, will not be met. It is essential that efforts be intensified 
to complete the withdrawal in early 2004. We will continue, via the OSCE, to 
assist in this process. 
26. Based on the enduring principles enshrined in the Washington Treaty, NATO 
today is demonstrating our commitment to multilateralism through effective 
action and our shared commitment to: the transatlantic link; NATO's fundamental 
security tasks including collective defense; our shared democratic values; and the 
United Nations Charter. As we prepare for the Istanbul Summit, we invite the 
Council in Permanent Session to intensify consultations on the challenges and 
threats facing the Alliance, and how best to respond to them. 
27. We continue to attach high priority to the implementation of measures to enhance 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the NATO Headquarters organization, 
including through modern management and financial systems, sound and 
transparent management of the new Headquarters project, and improvements to 
gender balance and diversity in the Alliance's International Staff. 
28. We wish to thank Lord Robertson of Port Ellen warmly for his leadership role in 
guiding NATO's transformation. We are confident that the new Secretary 
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General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, will continue to carry forward NATO's 
evolution, and build on the Alliance's record of success, and we pledge our full 
support to him. 
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APPENDIX I 





The speech acts are categorized as the following: 
• Assertions: express a belief and the intention that 
' another/others also hold that belief; 
• Commitment: express an intention to perform some 
act in the future; 
• Directive: express the intention that another/others act 
in a particular way. 
There propositions add 'hereby' to the speech act to stress the 
fundamental point of speech act theory that language is 
action. 
The propositions specify implicitly conveyed intentions. 
Reflexive intentions differ depending on the type of speech 
act. The reflexive intentions in the pragmatic analysis follow 
the following form: 
• Assertion: P is the case. 
o Reflective Intentions 
• S believes that P. 
• S wants H to believe that P. 
• Directive: Do X. 
o Reflective Intentions 
• S believes that his utterance, in virtue 
his authority over H, constitutes 
sufficient reason for H to do X. 
• S wants H to do X because of S's 
command. 
• Commitment: I will do Y. 
o Reflective Intentions 
• S believes his utterance obligates him 
to do Y on condition that H indicates 
he wants S to do Y. 
• S wants Y on the condition that H 
indicates he wants S to do Y. 
• S wants H to believe (1) and (2). 
These propositions come from Grice's cooperative principle, 
which includes the following maxims of conversation: 
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Presuppositions 
• The maxim of quality: Do not say what you believe to 
be false, and do not say anything for which you lack 
adequate evidence. 
• The maxim of quantity: Make your contribution as 
informative as is required for the current purposes of 
the exchange. 
• The maxim of relevance: Make your contributions 
relevant. 
• The maxim of manner: Avoid obscurity, avoid 
ambiguity, be brief and be orderly. 
Researchers and analyst infer implicature by assuming that 
speakers follow these maxims. 
The presuppositions are inferences that need to be true for a 
statement to be meaningful or have a truth value. Most 
suppositions have the characteristics of 'constancy under 
negation.' The classic example is as follows: 
• The King of France is bald. 
• The King of France is not bald. 
• The King of France exists. 
The first two statements help to suppose the third, even 
through the first two negate one another. This is consistent 
under negation. Most presuppositions in the pragmatic 
analysis have this property. 
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APPENDIX J 
DIALOGICAL ANALYSIS FOR SPEECH ACT 1 
Dialogical Analysis for Speech Act 1 • 
Statement: Press Communique M-NAC-2 (1996) 165 held at NATO HQ Brussels 10 
Dec 1996 - _ . 
Speech Act: Assertion, Commitment, and Directive 
a. The member nations herby assert to: 
a. Preserve its political and military strength, ensuring its ability to carry out 
the full range of its missions. 
b. Help build a truly cooperative European security structure. 
c. Open the Alliance and its ability to carry out all its new roles and mission; 
d. Remains steadfast in its primary goal of providing stability and security in 
the Euro-Atlantic area. 
a. Strengthening cooperative relations with all our Partners including through 
an enhanced Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the initiative to establish an 
Atlantic Partnership Council. 
b. A broad process of integration and cooperation is underway in Europe; 
Russia is a part of it through its membership in the OSCE and the Council 
of Europe and its relationship with NATO as well as the European Union 
andtheWEU. c 
c. Reaffirm that the nuclear forces of the Allies continue to play a unique and 
essential role in the Alliances strategy of war prevention. 
d. Develop on the basis of transparency ever-closer and deeper cooperative 
ties open to all Partner countries by making the Partnership more 
operational; strengthening its political consultation element, taking full 
account of the respective activities of the OSCE and the relevant European 
institutions such as the WEU and the EU; and involving Partners more in 
operations planning and Partnership decision-making. 
e. Value the close and effective cooperation between Russia and NATO in 
IFOR. 
f. Continue to support Ukraine as it develops as a democratic nation and a 
market economy. 
g. Support the Middle East peace process, and urge all participants to remain 
firmly committed to it. 
h. The CFE Treaty is a fundamental cornerstone of security and stability for 
all in the Euro-Atlantic area 
i. Proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their 
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delivery means continues to be a matter of serious concern to us. 
j . Reaffirm our commitment to the Alliance's common-funded programs. 
b. The member nations hereby direct to: 
a. Urge all participants of the Middle East Peace process to remain firmly 
i committed to it. 
b. Urge the Russian Federation to follow the United States in ratifying the 
START II Treaty. 
c. Urge all States Parties who have not yet done so to approve this CFE 
Flank Agreement before the end of the extended provisional application 
period. 
d. Urge the early ratification of the Treaty on Open Skies by those states 
which have not already ratified. 
e. Urge all other nations to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 
c. The member nations hereby commit to: 
a. Develop a new command structure; 
b. Finalize all necessary arrangements for the European Security and 
Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO; , 
c. Invite one or more of the countries which have expressed interest in 
joining the Alliance to begin accession negotiations; 
k. Work with Partners on the initiative to establish an Atlantic Partnership 
Council (APC) as a single new cooperative mechanism; 
1. Further develop an enhanced relationship with Russia and the Ukraine by 
aiming at reaching an agreement at the earliest possible date on the 
development of a strong, stable and enduring security partnership; 
d. Enhancing the Mediterranean dialogue; 
e. Further developing the ability to carry out new roles and missions relating 
to conflict prevention and crisis management; 
m. Further enhance our political and defense efforts against the proliferation 
of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their delivery means; 
n. Ensuring that the NACC goals of enhancing transparency and confidence 
in security matters among member states remain central to future 
cooperation, 
o. Enhance the political dimension of the Partnership through increasing 
opportunities for political consultations, 
p. Expand the agreed fields of military missions within the PfP to the full 
range of the Alliance's new mission, 
q. Broaden the NATO/PfP exercise program in accordance with the 
expanded scope of the Partnership, 
r. Enable Partner countries to participate in the planning and execution of 
PfP activities. 
s. Involve Partners more substantively and actively in PfP-related parts of 
the regular peacetime work of NATO's Military Authorities, 
t. Examine, together with Partners, the possible modalities for the 
elaboration of a political-military framework for PfP operations, 
u. Increase regional cooperation within the Partnership provided it remains 
open to all Partners and remains an integral part of the overall PfP. 
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v. Develop a charter between NATO and Russia, which would encompass 
the shared principles that will form the basis of our relationship; a broad 
set of areas of practical cooperation; mechanisms for regular and ad hoc 
consultations; and mechanisms for military liaison and cooperation, 
w. The development of a distinctive and effective NATO-Ukraine 
relationship, which could be formalized, possibly by the time of the 
Summit, building on the document on enhanced NATO-Ukraine relations 
agreed in September 1995, and taking into account recent Ukrainian 
proposals, 
x. Keep under review the allocation of resources in order to ensure their 
optimal us. 
y. Identify the implications of adaptation for NATOs common-funded 
budgets and to make appropriate recommendations for dealing with these. 
z. Improve its capabilities to address the risks posed by proliferation and 
strengthen the review process of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT), scheduled for April 1997. . 
Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, and Enforcement ' 
Explicit Performative: 
a. The member nations hereby assert the Alliance will uphold the security and 
stability of its member countries while taking a new shape, reflecting the 
fundamental changes in the security environment in Europe and the enduring 
vitality of the transatlantic partnership which underpins our endeavors. 
a. The member nations hereby encourage the members of the Alliance to ratify, 
accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies. 
b. The member nations hereby commits the Alliance to do the following: 
a. Agree on a new command structure; 
b. Finalize all necessary arrangements for the ESDI within NATO; 
c. Invite one or more of the countries which have expressed interest in 
joining the Alliance to begin accession negotiations; 
d. Pledge that the Alliance will remain open to the accession of further 
members and will remain ready to pursue consultations with nations 
seeking NATO membership, as it has done in the past; 
e. Strengthening cooperative relations with all our Partners including through 
an enhanced Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the initiative to establish an 
Atlantic Partnership Council; 
f. Intensifying and consolidating relations with Russia beyond the 
Partnership for Peace; 
g. Further develop an enhanced relationship with Ukraine; 
h. Enhancing our Mediterranean dialogue; 
i. Further develop our ability to carry out new roles and missions relating to 
conflict prevention and crisis management; and 
j . Further enhancing our political and defense efforts against the 
proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their 




a. The member nations believe that its must maintain security and stability 
while being able to maintain in the current global security environment. 
b. The member nations want the Alliance to uphold its mission by carry out 
cooperative means through political and military measures. 
d. Directive 
3. The member nations believe that its utterance, in virtue of its authority 
over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for to the member nations 
to ratify, accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies. 
4. The member nations want its members to ratify, accede and fully 
implement NATO treaties and policies because of NATO's command. 
e. Commitment: 
a. The member nations believe that its utterance obligates the Alliance to 
secure and stabilize the global security environment on the condition that 
) the member nations indicate they will agree to a new structure command; 
make arrangements for the ESDI; keep the Alliance open for new 
membership; strengthen cooperative relations with all Partners , especially 
those with Russia and the Ukraine; enhance Mediterranean dialogue; and 
further enhance political and defense efforts relating to conflict 
prevention, crisis management, and WMDs. 
b. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the directives on the 
condition that the member countries will be able to secure and stabilize the 
Euro-Atlantic area and protect their citizens. 
c. The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and (b). 
Implicatures: 
a. Assertion: 
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens. 
i. Quality: The member nations believe that its members along with 
other countries around the world and their citizens are a part of the 
same race - human, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs the members 
that they are fellow citizens, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant 
to its members, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to the Alliance. 
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral 
commitment to use. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing 
security through multilateral alliance commitment, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members it 
is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries. 
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political 
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relationships. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security 
, through political relationships, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations'assertion informs its members it 
is establishing political relationships, 
hi. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries. 
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved 
peacefully, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations; assertion informs its members 
conflicts can be resolved peacefully, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can 
be resolved peacefully, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries. 
e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its members will use force 
if necessary, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members 
will use force if necessary, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing its use of force 
is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries, 
a. Directive: 
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its members along 
with other countries in the global security and their citizens are a 
part of the same race - human, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs the member 
countries and other countries that they are fellow citizens, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant 
to its members and other countries in the global security 
environment. , / 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its directive 
to its members and other countries in the global security 
environment. 
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral 
commitment to use. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing 
security through multilateral alliance commitment, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs its member 
countries and other countries it is establishing a multilateral 
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alliance commitment, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries 
and other countries 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries and other countries in the global security 
environment. 
c. NATO ' member countries believe security is based on political 
relationships. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security 
through political relationships, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member 
countries and other countries it is establishing political 
relationships.
 } 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries 
and other countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries and other countries in the global security 
environment. 
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved 
peacefully, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member 
countries and other countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can 
be resolved peacefully, 
v. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries and other countries in the global security 
environment, 
b. Commitment: 
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its member countries 
along with other countries around the world and their citizens are a 
part of the same race - human, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs the 
member countries that they are fellow citizens. „ • . ' 
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant 
to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
commitment to its member countries. 
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral 
commitment to use. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing 
security through multilateral alliance commitment. 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its 
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member countries it is establishing a multilateral alliance 
commitment, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its' 
commitment to its member countries. 
. c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political 
relationships. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security 
through political relationships, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its 
member countries it is establishing political relationships, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
commitment to its member countries. 
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved 
peacefully, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its 
member countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can 
be resolved peacefully, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations clearly conveying its commitment 
to its member countries. 
e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its member countries will 
use force if necessary, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its 
member countries will use force if necessary, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing it will force is 
relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
commitment to its member countries! 
(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are sincere. 
(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are normative. .' 
Presuppositions: 
a. If the member nations preserve its political and military strength, ensuring its 
ability to carry out the full range of its missions, then the Alliance will be able to 
stabilize and secure in the whole Euro-Atlantic area and the global security 
environment. 
b. If member nations do not preserve its political and military strength, ensuring its 
v
 ability to carry out the full range of its missions, then the Alliance will not be able 




DIALOGICAL ANALYSIS FOR SPEECH ACT 2 
Dialogical Analysis for Speech Act 2 • __ ___ 
Statement: Press Communique M-NAC-2 (1997) 155 held at NATO HQ Brussels 16 
Dec 1997 . 
Speech Act: Assertion, Commitment, and Directive 
a. The member nations assert to: 
a. Have taken historical steps to transform the Alliance. 
b. Have endorsed politico-military guidance for the development of options 
for a future NATO-led military presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
following the end of SFOR's mandate. 
c. Have completed the initial estimates of the resource implications for 
accession of the three invitees, and have confirmed that the costs will be 
manageable. 
d. Have made significant progress has been made on developing the 
European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance. 
e. NATO enlargement is part of a comprehensive process. 
f. Welcome the confirmation by the invited countries of their willingness to 
assume the rights and obligations of NATO membership and to meet the 
associated political commitments. 
g. Admitting new members will entail resource implications for the Alliance, 
h. The Partnership for Peace continues to be the focal point of our efforts to 
build with Partners new patterns of practical cooperation across a wide 
range of security issues. 
i. The Partnership for Peace has shown its value in contributing to stability 
in Europe through the special assistance the Alliance is continuing to 
provide to Albania, in the context of PfP and drawing on the experience of 
the Italian-led Multinational Protection Force, in the rebuilding of its 
national armed forces following the crisis in that country in early 1997. 
j . The signature in Paris last May of the NATO-Russia Founding Act 
marked the beginning of a fundamentally new relationship between 
NATO and Russia. 
k. That the Ukraine has a key role to play in European security; and that 
Ukraine's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, democratic 
development, economic prosperity and its status as a non-nuclear weapon 
state are key factors for security and stability in Central and Eastern 
Europe and on the continent as a whole. , 
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1. Believes the security of the Mediterranean region and the whole of Europe 
are closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean, 
m. Implementation of the CJTF concept will enhance the Alliance's ability to 
plan and conduct quickly and effectively a wide range of military 
operations employing multinational and multi-service forces capable of 
being generated and deployed at short notice, 
n. The Alliance Strategic Concept adopted by our Heads of State and 
Government in Rome in 1991, sets out the principal aims and objectives of 
the Alliance, 
o. To succeed, the Peace Agreement must continue to be implemented in an 
environment of general security, 
p. A broad security dialogue would represent a significant element in 
establishing regional stability, 
q. NATO's interest in stability extends beyond Bosnia and Herzegovina to 
the surrounding region, 
r. The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and 
their means of delivery pose risks to the Alliance. 
s. We strongly condemn all acts of terrorism. 
b. The member nations direct to: 
a. Urge all states that have not yet signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons 
Convention to do so, and call upon those that have ratified to carry out 
fully their obligations under the Convention. 
b. Urge the Russian Federation to ratify the START II Treaty as soon as 
possible, so that negotiations on START III can begin. 
c. Urge Russia to honor its commitments as stated by President Yeltsin in 
1992 to substantially reduce its tactical nuclear weapons stockpile. 
d. Urge the Russian Federation, Belarus and Ukraine to take the necessary 
steps to permit its entry into force. 
c. The member nations commit to: 
a. Cooperate closely with the three invited countries through the coming 
months, building on the successful accession talks this year; and we will 
work for the timely ratification of the Protocols of Accession 
b. Realize the full potential of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
(EAPC). 
c. Pursue vigorously our consultations and cooperation with Russia under the 
auspices of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. 
d. Carry forward our program of consultations and cooperation with Ukraine 
under the new NATO-Ukraine Charter. 
e. Carry out through our Mediterranean Cooperation Group a new round of 
individual dialogues; with our six, Mediterranean Dialogue Partners, and 
established a work program for cooperation. 
f. Reinforce peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, based on Allied 
solidarity and cohesion, as reflected in our common commitment to the 
core function of collective defense, and in the maintenance of a strong 
transatlantic link, a new cooperative partnership with other Euro-Atlantic 
nations, building a ESDI within NATO, and the Alliance's effectiveness 
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for the full range of its missions, 
g. Continue our intensified dialogues with those nations that aspire to NATO 
membership or otherwise wish to pursue a dialogue on membership 
questions/ 
h. Endorse the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre and a 
Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit, 
i. Increase further the effectiveness of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
and the enhanced Partnership for Peace, in cooperation with Partners, 
j . Enhancing NATO's information efforts in Russia, and we expect to open a 
NATO Documentation Centre in Moscow and encourage Russia to play an 
active role in the EAPC and"the enhanced PfP. 
k. Launching a rich and varied program of consultation and practical 
cooperation with Ukraine and work with the Ukraine to develop a more 
focused Individual Partnership Program. 
1. Attach great importance to an early and successful completion of the 
process of the Alliance's internal adaptation, 
m. Develop the arrangements and procedures necessary for the planning, 
preparation, conduct and exercise of WEU-led operations using NATO 
assets and capabilities, 
n. Endorse the terms of reference agreed by the Council in Permanent 
Session for the examination, and updating as necessary, of the Alliance 
Strategic Concept, as mandated by our Heads of State and Government in 
Madrid, 
o. Strengthening the OSCE as a primary instrument for early warning, 
conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation as 
well as for enhancing cooperative security and advancing democracy and 
human rights, 
p. To the full and unconditional implementation of the Peace Agreement in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the establishment of that country as a 
single, democratic and multi-ethnic state, 
q. Endorsed politico-military guidance to the NATO Military Authorities for 
the development of options for a NATO-led military presence in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina following the end of SFOR's mandate, 
r. Organizing courses for military and civilian defense officials of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina at the NATO School to promote reconciliation among 
the formerly warring factions. 
s. Launch an initial set of security cooperation activities with Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to include both Entities and all three ethnic groups, 
t. Endorse efforts to negotiate an effective verification regime to strengthen 
the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, 
u. Early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and an early 
start to negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, 
v. Continue to support all efforts to combat terrorism, including using 
arrangements in the Alliance for consultation on threats of a wider nature 
that affect Alliance security interests. In accordance with our national 
legislation, we stress the need for the most effective cooperation possible 
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to prevent and suppress this scourge. 
Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement •. 
Explicit Performative: 
• The member nations hereby assert the Alliance will uphold its mission through 
the reinforcement of peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, based upon on 
Allied solidarity and cohesion, as reflected in our common commitment to the 
core function of collective defense, and in the maintenance of a strong 
transatlantic link, a new cooperative partnership with other Euro-Atlantic nations, 
building a ESDI within NATO, and the Alliance's effectiveness for the full range 
of its missions. 
b. The member nations hereby encourage its members to ratify, accede and fully 
implement NATO treaties and policies. 
• The member nations hereby commit the Alliance to do the following: 
a.r Continue with the comprehensive process of enlarging NATO; 
b. Continue to remain open through the admission of new members into the 
Alliance; 
c. Provide broad cooperation with Partners in the EAPC and the enhanced 
PfP; 
d. Create' a strong, stable and enduring partnership with Russia and a 
distinctive Partnership with Ukraine; 
e. Continue to enhanced Mediterranean dialogue; 
f. Strengthening the OSCE as a primary instrument for early warning, 
conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation as 
well as for enhancing cooperative security and advancing democracy and 
human rights; 
w. Continue efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina by endorsing politico-military 
guidance to the NATO Military Authorities for the development of options 
for a NATO-led military presence; launch an initial set of security 
cooperation activities to include both Entities and all three ethnic groups; 
g. Endorse and continue with measures for the proliferation of WMD; and 
h. Continue to support all efforts to combat terrorism. 
Reflective Intentions: 
a. Assertion: 
a. The member nations believe that it must uphold its mission through the 
reinforcement of peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area while being 
able to< evolve and maintain the Alliance in the global security 
environment. 
b. The member nations want the Alliance upholds its mission by carry out 
cooperative means through political and military measures. 
b. Directive 
5. The member nations believe that its utterance, in virtue of its authority 
over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for to the member nations 
to ratify, accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies. 
6. The member nations want is members to ratify, accede and fully 
implement NATO treaties and policies because of NATO's command. 
c. Commitment: 
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a. The member nation believes that its utterance obligates the Alliance to 
promote peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and the global 
security environment on the condition that the member countries, as 
reflected in our common commitment to the core function of collective 
defense, and in the maintenance of a strong transatlantic link, a new 
cooperative partnership with other Euro-Atlantic nations, building a ESDI 
within NATO, and the Alliance's effectiveness for the full range of its 
missions. 
b. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the directive on the 
condition that the member countries will be able to promote peace and 
security amongst themselves. 
c. The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and (b). _ _ _ 
Implicatures: 
c. Assertion: 
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens. 
i. Quality: The member nations believe that its members along with 
other countries around the world and their citizens are a part of the 
same race - human, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations'assertion informs the members 
that they are fellow citizens, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant 
to its members, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to the Alliance. 
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral 
commitment to use. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing 
security through multilateral alliance commitment, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members it 
is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries. 
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political 
relationships. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security 
through political relationships, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations'assertion informs its members it 
is establishing political relationships, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries. 
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully. 
- i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved 
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peacefully, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members 
conflicts^can be resolved peacefully, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can 
be resolved peacefully, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries, 
e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its members will use force 
if necessary, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members 
will use force if necessary, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing its use of force, 
is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries, 
b. Directive: 
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens. 
. i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its members along 
with other countries in the global security and their citizens are a 
part of the same race - human, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs the member 
countries and other countries that they are fellow citizens, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant 
to its members and other countries in the global security 
environment, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its directive 
to its members and other countries in the global security 
environment. \ 
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral 
commitment to use. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing 
security through multilateral alliance commitment, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs its member 
countries and other countries it is establishing a multilateral 
alliance commitment, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries 
and other countries 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries and other countries in the global security 
environment. 
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political 
relationships. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security 
through political relationships. 
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ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member 
countries and other countries it is establishing political 
relationships, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries 
and other countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries and other countries in the global security 
environment, 
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved 
peacefully, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member 
countries and other countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can 
be resolved peacefully, 
v. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries and other countries in the global security 
environment, 
d. Commitment: 
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its member countries 
along with other countries around the world and their citizens are a 
part of the same race - human, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs the 
member countries that they are fellow citizens, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant 
to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
commitment to its member countries. 
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral 
commitment to use. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing 
security through multilateral alliance commitment, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its 
member countries it is establishing a multilateral alliance 
commitment, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
commitment to its member countries. 
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political 
relationships. r 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security 
through political relationships. 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its 
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member countries it is establishing political relationships, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
commitment to its member countries. 
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved 
peacefully, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its 
member countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can 
be resolved peacefully, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations clearly conveying its commitment 
to its member countries. 
e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its member countries will 
use force if necessary, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its 
member countries will use force if necessary, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing it will force is 
relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
commitment to its member countries. 
(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are sincere. 
(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are normative. 
Presuppositions: 
a. If the member nations are able to maintain an Allied solidarity and cohesion, as 
reflected in our common commitment to the core function of collective defense, 
and in the maintenance of a strong transatlantic link, a new cooperative 
partnership with other Euro-Atlantic nations, building a ESDI within NATO, and 
the Alliance's effectiveness for the full range of its missions, then the Alliance 
will be able to promote peace and stability in the whole Euro-Atlantic area and 
throughout the global security environment. 
b. If the member nations are not able to maintain an Allied solidarity and cohesion, 
as reflected in our common commitment to the core function of collective 
defense, and in the maintenance of a strong transatlantic link, a new cooperative 
partnership with other Euro-Atlantic nations, building a ESDI within NATO, and 
the Alliance's effectiveness for the full range of its missions, then the Alliance 
will not be able to promote peace and stability in the whole Euro-Atlantic area 




DIALOGICAL ANALYSIS FOR SPEECH ACT 3 
Dialogical Analysis for Speech Act 3 •, • 
Statement: Press Communique M-NAC-2 (1998) 140 held at NATO HQ Brussels 8 Dec 
1998 -^___ 
Speech Act: Assertion, Commitment and Directive 
a. The member nations hereby assert to: 
a. Celebrate the historic achievements of NATO as a strong, united and 
successful Alliance. 
b. We are pleased with the successful completion by all Allies of the 
ratification process for the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland to the Washington Treaty. 
c. The membership of these countries will contribute to an overall 
strengthening of the Alliance and to enhancing security and stability in 
Europe. 
d. Reaffirm that the door remains open to NATO membership under Article 
10 of the North Atlantic Treaty and in accordance with Paragraph 8 of the 
Madrid Summit Declaration. 
e. We are pleased that the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and an 
enhanced Partnership for Peace (PfP) are resulting in a stronger 
consultative forum and a more operational Partnership. 
f. The Partnership for Peace continues to be the focal point of our efforts to 
build with Partners new patterns of practical military and defense-related 
cooperation across a wide range of issues. 
g. Political-military framework will be a key element in future cooperation 
and will provide for an increased role of Partners in one of the Alliance's 
major new tasks. 
h. Partnership for Peace programs can also play an important role in 
contributing to Alliance efforts in reinforcing regional stability, such as in 
the Balkans. 
i. Encouraged by the developing process of consultation and practical 
cooperation with Russia under the auspices of the Permanent Joint Council 
(PJC) and remain committed to working together with Russia to achieve a 
strong, stable and enduring partnership, on the basis of the principles of 
common interest, reciprocity and transparency, as called for in the NATO-
Russia Founding Act. 
j . The crisis in Kosovo has confirmed the value of the PJC as a consultative 
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forum, 
k. The Ukraine has a key role to play in European security. 
1. Security in Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the 
Mediterranean, 
m. We therefore give great attention to our Mediterranean Dialogue which is 
part of the Alliance's cooperative approach to security, contributes to 
building confidence with participating countries and mutually reinforces 
other international efforts towards this end. 
n. The establishment of the Kosovo Verification Missions has opened a new 
stage in cooperation between NATO and the OSCE. 
o. CFE Treaty as a cornerstone of European security, 
p. The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and 
their means of delivery continue to be a matter of serious concern for the 
Alliance, 
q. We recognize that proliferation can pose a direct threat to the Alliance, 
r. We underline the risk to international and regional stability posed by the 
spread of NBC weapons. 
s. Terrorism constitutes a serious threat to peace, security and stability which 
can threaten the territorial integrity of States. We reiterate our 
condemnation of terrorism. 
b. The member nations hereby direct to: 
a. Call on Russia to ratify the START II Treaty without delay. 
b. Call upon all countries to accede to and implement the START II Treaty 
indue course. , 
c. We urge all countries to accede to and fully implement the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. 
d. We call on Russia, Ukraine and Belarus to ratify the Open Skies Treaty 
without delay. 
c. The member nations hereby commit to: 
a. Recommend to our Heads of State and Government that at the Washington 
Summit they set out their shared vision of the Alliance in the years ahead -
an Alliance adapted, renewed and ready to meet the security challenges of 
the 21st century. 
b. Develop for the Washington Summit a comprehensive package that will 
continue the enlargement process, operationalize our commitment to the 
open door policy and underscore our willingness to assist aspiring 
countries in meeting NATO standards. 
c. Continue with internal adaption to be able to maintain the Alliance's 
military effectiveness for the full range of its missions building on its 
essential collective defense capabilities and its ability to react to a wide 
range of contingencies, to preserve the transatlantic link, and to develop 
the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance. 
d. Make recommendations on how best to further enhance the effectiveness 
of ESDI within the Alliance, including the contribution made by all 
European Allies, beyond the Washington Summit. 
e. Ensure that the Strategic Concept is fully consistent with the Alliance's 
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new security environment. 
f. Reaffirm our commitment to collective defense and the transatlantic link-
take account of the challenges the Alliance now faces; and present an 
Alliance ready and with a full range of capabilities to enhance security and 
stability for countries in the Euro-Atlantic area in the 21st century, 
including through dialogue, cooperation and partnership and, where 
appropriate, non-Article 5 crisis response operations, such as that in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the possible participation of partners. We 
instructed the Council in Permanent Session to pursue this work 
vigorously so that the new text is available by the time of the Washington 
Summit. 
g. Enhance future cooperation by establishing a basis for Partner 
involvement in political consultations and decision-making, command 
arrangements and operational planning for NATO-led non-Article 5 
operations 
h. Increased attention given to multinational formations as a means to 
enhance military cooperation between Allies and Partners, as in 
IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
i. Establish the NATO-Russia Scientific and Technological Cooperation 
Committee, 
j . Continue to work closely with Russia to develop an updated and 
substantial Individual Partnership Program (IPP) to include a wide range 
of practical defense-related and military-to-military cooperative activities^ 
k. Utilize as fully as possible the potential offered by Ukraine's active 
participation in enhanced PfP and the agreed NATO-Ukraine Work Plan 
for 1999. 
1. Support an active information effort in Ukraine through the NATO 
Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv. 
m. Further improve the political, civil and military aspects of our Dialogue, 
n. Support the efforts of the OSCE to develop a Document-Charter on 
European Security, 
o. A successful adaption of the CFE Treaty, 
p. Prevent proliferation and to reversing it, should it occur, through 
diplomatic means, 
q. Prepare to expand NATO's efforts to address the evolving proliferation 
threat, 
r. Achieve progress on a legally binding / protocol including effective 
verification measures to enhance compliance and promote transparency 
that strengthens the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention. 
s. Combat terrorism in accordance with our international commitments and 
national legislation. • : . ' 
Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, Deterrence, and Enforcement 
Explicit Performative: 
a. The member nations hereby assert the Alliance is able to adapt, renew and is 
ready to meet the security challenges of the 21st century through security and 
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stability for its member nations and throughout the global security environment. 
b. The member nations hereby encourage its members to ratify, accede and fully 
implement NATO treaties and policies. 
c. The member nations hereby commit the Alliance to do the following: 
a. Develop a comprehensive package that will continue the enlargement 
process, pperationalize our commitment to the open door policy and 
underscore our willingness to assist aspiring countries in meeting NATO 
standards; 
b. Continue with internal adaption; 
c. Improve the political, civil and military aspects of the Alliance; 
d. Prepare to expand NATO's efforts to address the evolving proliferation 
threat; and 
e. Combat terrorism in accordance with our international commitments and 
national legislation. . 
Reflective Intentions: 
a. Assertion 
a. The member nations believes that its must be able to adapt, renew and is 
ready to meet the security challenges of the 21st century while maintaining 
security and stability for its members nations and throughout the global 
security environment. 
b. The member nations want the Alliance to believe that it has the ability to 
adapt, renew, and has the ability to be ready to meet the security 
challenges in the global security environment while upholding security 
and stability. 
b. Directive 
a. The member nations believe that its utterance, in virtue of its authority 
over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for to the member nations 
to ratify, accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies. 
b. The member nations want its members to ratify, accede and fully 
implement NATO treaties and policies because of NATO's command. 
c. Commitment 
a. The member nations believe its utterance obligates the Alliance to 
maintaining security and stability on the condition that it can develop a 
comprehensive package that will continue the enlargement process; 
operationalize our commitment to the open door policy and underscore our 
willingness to assist aspiring countries in meeting NATO standards; 
continue with internal adaption; improve the political, civil and military 
aspects of the Alliance; prepare to expand NATO's efforts to address the 
evolving proliferation threat; and combat terrorism in accordance with our 
international commitments and national legislation. 
b. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the directives on the 
condition that the member countries will be able to adapt, renew, and has 
the ability to be ready to meet the security challenges in the global security 
environment while upholding security and stability. 
c. The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and (b). 
Implicatures: ' ___ 
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e. Assertion: 
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens. 
i. Quality: The member nations believe that its members along with 
other countries around the world and their citizens are a part of the 
same race - human, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs the members 
that they are fellow citizens, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant 
to its members, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to the Alliance. 
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral 
commitment to use. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing 
security through multilateral alliance commitment, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members it 
is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries. 
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political 
relationships. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security 
through political relationships, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members it 
is establishing political relationships, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries. 
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved 
peacefully, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members 
conflicts can be resolved peacefully, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can 
be resolved peacefully, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries. 
e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its members will use force 
if necessary, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members 
will use force if necessary. 
_____ iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing its use offeree 
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is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries, 
c. Directive: 
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its members along 
with other countries in the global security and their citizens are a 
part of the same race - human, 
ii. Quantity: NATO directive informs the member countries and other 
countries that they are fellow citizens, 
iji. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant 
to its members and other countries in the global security 
environment, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its directive 
to its members and other countries in the global security 
environment. 
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral 
commitment to use. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing 
security through multilateral alliance commitment, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs its member 
countries and other countries it is establishing a multilateral 
alliance commitment. 
Hi. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries 
and other countries 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries and other countries in the global security 
environment. 
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political 
relationships. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security 
through political relationships, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member 
countries and other countries it is establishing political 
relationships, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries 
and other countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries and other countries in the global security 
environment. 
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved 
peacefully. 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member 
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countries and other countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can 
be resolved peacefully, 
v. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries and other countries in the global security 
environment, 
f. Commitment: 
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its member countries 
along with other countries around the world and their citizens are a 
part of the same race - human, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs the 
member countries that they are fellow citizens, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant 
to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
commitment to its member countries. 
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral 
commitment to use. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing 
security through multilateral alliance commitment, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its 
member countries it is establishing a multilateral alliance 
commitment, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
commitment to its member countries. 
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political 
relationships. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security 
through political relationships, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its 
member countries it is establishing political relationships, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
commitment to its member countries. 
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved 
peacefully, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its 
member countries conflicts cdn be resolved peacefully, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can 
be resolved peacefully. 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations clearly conveying its commitment 
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to its member countries.
 ( 
e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its member countries will 
use force if necessary, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its 
member countries will use force if necessary, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing it will force is 
relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
commitment to its member countries. 
(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are sincere. 
(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are normative. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Presuppositions: 
a. If the member nations are able to adapt, renew and is ready to meet the security 
challenges of the 21st century, then the Alliance will be able to maintaining 
security and stability for its member nations and throughout the global security 
environment. 
b. If the member nations are not able to adapt, renew and is ready to meet the 
security challenges of the 21st century, then the Alliance will not be able to 
maintaining security and stability for its member nations and throughout the 
global security environment. _ 
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APPENDIX M 
DIALOGICAL ANALYSIS FOR SPEECH ACT 4 
Dialogical Analysis for Speech Act 4 -. . ' ' 
Statement: Press Communique M-NAC-2 (1999) 166 held at NATO HQ Brussels 15 
Dec 1999 
Speech Act: Assertion, Commitment, and Directive 
a. The member nations hereby assert: 
a. We set forth NATO's vision for the 21st century and approved an 
updated Strategic Concept at the Washington Summit, where we also 
celebrated the Alliance's 50th Anniversary. 
b. We admitted as new members the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. 
c. We contributed decisively, in particular through the conduct of our air 
campaign and the subsequent deployment of KFOR, to the international 
community's objective of creating the basis for long-term peace and 
stability in Kosovo. 
d. The Kosovo air campaign, which demonstrated the cohesion and unity of 
the Alliance and its determination to act, reinforced the diplomatic efforts 
of the international community and achieved the key objectives of the 
NATO Allies and their Partners. 
e. We are determined to play our part in meeting in full the aims of the 
international community as set out in UN Security Council Resolution 
1244. 
f. Close civil-military relations are essential for the success of our common 
goals and of our peace-building efforts in the region. 
g. The achievement of the de-militarization and the dissolution of the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) under the supervision of KFOR was an 
important step in establishing an environment for post-conflict, 
reconciliation. 
h. Our individual bilateral efforts, the substantial role of the EU and that of 
other international bodies, are making a decisive contribution to the 
economic reconstruction of Kosovo. 
i. We express our deep appreciation for the robust practical and political 
support provided by Partner countries of the region throughout the air 
campaign and thereafter. This support was and remains critical to 
success. 
j . The Alliance remains committed to supporting a peaceful future for 
• • . • Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single democratic state composed of two 
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multi-ethnic Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 
Republika Srpska. 
k. SFOR has helped to secure a more stable and secure environment in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
1. The important challenges remain, such as: 
i. the return of displaced persons to minority areas; 
ii. further reduction of both Entities'armed forces; 
iii. further progress in humanitarian de-mining; 
iv. improving the effectiveness of all common institutions, notably 
the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and cooperation 
between Entities; 
v. transferring to the ICTY persons indicted for war crimes; 
vi. the fight against corruption, organized crime and illegal secret 
services; 
vii. judicial and police reform; and 
viii. the establishment of a state border service, 
m. We remain concerned about continued tensions between Belgrade and 
the democratically elected government of Montenegro, 
n. The forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections in Croatia will 
be crucial for its future, 
o. Our experience in Kosovo has confirmed that NATO must continue to 
adapt and improve its defense capabilities to ensure the effectiveness of 
future multinational operations across the full range of Alliance missions, 
p. The DCI is essential to strengthening European defense capabilities and 
the European pillar of NATO, so that European Allies will be able to 
make a stronger and more coherent contribution to NATO, 
q. The development of an effective ESDI will strengthen the Alliance, 
through which we remain ready to pursue common security objectives 
wherever possible, 
r. Our readiness to define and adopt, in accordance with our decisions taken 
in Washington, the necessary arrangements for European Union ready 
access to separable but not separate NATO collective assets and 
capabilities, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not 
engaged militarily as an Alliance, respecting the requirements of NATO 
operations and the coherence of its command structure. 
s. The importance of finding solutions satisfactory to all Allies, for the 
necessary involvement of non-EU European Allies in these structures, 
t. Participation of non-EU European Allies will enhance the effectiveness 
of EU-led military operations and will contribute directly to the 
effectiveness and vitality of the European pillar of NATO, 
u. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council remains the key forum for regular 
consultation on security and defense related issues between the Alliance 
and its Partners, 
v. Our aim remains to establish a strong, stable and enduring partnership 
within the framework of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. 
w. We are deeply concerned about the conflict in Chechnya, continuing 
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reports of civilian casualties there and the plight of displaced persons. 
We condemn, in particular, Russian threats against unarmed civilians, 
such as those in Grozny, 
x. Acknowledging the right of Russia to preserve its territorial integrity and 
to protect its citizens against terrorism and lawlessness, 
y. We condemn terrorism in all its manifestations but believe that Russia's 
pursuit of a purely military solution to the conflict is undermining its 
legitimate objectives. 
z. The Mediterranean Dialogue is an integral part of the Alliance's 
cooperative approach to security since security in the whole of Europe is 
closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean, 
aa. We reaffirm that arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will 
continue to play an important role in the achievement of NATO's 
security objectives. t 
bb. The Adapted CFE Treaty will enhance security throughout Europe, not 
least as it introduces a more constraining structure of National and 
Territorial Ceilings, while permitting sufficient deployment flexibility for 
routine training purposes and effective crisis management, thereby 
ensuring NATO's ability to fulfill its responsibilities, 
cc. NATO countries are concerned about continued Russian non-compliance 
with the Treaty's Article V («flank») limits, 
dd. The Alliance attaches importance to preserving strategic stability, 
ee. The prevention of the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery 
remains our primary aim. 
ff. Recognize that proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) 
weapons and their means of delivery, which pose a potential threat to the 
Allies' populations, territory and forces, can continue to occur despite our 
preventive efforts and can pose a direct military threat to those 
populations, territories and forces, 
gg. In order to enhance the effectiveness of Civil-Military Cooperation, 
confirmed in the Strategic Concept as essential to the Alliance's 
operational capability, a fundamental review of civil emergency planning 
in NATO is nearing completion, 
hh. Terrorism constitutes a serious threat to peace, security and stability that 
can threaten the territorial integrity of States, 
ii. The terrorist threat against deployed NATO forces and NATO 
installations requires the consideration and development of appropriate 
measures for their continued protection taking full account of host nation 
responsibilities, 
b. The member nations hereby direct to: 
a. Urge all community leaders in Kosovo, irrespective of their ethnic 
background, to work together and with the international community in 
the reconstruction of Kosovo and the establishment of a democratic 
society founded on the rule of law, tolerance and respect for human 
rights. 
b. Urge all parties to demonstrate fully their commitment to the Dayton 
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process and their cooperation with the High Representative, as the basis 
for further progress in transferring administrative responsibility to local 
authorities. 
c. Call upon the Presidency to implement in full the commitments made in 
the New York Declaration of 15 November, and to support the work of 
the Standing Committee on Military Matters. 
d. Demand that all parties fully co-operate with the ICTY, in particular by 
surrendering inductees within their territory. 
e. Call on Belgrade and the government of Montegro to resolve their 
differences in a peaceful and pragmatic way and refrain from any 
destabilizing measures. 
f. We encourage all aspirants to set themselves realistic, prioritized goals 
and timelines and to allocate the necessary resources to them. 
g. We encourage Russia to resume cooperation on the broad range of issues 
foreseen in the Founding Act and to engage actively in the EAPC and the 
Partnership for Peace. 
h. Urge Russia to exercise the fullest restraint, to refrain from the use of 
force against civilians and protect their human rights, to facilitate the 
provision of humanitarian aid to those in need, and to co-operate fully 
with international relief agencies and to ensure security for their 
operations. 
i. We urge Russia to open all avenues for a political solution to the conflict. 
j . We encourage Ukraine to move forward with its democratic and 
economic reforms, and reaffirm NATO's support for Ukraine's efforts to 
this end. 
k. Call on Russia to ratify the START II Treaty without delay. 
1. Call upon all countries to accede to and implement the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty as soon as possible, 
c. The member nations hereby commit to: 
a. Take steps to further adapt the Alliance to the new security environment. 
b. Further its fundamental security tasks, as set out in the Strategic Concept, 
and the importance of our individual and collective efforts to achieve our 
guiding objective of enhancing the security and stability of the Euro-
Atlantic area. 
c. Review the status of NATO's comprehensive approach and continuing 
commitment to the promotion of security, stability, peace and democracy, 
and the peaceful resolution of disputes in the region, including through 
the NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo, and 
the implementation of NATO's South-East Europe Initiative. 
d. Monitor closely the situation in South-East Europe. 
e. Helping to establish a peaceful, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo 
where all peoples can live in peace and security and enjoy universal 
human rights and freedoms on an equal basis, including through 
participation in democratic institutions. 
f. Continue to do our utmost to provide a secure environment and we will 
give appropriate support for the conduct of free and fair elections under 
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the auspices of the OSCE. 
g. Our goal of integrating all the countries of South-East Europe into the 
Euro-Atlantic Community. 
h. Building on the Alliance's already extensive cooperation in the region as 
evidenced by NATO's leadership of the SFOR and KFOR operations. 
i. Continue to contribute to the success of the Stability Pact by making 
available its wealth of experience and expertise in practical military and 
defense-related cooperation and by ensuring that our efforts complement 
and contribute to the goals of the Pact. 
j . Contribute to effective conflict prevention. 
k. Continue to consider means to ensure an effective and coherent Alliance 
contribution to the efforts of the international community to prevent and 
defuse conflicts, and to make recommendations where and if appropriate. 
1. Ensure that NATO's forces can meet the challenges of mobility, 
deployability, sustainability, effective engagement, survivability and 
interoperable and effective command, control and communications 
systems. 
m. Reinforcing the Alliance's European pillar. 
n. Take into account the evolution of relevant arrangements in the EU. 
o. Reaffirms its commitment to remain open to new members. 
p. Further enhance Partnership for Peace and make it more operational. 
q. Endorse the Operational Capabilities Concept which will reinforce PfP's 
operational capabilities and improve the capability and interoperability of 
Parmer forces, as well as enhance the Alliance's overall ability to put 
together tailored force packages to mount and sustain future NATO-led 
PfP operations along the lines of SFOR and KFOR. 
r. Continue to attach importance to consultations and practical cooperation 
with Russia. 
s. Support the efforts of the Joint Working Group on Defense Reform and 
remain prepared to provide advice, as appropriate, to assist Ukraine with 
the transformation of its defense establishment. In the economic area, we 
welcome the initiation of a program for the retraining of retired military 
officers. 
t. Efforts aimed at reducing nuclear weapons. 
u. An early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 
v. Remain committed to preventing proliferation and reversing it where it 
has occurred through diplomatic means. 
w. Support deepening consultations with Russia in these areas within the 
Permanent Joint Council, as well as with Ukraine in the NATO-Ukraine 
Commission and with other Partners in the EAPC, as well as with the 
Mediterranean Dialogue countries. 
x. Consider options for confidence and security building measures, 
verification, non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament, in the 
light of overall strategic developments and the reduced salience of 
nuclear weapons. 
y. Condemnation of terrorism and reaffirm our determination to combat it in 
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' accordance with our international commitments and national legislation-
Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of Force 
Explicit Performative: 
d. The member nations hereby assert the Alliance has been able to adapt, renew and 
is ready to meet the security challenges of the 21st century by maintaining 
stability and security; ensuring the effectiveness of bilateral and multinational 
operations across the full range of Alliance missions; maintaining civil-military 
relations; implementing robust practical and political support provided by 
Partner countries; having the ability to define, adopt, and evolve policies; and 
establishing a strong, stable and enduring partnerships within the framework of 
the Alliance. 
e. The member nations hereby direct the following: 
a. Member countries to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO treaties 
and policies; 
b. Leaders in Kosovo to work together and with the international 
community in the reconstruction of Kosovo and the establishment of a 
democratic society; 
c. Belgrade and the government of Montegro to resolve their differences in 
a peaceful and pragmatic way and refrain from any destabilizing 
measures; 
d. Russia to open all avenues for a political solution to the conflict; and 
e. Ukraine to move forward with its democratic and economic reforms. 
f. The member nations hereby commit to the following: 
a. Further adapt the Alliance to the new security environment while still 
maintaining security and stability; 
b: Continue to consider means to ensure an effective and coherent Alliance 
contribution to the efforts of the international community to prevent and 
defuse conflicts, and to make recommendations where and if appropriate 
c. Monitor closely the situation in South-East Europe; 
d. Continue efforts in Kosovo and other areas of involvement of the 
Alliance; 
e. Help to establish a peaceful, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo; 
f. Contribute to effective conflict prevention; 
g. Reinforcing the Alliance's European pillar; 
h. To remain open to new members. 
i. Continue to attach importance to consultations and practical cooperation 
with Russia and the Ukraine; 
j . Efforts aimed at reducing nuclear weapons; and 
k. Reaffirm our determination to combat it in accordance with our 
international commitments and national legislation. 
Reflective Intentions: 
d. Assertion: 
a. The member nations believe the Alliance has been able to adapt, renew 
and is ready to meet the security challenges of the 21st century. 
b. The member nations want its members to believe it has adapted, 
renewed, arid is ready in the global security environment based upon the 
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Alliance's ability to maintain stability and security; ensuring the 
effectiveness of bilateral and multinational operations across the full 
range of Alliance missions; maintaining civil-military relations; 
implementing robust practical and political support provided by Partner 
countries; having the ability to define, adopt, and evolve policies; and 
establishing a strong, stable and enduring partnerships within the 
framework of the Alliance. 
e. Directive: 
a. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over 
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for to the member nations to 
ratify, accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies. 
i. The member nations want its members to ratify, accede and fully 
implement NATO treaties and policies because of NATO's 
command. -
b. The member nation believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over 
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for leaders to work together 
and with the international community in the reconstruction of Kosovo 
and the establishment of a democratic society. 
i. The member nations want the leaders of Kosovo to work together 
and with the international community in the reconstruction of 
Kosovo and the establishment of a democratic society because of 
NATO's command. 
c. The member nations believe in its utterance, virtue of its authority over 
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for both parties to resolve their 
differences in a peaceful and pragmatic way and refrain from any 
destabilizing measures. 
i. The member nations want the parties of Belgrade and Montegro 
to resolve their differences in a peaceful and pragmatic way and 
refrain from any destabilizing measures because of NATO's 
command. 
d. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over 
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for Russia to open all avenues 
for a political solution to the conflict. 
i. The member nations want Russia to open all avenues for a 
political solution to the conflict because of NATO's command. 
1. The member nations believe in its utterance, virtue of its authority over 
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for the Ukraine to move 
forward with its democratic and economic reforms. 
i. The member nations want the Ukraine to move forward with its 
democratic and economic reforms because of NATO's command. 
f. Commitment: 
a. The member nations believe its utterance obligates the Alliance to adapt, 
renew and is ready to meet the security challenges of the 21st century on 
the condition that the member countries want to maintain stability and 
security; ensure the effectiveness of bilateral and multinational 
operations across the full range of Alliance missions; maintain civil-
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military relations; implement robust practical and political support 
provided by Partner countries; have the ability to define, adopt, and 
evolve policies; and establish a strong, stable and enduring partnerships 
within the framework of the Alliance. 
b. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the directives on the 
condition that the member nations would be able to maintain the ability 
to adapt, renew, and have the ability to be ready to meet the security 
challenges in the global security environment while upholding security 
and stability 
c. NATO wants the member nations to believe (a) and (b). 
Implicatures: 
g. Assertion: 
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens. 
i. Quality: The member nations believe that its members along with 
other countries around the world and their citizens are a part of 
the same race - human, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations'assertion informs the members 
that they are fellow citizens, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is 
relevant to its members, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
assertion to the Alliance. 
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral 
commitment to use. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing 
security through multilateral alliance commitment, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members 
it is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
assertion to its member countries. 
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political 
relationships. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security 
through political relationships, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members 
it is establishing political relationships, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
assertion to its member countries. 
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved 
peacefully. 
•. ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members 
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conflicts can be resolved peacefully, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can 
be resolved peacefully, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
assertion to its member countries, 
e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its members will use 
force if necessary, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations'assertion informs its members 
will use force if necessary, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing its use of 
force is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
assertion to its member countries, 
d. Directive: 
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its members along 
with other countries in the global security and their citizens are a 
part of the same race - human, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs the member 
countries and other countries that they are fellow citizens, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is 
relevant to its members and other countries in the global security 
environment. \ 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
directive to its members and other countries in the global security 
environment. 
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral 
commitment to use. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing 
security through multilateral alliance commitment, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs its member 
countries and other countries it is establishing a multilateral 
alliance commitment, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries 
and other countries 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
assertion to its member countries and other countries in the global 
security environment. 
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political 
relationships. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security 
through political relationships, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member 




iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries 
and other countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
assertion to its member countries and other countries in the global 
security environment, 
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved 
' peacefully. 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member 
countries and other countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully. 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can 
be resolved peacefully, 
v. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
assertion to its member countries and other countries in the global 
security environment, 
h. Commitment: < 
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its member countries 
along with other countries around the world and their citizens are 
a part of the same race-human, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs the 
member countries that they are fellow citizens, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is 
relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
commitment to its member countries. 
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral 
commitment to use. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing 
security through multilateral alliance commitment, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its 
member countries it is establishing a multilateral alliance 
commitment, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
commitment to its member countries. 
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political 
relationships. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security 
through political relationships, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its 
member countries it is establishing political relationships. 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
276 
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
commitment to its member countries, 
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved 
peacefully, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its 
member countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can 
be resolved peacefully, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations clearly conveying its 
commitment to its member countries. 
," e, NATO member countries will use force if necessary. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its member countries will 
use force if necessary, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its 
member countries will use force if necessary, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing it will force is 
relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
commitment to its member countries. 
(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are sincere. 
(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are normative. . . 
Presuppositions: 
c. If the member nations have the ability to adapt, renew, and be ready to meet the 
security challenges of the 21st century, then the Alliance will be able to maintain 
security and stability for its member nations and throughout the global security 
environment, 
a. If the member nations do not possess the ability to able to adapt, renew, and be 
ready to meet the security challenges of the 21st century, then the Alliance will 
not be able to maintaining security and stability for its member nations and 
throughout the global security environment. -. 
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APPENDIX N 
DIALOGICAL ANALYSIS FOR SPEECH ACT 5 
Dialogical Analysis for Speech Act 5 " •' ." 
Statement: Press Communique M-NAC-2 (2000) 124 held at NATO HQ Brussels 15 
Dec 2000 . . : .' 
Speech Act: 
a. The member nations hereby assert: 
a. Reaffirm NATO's strong commitment to the achievement of security, 
stability, peace, democracy and respect for human rights in South-East 
Europe and will continue to pursue this objective vigorously, primarily 
through the NATO-led peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and in Kosovo. 
b. Reiterate our support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all 
countries in the region. 
c. Welcoming the democratic changes that have taken place in the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) after September's parliamentary and 
presidential elections. 
d. The democratic changes in the FRY will pave the way for increased 
stability across the region and offer new opportunities for regional 
cooperation. 
e. Recent acts of violence by insurgent elements in the Presevo Valley and 
the Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) adjacent to the internal boundary between 
Kosovo and Serbia, are of concern to NATO and KFOR. 
f. Condemn the violence caused by extremists and call on the perpetrators to 
cease their illegal activity forthwith. Any extremist activity and the 
possibility of an escalation of violence present a continuing threat to 
stability in the region, especially for neighboring countries. 
g. Reaffirm our commitment to the full implementation of UNSCR 1244. 
h. The municipal elections in late October were a milestone for democratic 
development in Kosovo, 
i. The protection and security of all the people of Kosovo remain a priority, 
j . Violence from any quarter, whether ethnically, politically or criminally 
motivated, is unacceptable, 
k. Concerned about the high level of organized crime which is a continuing 
threat to the people of Kosovo and neighboring countries. 
1. Greater and more rapid progress needs to be made in Bosnia and 
- Herzegovina towards a self-sustaining, multi-ethnic democracy. 
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m. Those important challenges remain. In particular, further progress must be 
achieved in market reform, economic re-construction and the creation of a 
self-sustaining economy and a single economic space; the adjudication of 
property claims enabling the return of refugees and displaced persons 
especially to areas in which their ethnic groups are in the minority; 
improving the effectiveness of all state level institutions and cooperation 
between Entities; transferring to the ICTY persons indicted for war 
crimes; the fight against corruption, organized crime and illegal secret 
services; judicial and police reform; and the full functioning of the State 
Border Service. We support the High Representative in his, use of the 
authority accorded to him to advance this agenda. 
n. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs armed forces with a unified command and 
control capable of joint deployment and joint action under international 
and regional security organizations. 
o. NATO's efforts are aimed at enabling the countries of the region to work 
together to ensure their own security and thus support and complement the 
objectives of the Stability Pact for South-East Europe. 
p. DCI will provide the forces and capabilities the Alliance urgently requires 
to meet the security challenges of the 21st century by ensuring the 
effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full spectrum of 
Alliance missions. 
q. The implementation of DCI will depend on the adequacy of national 
defense budgets. 
r. The DCI will also promote greater interoperability among Alliance forces 
and, where applicable, between Allied and Partner forces. 
s. Reaffirmed our determination to reinforce NATO's European pillar and 
remain committed to a balanced and dynamic transatlantic partnership. 
t. Alliance will remain the foundation for the collective defense of its 
members and continue actively to play its important role in crisis 
management as set out in the Strategic Concept. 
u. The European Allies are committed to further strengthening their military 
capabilities and to reinforcing the Alliance's European pillar. This will 
enhance their ability to contribute both to the Alliance's missions and to 
EU-led operations for Petersberg tasks where the Alliance as a whole is 
not engaged. 
v. The Alliance agrees that these proposals constitute the basis for the 
permanent NATO/EU agreement. 
w. Reaffirm the Alliance's commitment to remain open to new members. 
x. We believe that Partnership is pivotal to the role of the Alliance in 
promoting security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region and 
contributes to the enhancement of the Alliance's capabilities in crisis 
management. 
y. We value highly the continuing progress in making the Partnership for 
Peace more operational and look forward to reviewing progress on these 
initiatives at our next meeting. 
z. We value our ongoing consultations and cooperation with Russia in the 
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framework of the PJC on such issues as strategy, defense policy and 
military doctrines, infrastructure development programs, nuclear weapons, 
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of 
delivery, theatre missile defense, air defense, and other disarmament and 
arms control issues, including CFE and Open Skies, scientific and 
environmental issues, civil emergency preparedness, and the retraining of 
discharged military personnel. 
aa. Great importance to the further development of military-to-military 
cooperation and are pursuing our negotiations with Russia with a view to 
opening a NATO Military Liaison Mission in Moscow in the near future, 
as called for in the Founding Act. 
bb. Reaffirm that a mutually satisfactory, just and durable solution to the 
conflict in Chechnya is urgent and essential and that the parties must take 
steps to begin a dialogue that can lead to a settlement. 
cc. Acknowledging the right of Russia to preserve its territorial integrity and 
its right and responsibility to protect all its citizens against criminality and 
terrorism which we condemn in all its forms. 
dd. We deplore the continued loss of life and material damage inflicted upon 
the civilian population; this calls for prompt and independent investigation 
of violations of human rights and breaches of international law. 
ee. We recall the importance we attach to the efforts of humanitarian 
assistance organizations to relieve the suffering of the displaced and call 
on Russia to support them fully. 
ff. We value our relationship with an independent, democratic and stable 
Ukraine and Ukraine's contribution to ensuring stability in Central and 
Eastern Europe and the continent as a whole. 
gg. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue is an essential part of the Alliance's 
cooperative approach to security, since security in the whole of Europe is 
closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. 
hh. Reaffirm the progressive nature of the Dialogue. 
ii. Early entry into force of the Adapted CFE Treaty will ensure CFE's 
continuing viability as a cornerstone of European security and stability. 
jj . Believe ratification by our governments can only be envisaged in the 
context of compliance by all States Parties with the Treaty's agreed levels 
of armaments and equipment and consistent with the commitments 
contained in the CFE Final Act. 
kk. The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and 
their means of delivery continue to be a matter of serious concern for the 
Alliance as it poses risks to international and regional security and can 
pose a direct military threat to Allies' populations, territory and forces. 
11. We continue to place great importance on non-proliferation regimes, 
international arms control and disarmament, and export control regimes as 
means to prevent proliferation. 
mm. We reaffirm that the Alliance's defense posture must have the 
capability to address appropriately and effectively the risks associated 
with the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery. 
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nn. We continue to emphasize the importance of universal accession and 
adherence to, as well as full compliance with, the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. 
00. We deplore the recent terrorist attacks against nationals of several NATO 
countries and deeply regret the tragic loss of life. 
pp. Terrorism constitutes a threat to internal and international security, to 
peaceful relations between States and to their territorial integrity, to the 
development and functioning of democratic institutions throughout the 
world and to the enjoyment of human rights and civil liberties, 
qq. We strongly condemn this scourge in all its manifestations, and reiterate 
our strong determination to combat it in{ full compliance with all our 
international commitments and national legislation, 
b. The member nations hereby direct to: 
a. Call upon the new representatives on the Kosovo municipal councils to 
carry out their duties responsibly, in close cooperation with the 
international community. 
b. Call upon all Rosovo inhabitants to support the significant efforts being 
made by KFOR and UNMIK to strengthen the rule of law. 
c. Call upon all communities in Kosovo to work towards this goal in 
cooperation with KFOR and UNMIK. 
d. Call on the newly elected leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina to commit 
themselves to the full implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, 
taking on greater responsibility for and ownership of the process. In 
particular, we encourage them to redouble their efforts to improve the 
functioning of state level institutions. 
e. Urge the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina to implement the objectives 
of Annex I B of the Dayton Peace Agreement concerning confidence-
building and security measures. 
f. Urge Russia to respect its international obligations as a member of the 
UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, as well as the relevant principles 
enshrined in the Founding Act. 
g. Call on the Chechen side to co-operate in good faith in seeking a solution 
to the conflict, to condemn terrorism and to take action against it. 
h. We urge the Russian government to expedite the OSCE Assistance 
Group's return to Chechnya under its existing mandate. 
i. Encourage Ukraine to pursue these efforts, and in that regard we welcome 
the approval of Ukraine's state program for the reform of the armed 
forces, and the recent Presidential Decree on its implementation. 
j . Although the Alliance is not involved in the Middle East Peace Process, 
we strongly support it and urge all participants to remain firmly committed 
to it. 
k. We call upon the States participating in the negotiations on regional 
stability under the Accords to make use of the fresh impetus generated by 
the participation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the OSCE, with 
the aim of concluding their work by the agreed deadline. 
1. Call on Russia and Belarus to ratify the Open Skies Treaty to allow it to 
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enter into force as soon as possible, 
m. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of 
nuclear disarmament, 
n. We welcomed Russian ratification of the START II Treaty. 
0. We will encourage countries that are not part of the MTCR to subscribe to 
and adopt its principles, commitments, confidence-building measures and 
incentives. 
c. The member nations hereby commit to: 
a. Promote long-term stability based on regional reconciliation, good 
neighborliness, confidence-building measures, regional cooperation, a 
lasting resolution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons, and 
cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). 
•b." Continue working towards a peaceful, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and 
democratic Kosovo where its entire people, irrespective of ethnic origin or 
religion, can live in peace and security and enjoy universal human rights 
and freedoms on an equal basis, including through participation in 
democratic institutions. 
c. Support the efforts of the SRSp to establish local democratic, self-
governing institutions in Kosovo. 
d. Support the efforts of the international community to establish a 
functioning judicial system in Kosovo, but acknowledge that much work 
remains to be done in this respect. 
e. The full implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
f. Continue to work closely, in particular through SFOR, with the High 
Representative and with other organizations, such as the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Police Task 
Force (IPTF) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). 
g. Endorse SFOR's continuing close working relationship with the civilian 
agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
h. Assist in drawing up a similar program for Albania. 
i. Contributing to the Stability Pact effort to develop a South-East Europe 
regional civil-military emergency response capability through its Disaster 
Prevention and Preparedness Initiative. 
j . Providing sufficient resources to ensure its implementation. 
k. Making the most effective use of resources and to finding innovative 
approaches to overcoming shortfalls in capabilities, taking advantage of 
national contributions and possible cooperative and collective 
arrangements and mechanisms, including multinational, joint and common 
funding. 
1. To provide, subject to the necessary decisions, further expert advice upon 
request by the EU. 
m. To work for permanent arrangements to ensure full transparency, 
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consultation and cooperation between NATO and the EU. 
n. Develop cooperation and consultations between NATO and the EU on 
questions of common interest relating to security, defense and crisis 
management, so that crises can be met with the most appropriate military 
response and effective crisis management ensured. 
o. Intensify consultation in times of crisis, which will also enable non-EU 
European Allies to raise their concerns when they consider their security 
interests might be involved. 
p^ Continue to work on the ESDI within the Alliance as directed at the 
Washington Summit and agreed at subsequent Ministerial meetings. 
q. To put in place arrangements for: assured EU access to NATO planning 
capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations; 
the presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO 
capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations; the 
identification of a range of European command options for EU-led 
operations, further developing the role of DSACEUR in order for him to 
assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities; and the further 
adaptation of the Alliance's defense planning system, taking account of 
relevant activities in and proposals from the European Union. Allies will 
be consulted on the EU's proposed use of assets and capabilities, prior to 
the decision to release these assets and capabilities, and kept informed 
during the operation. 
r. Continue to provide advice, feedback and assistance to the aspiring 
countries on their preparations for possible future membership. 
s. Continue to place high priority on the strengthening of our partnership 
with all members of the Euro-Atlantic community through the EAPC and 
the Partnership for Peace. 
t. Continue to develop the EAPC as a key forum for political consultation 
and practical cooperation on Euro-Atlantic security issues. 
u. Continue efforts in the EAPC/PfP framework to support broader efforts 
underway to address the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and 
in support of global humanitarian mine action and the promotion of 
International Humanitarian Law, among other EAPC priority areas. 
v. Further develop cooperation on information and outreach opportunities 
and welcome Partners' continuing interest in cooperation in civil 
emergency preparedness. 
w. To the full implementation of the Political-Military Framework for 
NATO-led PfP operations. 
x. Building a strong, stable and enduring partnership with the Russian 
Federation in accordance with the NATO-Russia Founding Act, on the 
basis of the principles of transparency and reciprocity. 
y. Continue dialogue and cooperation in the framework of the PJC on issues 
relating to the operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, building on the valuable 
"experience of practical cooperation with Russian forces in both SFOR and 
KFOR. 
z. Implementing the program of cooperation between NATO and Russia on 
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search and rescue at sea agreed by PJC Defense Ministers on 5 December 
2000 and to the early signature of a Memorandum of Understanding with 
Russia on environmental protection, 
aa. Support the implementation of Ukraine's defense reform and welcome the 
enhanced role and new initiatives of the Joint Working Group on Defense 
Reform, 
bb. Consider ways to strengthen the political and practical dimensions of our 
cooperative relations with all the Mediterranean partners in accordance 
with the Washington Summit decisions, in areas where NATO can bring 
an added value and where partners have expressed interest, 
cc. Support the implementation of such an agreement within the framework of 
the Stability Pact for South-East Europe, 
dd. Pursue vigorously implementation of the recommendations contained in 
the CFE Treaty, including with Russia through the PJC. 
ee. Continued work in NATO inter alia on Theatre Missile Defense for point 
and area defense, in particular on the feasibility study on a possible system 
for the defense of deployed NATO forces, 
ff. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) as an important 
element in our efforts to counter the proliferation of means for delivering 
Weapons of mass destruction. 
Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of Force 
Explicit Performative: 
b. The member nations hereby assert to uphold and maintain stability and security 
for the Alliance, its members nations and their citizens by remaining strongly 
committed to the achievement of security, stability, peace, democracy and respect 
for human rights for its member countries and in out -of-area mission, including 
South-East Europe; remain steadfast and adhere to policies and treaties; continue 
to pursue this objective vigorously, primarily through the NATO-led 
peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo; condemn all 
acts of violence and terrorism; enable the countries of the region to work together 
to ensure their own security; further strengthening their military capabilities and 
to reinforcing the Alliance's European pillar; continue cooperative efforts to work 
with Russia and any situations which arise concerning the nation; and finally 
continue to condemn all acts of terrorism and violence. 
c. The member nations hereby direct the following: 
a. Member countries to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO treaties 
and policies; 
b. Encourage non-member countries to subscribe to and adopt its principles, 
commitments, confidence-building measures and incentives. 
c. Representatives and leaders in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Herzegovina to carry 
out their duties responsibly and work together and in close cooperation 
with the international community and adhere to all treaties and policies; 
d. Urge Russia and Chechnya to cooperate in good faith to find a solution to 
the conflict; and 
e. Encourage Ukraine to move forward on its current path of political and 
economic reform. ; 
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d. The member nations hereby commit to the following: 
d. Promote long-term stability based on regional reconciliation, good 
neighborliness, confidence-building measures, regional cooperation, a 
lasting resolution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons, and 
cooperation; 
e. Continue working towards a peaceful, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and 
democratic for all member nations and in out-of-mission areas where all 
its people, irrespective of ethnic origin or religion, can live in peace and 
security and enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis, 
including through participation in democratic institutions; 
f. Providing sufficient resources to ensure its implementation to efficiently 
carry out policies, treaties, and out-of-area mission; 
g. Effectively use resources and find innovative approaches to overcoming 
shortfalls in capabilities, taking advantage of national contributions and 
possible cooperative and collective arrangements and mechanisms, 
including multinational, joint and common funding. 
h. To work for permanent arrangements to ensure full transparency, 
consultation and cooperation between member nations, especially in 
regards to NATO and the EU; 
i. Intensify consultation in times of crisis; 
j . Continue to provide advice, feedback and assistance to the aspiring 
countries on their preparations for possible future membership; and 
k. Consider ways to strengthen the political and practical dimensions of our 
cooperative relations with all partners. . • • - • ' 
Reflective Intentions: 
b. Assertion: 
a. The member nations believe the Alliance has been able to maintain and 
uphold its original mission; as such the Alliance needs to adapt, renew, 
and be ready to meet the challenges of the global security environment. 
b. The member nations want the Alliance to be able to maintain and uphold 
its original mission while being able to adapt, renew, and be ready to meet 
the challenges of the global security environment based upon the 
Alliance's ability to remain strongly committed to the achievement of 
security, stability, peace, democracy and respect for human rights for its 
member countries and in out -of-area mission, including South-East 
Europe; remain steadfast and adhere to policies and treaties; continue to 
pursue this objective vigorously, primarily through the NATO-led 
peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo; 
condemn all acts of violence and terrorism; enable the countries of the 
region to work together to ensure their own security; further strengthening 
their military capabilities and to reinforcing the Alliance's European 
pillar; continue cooperative efforts to work with Russia and any situations 
which arise concerning the nation; and finally continue to condemn all 
acts of terrorism and violence. 
c. Directive: . 7 ' 
a. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over 
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the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for the member nations to ratify, 
accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies, 
i. The member nations want its members to ratify, accede and fully 
implement NATO treaties and policies because of NATO's 
command. 
b. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over 
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to encourage non-member 
countries to subscribe to and adopt its principles, commitments, 
confidence-building measures and incentives. 
i. The member nations want to encourage non-member countries to 
subscribe to and adopt its principles, commitments, confidence-
building measures and incentives because of NATO's command. 
c. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over 
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for the representatives and ( 
leaders in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Herzegovina to carry out their duties 
responsibly and work together and in close cooperation with the 
international community and adhere to all treaties and policies. 
i. The member nations want the representatives and leaders in 
Kosovo, Bosnia, and Herzegovina to carry out their duties 
responsibly and work together and in close cooperation with the 
international community and adhere to all treaties and policies 
because of NATO's command. 
d. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over 
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to urge Russia and Chechnya to 
cooperate in good faith to find a solution to the conflict. 
i. The member nations want to urge Russia and Chechnya to 
cooperate in good faith to find a solution to the conflict because of 
NATO's command, 
f. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over 
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to encourage Ukraine to move 
forward on its current path of political and economic reform, 
i. The member nations want the Ukraine to move forward on its 
current path of political and economic reform because of NATO's 
command, 
d. Commitment: 
1. The member nations believes its utterance obligates the Alliance to be able 
to maintain and uphold its original mission while being able to adapt, 
renew, and be ready to meet the challenges of the global security 
environment on the condition that its member countries want to promote 
long-term stability based on regional reconciliation, good neighborliness, 
confidence-building measures, regional cooperation, a lasting resolution to 
the problem of refugees and displaced persons, and cooperation; continue 
working towards a peaceful, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and democratic 
for all member nations and in out-of-mission areas where all its people, 
irrespective of ethnic origin or religion, can live in peace and security and 
enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis, including 
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through participation in democratic institutions; provide sufficient 
resources to ensure its implementation to efficiently carry out policies, 
treaties, and out-of-area mission; effectively use resources and find 
innovative approaches to overcoming shortfalls in capabilities, taking 
, advantage of national contributions and possible cooperative and 
collective arrangements and mechanisms, including multinational, joint 
and common funding; work for permanent arrangements to ensure full 
transparency, consultation and cooperation between member nations, 
especially in regards to NATO and the EU; intensify consultation in times 
of crisis; continue to provide advice, feedback and assistance to the 
aspiring countries on their preparations for possible future membership; 
and consider ways to strengthen the political and practical dimensions of 
our cooperative relations with all partners, 
m. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the directives on the 
condition that the member nations will be able to maintain and uphold its 
original mission while being able to adapt, renew, and be ready to meet 
the challenges of the global security environment. 
n. The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and (b). 
Implicatures: 
i. Assertion: • , ' . " • ' 
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens. 
i. Quality: The member nations believe that its members along with 
other countries around the world and their citizens are a part of the 
same race - human, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs the members 
that they are fellow citizens, 
hi. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant 
to its members, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to the Alliance. 
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral 
commitment to use. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing 
security through multilateral alliance commitment, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations'assertion informs its members it 
is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment. 
Hi. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries. 
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political 
relationships. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security 
through political relationships, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members it 
is establishing political relationships. , 
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iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries. 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries.
 r 
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved 
peacefully, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members 
conflicts can be resolved peacefully, 
hi. Relevance: NATO member nations'are establishing conflicts can 
be resolved peacefully, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries. 
e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its members will use force 
if necessary, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members 
will use force if necessary, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing its use of force 
is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries, 
e. Directive: 
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its members along 
with other countries in the global security and their citizens are a 
part of the same race - human, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs the member 
countries and other countries that they are fellow citizens, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant 
to its members and other countries in the global security 
environment, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its directive 
to its members and other countries in the global security 
environment. 
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral 
commitment to use. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing 
security through multilateral alliance commitment, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs its member 
countries and other countries it is establishing a multilateral 
alliance commitment, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries 
and other countries 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
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to its member countries and other countries in the global security 
environment. 
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political 
relationships. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security 
through political relationships, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member 
countries and other countries it is establishing political 
relationships, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries 
and other countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries and other countries in the global security 
environment. 
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved 
peacefully, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member 
countries and other countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can 
be resolved peacefully, 
v. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries andpther countries in the global security 
environment, 
j . Commitment: 
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its member countries 
along with other countries around the world and their citizens are a 
part of the same race - human, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs the 
member countries that they are fellow citizens, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant 
to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
commitment to its member countries. 
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral 
commitment to use. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing 
security through multilateral alliance commitment, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its 
member countries it is establishing a multilateral alliance 
commitment, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries. 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
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commitment to its member countries. 
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political 
relationships. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security 
through political relationships, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its 
member countries it is establishing political relationships, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations' are clearly conveying its 
commitment to its member countries. 
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved 
peacefully, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its 
member countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can 
be resolved peacefully, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations clearly conveying its commitment 
to its member countries. 
e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its member countries will 
use force if necessary, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its 
member countries will use force if necessary, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing it will force is 
relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
commitment to its member countries. 
(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are sincere. 
(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are normative. 
Presuppositions: 
a., If the member nations are able to maintain and uphold its original mission while 
being able to adapt, renew, and be ready to meet the challenges of the global 
security environment, then the Alliance will be able to maintaining security and 
stability for its member nations and throughout the global security environment, 
b. If the member nations are not able to maintain and uphold its original mission 
while being able to adapt, renew, and be ready to meet the challenges of the 
global security environment, then the Alliance will not be able to maintaining 




DIALOGICAL ANALYSIS FOR SPEECH ACT 6 
Dialogical Analysis for Speech Act 6 
Statement: Press Communique M-NAC-2 (2001) 158 held at NATO HQ Brussels 6 Dec 
2001 ' . . -
Speech Act: Assertion, Commitment, and Directive 
a. The member nations hereby assert: 
a. The terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 resulted in 
the invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in 
the history of the Alliance. 
b. We deplore the loss of life which affected so many NATO members and 
partner countries. 
c. To reaffirm that a confident and cooperative partnership between the 
Allies and Russia, based on shared democratic values and the shared 
commitment to a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, as enshrined in 
the NATO-Russia Founding Act, is essential for stability and security in 
the Euro-Atlantic area. 
d. We support Russia's right to protect her territorial integrity, and recognize 
her right to protect all citizens against terrorism and criminality. 
e. The Alliance has played a particularly active role in promoting stability 
and security in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in close 
cooperation with the European Union (EU) and the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 
f. We reaffirm Our condemnation of the use of violence for political ends. 
g. We recognize the crucial contribution NATO's Partner countries are 
making to the Alliance's efforts to foster peace and stability in the Euro-
Atlantic region. 
h. The events of 11 September have underlined the importance of enhanced 
cooperation between the two organizations on questions of common 
interest relating to security, defense, and crisis management, so that crises 
would be met with the most appropriate military response and effective 
crisis management ensured. Important work remains to be done on the 
arrangements for NATO support to EU-led operations, in accordance with 
the decisions taken at the 1999 NATO~ Washington Summit and 
subsequent Ministerial meetings, 
i. Events on and since 11 September show that our security is challenged in 
a variety of different, sometimes unpredictable, ways. 
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j . We reaffirm that the Alliance must have the capability to defend 
appropriately and effectively against the threats that the proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery can pose. 
k. The Alliance's policy of support for arms control, disarmament and non-
proliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the 
Alliance's security objectives. 
1. Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament along with deterrence 
and defense play an essential role in enhancing security against these new 
threats and challenges. In this context, the role that missile defense could 
play is being actively considered as we continue our consultations with the 
United States on this issue, 
b. The member nations hereby direct to: 
a. Urge Russia to build on the steps towards establishing a political dialogue 
with Chechnya and find a prompt and lasting political and peaceful 
resolution to the conflict and to respect and protect the human and legal 
rights of the population. 
b. Gall on the Chechen side to cooperate in good faith in seeking a political 
solution to the conflict, to condemn terrorism and to take actions against it. 
c. Urge all parties involved in promoting stability and security in close 
cooperation EU and OSCE to implement the Framework Agreement in 
full, and to continue to cooperate with the international community. 
d. We encourage the newly elected leaders of Kosovo to exercise their new 
functions in strict compliance with United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1244 and the constitutional framework for provisional self-
government and in full cooperation with UNMIK and KFOR. We also 
call on them to establish effective cooperation with the authorities of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). 
e. Encourage all our Partners to seek a more active relationship with the 
Alliance. 
f. Encourage Ukraine to continue to take concrete steps to take its reform 
process forward and stand ready to assist it in this regard. 
c. The member nations hereby commit to: 
a. Upholding it's allegiance to its member states and its policies regarding 
the attacks of 11 September 2001. 
b. Taken stock of NATO's broad agenda, and given further guidance on its 
implementation. 
c. Forge a new relationship with Russia, enhancing our ability to work 
together in areas of common interest. 
d. Explore and develop, in the coming months, building on the Founding 
Act, new, effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, joint 
decision, and coordinated/joint action. 
e. Intensifying our cooperation in the common goals of a strong, stable and 
enduring partnerships and other areas, including non-proliferation, export 
control and arms control matters, arms transparency and confidence 
building measures, missile defense, search and rescue at sea, and military-
to-military cooperation,, which represents a major step towards a 
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qualitatively new relationship. 
f. Continuing the enlargement process of the Alliance and will encourage the 
nine aspirant countries to continue focused efforts to prepare for possible 
future membership, making full use of the opportunities offered through 
our Membership Action Plan (MAP). 
g. A peaceful, stable and democratic South-East Europe, and our 
determination to oppose all violence, whether ethnically, politically or 
criminally motivated. 
h. Support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the countries in 
South-East Europe. 
i. Promote regional reconciliation and cooperation, good neighborliness, 
stable and secure borders, protection of rights of members of all ethnic 
groups and minorities, confidence-building measures, a lasting solution to 
the problem of refugees and displaced persons, and full cooperation with 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 
j . NATO's operations in the Balkans and possibilities for rationalization and 
an enhanced regional approach, recognizing the need for continued close 
consultation with other international organizations involved. 
k. The territorial integrity of the Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia. 
1. Stand ready to continue to contribute to security by providing support for 
the EU and OSCE monitors for a further three-month period, as part of its 
contribution to peace and stability in the country. 
m. The full implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and call on all political leaders in this country 
to continue to renounce separatism and violence, to support democratic 
institutions and to take on greater responsibility for and ownership of the 
process of implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement. 
n. Strongly endorse the respective efforts of SFOR and the ICTY to detain 
and bring to trial persons indicted for war crimes. In this context, we 
reiterate that the Entities carry primary responsibility for bringing to 
justice persons indicted for war crimes, and urge them to cooperate more 
effectively with SFOR to this end. 
o. Further broaden and strengthen cooperation in the framework of the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP). 
p. Broaden and strengthen cooperation with our Mediterranean partners, and 
invite them to intensify their dialogue with us on security matters of 
common concern. 
q. Achieving a close, transparent and coherent NATO-EU relationship. 
r. Make progress on all the various aspects of our relationship, noting the 
need to find solutions satisfactory to all Allies on the issue of participation 
by non-EU European Allies. 
s. Ensure that Alliance forces have the best possible capabilities to meet 
these challenges and are able to work together seamlessly. 
t. Continue to work together to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy 
to meet these challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of political and 
defense efforts. 
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u. Contribute to the implementation of the conclusions of the 2000 Non-
Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and will work towards a 
successful outcome of the upcoming review, 
v. Support ongoing efforts to achieve an International Code of Conduct 
against Ballistic Missile Proliferation before the end of 2002. 
w. Swift resolution of remaining issues between Russia and Georgia. 
Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of Force 
Explicit Performative: 
c. The member nations hereby assert in order to uphold and maintain stability and 
security in a post 9-11 environment for the Alliance, its members nations and their 
citizens it is essential that confident and cooperative partnerships, based on shared 
democratic values and the shared commitment to a stable, peaceful and undivided 
Euro-Atlantics are upheld; continuing to uphold current policies and treaties; 
condemning all use of violence and terrorism for either military or political 
means; continue to engage in current and future out-of-area mission; and 
reaffirming the necessity of having the capability to defend appropriately and 
effectively against threats. 
d. The member nations hereby direct the following: 
a. Member countries to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO treaties 
and /• policies and to continue to cooperate with the international 
community; 
b. Urge Russia and Chechnya to cooperate in good faith to find a solution to 
the conflict 
c. Encourage the elected leaders of Kosovo to exercise their new functions in 
strict compliance and carry out their duties responsibly and work together 
and in close cooperation with the international community and adhere to 
all treaties and policies; 
d. Encourage all our Partners to seek a more active relationship with the 
Alliance; and 
e. Encourage Ukraine to continue to take concrete steps to take its reform 
process forward. 
e. The member nations hereby commit to the following: -
h. Upholding it's allegiance to its member states and its policies regarding 
the attacks of 11 September 2001; 
i. Continue to uphold existing relationships and forge new relationships 
Russia; 
j . Explore and develop, in the coming months, new, effective mechanisms 
for consultation, cooperation, joint decision, and coordinated/joint action; 
k. Continuing the enlargement process; 
1. To develop a peaceful, stable and democratic South-East Europe and the 
Balkans; 
m. Promote regional reconciliation and cooperation, good neighborliness, 
stable and secure borders, protection of rights of members of all ethnic 
groups and minorities, confidence-building measures, and lasting solution 
to the problem of refugees and displaced persons; 
n. NATO's operations in the Balkans and possibilities for rationalization and 
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an enhanced regional approach, recognizing the need for continued close 
consultation with other international organizations involved. 
o. Continue to denounce terrorism and all acts of violence; 
p. Further broaden and strengthen cooperation in the framework of the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP); 
q. Ensure that Alliance forces have the best possible capabilities to meet 
these challenges and are able to work together seamlessly; 
r. Continue to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet these 
challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts; 
and 
s. Find a swift resolution of remaining issues between Russia and Georgia. 
Reflective Intentions: 
c. Assertion: 
a. The member nations believe that the Alliance needs to be able to uphold 
and maintain stability and security in the post 9-11 in order to meet the 
challenges of the global security environment. 
b. The member nations want the Alliance to be able to uphold and maintain 
stability and security in the post 9-11 environment by being confident and 
cooperative partnerships, based on shared democratic values and the 
shared commitment to a stable, peaceful and undivided Euro-Atlantics are 
upheld; continuing to uphold current policies and treaties; condemning all 
use of violence and terrorism for either military or political means; 
continue to engage in current and future out-of-area mission; and 
reaffirming the necessity of having the capability to defend appropriately 
and effectively against threats. 
d. Directive: 
a. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over 
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for the member nations to ratify, 
accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies. 
i. The member nations want its members to ratify, accede and fully 
implement NATO treaties and policies because of NATO's 
command. 
b. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority oyer 
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to urge Russia and Chechnya to 
cooperate in good faith to find a solution to the conflict. 
i. The member nations want to urge Russia and Chechnya to 
cooperate in good faith to find a solution to the conflict because of 
NATO's command. 
c. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over 
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for the elected leaders of 
Kosovo to exercise their new functions in strict compliance and carry out 
their duties responsibly and work together and in close cooperation with 
the international community and adhere to all treaties and policies. 
i. The member nations want the elected leaders of Kosovo to 
exercise their new functions in strict compliance and carry out their 
duties responsibly and work together and in close cooperation with 
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the international community and adhere to all treaties and policies 
because of NATO's command. 
f. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over 
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for all Partners to seek a more 
active relationship with the Alliance. 
i. NATO wants all Partners to seek a more active relationship with 
the Alliance because of NATO's command. 
g. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over 
the Alliance; constitutes sufficient reason for the Ukraine to continue to 
take concrete steps to take its reform process forward. 
i. The member nations want the Ukraine to continue to take concrete 




a. The member nations believe its utterance obligates the Alliance to be able 
to be able to uphold and maintain stability and security in the post 9-11 in 
order to meet the challenges of the global security environment on 
condition that the member nations indicate they would uphold its 
allegiance to its member states and its policies regarding the attacks of 11 
September 2001; continue to uphold existing relationships and forge new 
relationships Russia; explore and develop, in the coming months, new, 
effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, joint decision, and 
coordinated/joint action; continuing the enlargement process; develop a 
peaceful, stable and democratic South-East Europe and the Balkans; 
promote regional reconciliation and cooperation, good neighborliness, 
stable and secure borders, protection of rights of members of all ethnic 
groups and minorities, confidence-building measures, and lasting solution 
to the problem of refugees and displaced persons; continue to denounce 
terrorism and all acts of violence; further broaden and strengthen 
cooperation in the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
(EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP); ensure that Alliance forces 
have the best possible capabilities to meet these challenges and are able to 
work together seamlessly; continue to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive 
strategy to meet these challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of political 
and defense efforts; and find a swift resolution of remaining issues 
between Russia and Georgia. 
b. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the directives on the 
condition that the member nations will be able to uphold and maintain 
stability and security in the post 9-11 in order to meet the challenges of the 
global security environment. 
c. The member nations wants the Alliance to believe (a) and (b). 
Implicatures: 
k. Assertion: 
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens. 
i. Quality: The member nations believe that its members along with 
other countries around the world and their citizens are a part of the 
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same race - human, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs the members 
that they are fellow citizens, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant 
to its members, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to the Alliance. ~ 
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral 
commitment to use. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing 
security through multilateral alliance commitment, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations'assertion informs its members it 
is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
c
 through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries. 
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political 
relationships. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security 
through political relationships, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members it 
is establishing political relationships, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries. 
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved 
peacefully, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members 
conflicts can be resolved peacefully, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can 
be resolved peacefully, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries. 
e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its members will use force 
if necessary, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members 
will use force if necessary, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing its use of force 
is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries, 
f. Directive: 
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a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its members along 
with other countries in the global security and their citizens are a 
part of the same race - human, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs the member 
countries and other countries that they are fellow citizens, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant 
to its members and other countries in the global security 
environment, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its directive 
to its members and other countries in the global security 
environment. 
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral 
commitment to use. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing 
security through multilateral alliance commitment, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs its member 
countries and other countries it is establishing a multilateral 
alliance commitment, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries 
and other countries 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries and other countries in the global security 
environment. 
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political 
relationships. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security 
through political relationships, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member 
countries and other countries it is establishing political 
relationships. , 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries 
and other countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries and other countries in the global security 
environment. 
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved 
peacefully, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member 
countries and other countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can 
be resolved peacefully. 
v. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
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to its member countries and other countries in the global security 
environment. 
1. Commitment: 
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its member countries 
along with other countries around the world and their citizens are a 
part of the same race - human, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs the 
member countries that they are fellow citizens, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant 
to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
commitment to its member countries. 
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral 
commitment to use. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing 
security through multilateral alliance commitment, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its 
member countries it is establishing a multilateral alliance 
commitment, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
commitment to its member countries. 
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political 
relationships. v 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security 
through political relationships, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its 
member countries it is establishing political relationships, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
commitment to its member countries. 
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved 
peacefully, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its 
member countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can 
be resolved peacefully, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations clearly conveying its commitment 
to its member countries. 
e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its member countries will 
use force if necessary. ' -. 
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ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its 
member countries will use force if necessary, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing it will force is 
[
 relevant to its member countries. 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
commitment to its member countries. 
(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are sincere. 
(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are normative. _____ 
Presuppositions: -
a. If the member nations are able to uphold and maintain stability and security in the 
post 9-11, then the Alliance will be able to maintaining security and stability for 
its member nations and throughout the global security environment. 
b. If the member nations are not able to uphold and maintain stability and security in 
the post 9-11, then the Alliance will not be able to maintaining security and 
stability for its member nations and throughout the global security environment. 
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APPENDIX P 
DIALOGICAL ANALYSIS FOR SPEECH ACT 7 
Dialogical Analysis for Speech Act 7 - • , -
Statement: Press Communique M-NAC-2 (2002) 59 held at NATO HQ Brussels 14 May 
2002 
Speech Act: Assertive, Commitment, and Directive 
a. The member nations hereby assert: 
a. Re-affirmed NATO's commitment to a peaceful, stable and democratic 
South-East Europe, and to the development of close and effective relations 
between NATO and the European Union. 
b. Reiterate our determination to combat the threat of terrorism for as long as 
necessary. 
c. Meeting this challenge is fundamental to our security. 
d. Disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation make an essential 
contribution to preventing the use of WMD, along with deterrence and 
defense. 
e. To carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field 
forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain 
operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives. 
f. The accession process will take into account work conducted under the 
MAP, and the MAP will be used to help the integration of invitees into 
Alliance structures. 
g. We commend Croatia on the progress it has made in its reform efforts, 
making full use of the options offered by Partnership for Peace (PfP), the 
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Intensified Dialogue. 
h. We welcome the decisive and substantial deepening of the NATO-Russia 
relationship, which marks an historic step towards the Alliance's long-
standing goal of building a secure, cooperative and democratic Euro-
Atlantic area. 
i. We note Ukraine's strong determination to pursue full Euro-Atlantic 
integration. 
j . Since 11 September, the important contribution made by NATO's 
Partnerships to Euro-Atlantic security has been confirmed and reinforced. 
k. Our joint efforts in the Balkans have furthered the achievement of peace 
and stability in that region and shown that close cooperation brings 
considerable benefits. 
1. The events of 11 September have underlined the importance of enhanced 
301 
cooperation between the two organizations on questions of common 
interest relating to security, defense, and crisis management, so that crises 
would be met with the most appropriate military response and effective 
crisis management ensured, 
m. The continued presence of NATO-led forces demonstrates and embodies 
our determination to oppose all violence whether ethnically, politically or 
criminally motivated, and to strengthen peace, tolerance, the rule of law 
and democratic institutions in the region, 
n. We reiterate that the Entities carry primary responsibility for bringing to 
justice persons indicted for war crimes, and urge them to cooperate more 
effectively with SFOR to this end. 
o. Reaffirm our commitment to the full implementation of United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1244, and welcome the establishment of 
provisional institutions of self-government which include representatives 
of all communities, 
p. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, along with deterrence 
and defense play an essential role in enhancing security against these new 
threats and challenges, 
q. The Alliance stresses the importance of abiding by and strengthening 
existing multilateral non-proliferation and export control regimes and 
international arms control and disarmament accords, 
r. Recognizing the contributions of the CFE Treaty to European security and 
stability, we recall that the entry into force of the adapted CFE Treaty 
would permit accession by non-CFE States. 
b. The member nations hereby direct: 
a. Croatia to continue to contribute to stability in the Balkans. 
b. Urge Russia to find a prompt and lasting political and peaceful resolution 
to the conflict in Chechnya, and to respect and protect the human and legal 
rights of the population. 
c. Call on the Chechen side to cooperate in good faith in seeking a political 
solution to the conflict, to condemn terrorism and to take action against it. 
d. Encourage Ukraine to implement the reforms required to achieve this 
objective and stand ready to continue to assist it in this regard. 
e. Call on the local authorities in the country to take on greater responsibility 
for and ownership of the process of implementing the Dayton Peace 
Agreement. 
f. Call on the provisional institutions and community leaders to assume their 
responsibilities and fully cooperate with UNMIK, KFOR and the' 
international community to promote a peaceful, multi-ethnic, multi-
cultural and democratic Kosovo. 
g. Encourage Russia to enhance its cooperation with NATO to facilitate our 
efforts to verify this claim as soon as possible. ( 
c. The member nations hereby commit to: 
a. Act on its core commitments to deter and defend against any threat of 
aggression against any NATO member state, as provided for in Articles 5 
and 6 of the Washington Treaty. '• 
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b. To the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan. 
c. The Alliance and its members are playing their full part in the current 
campaign against terror, confirming NATO's key role in ensuring Euro-
Atlantic security, including in the face of new threats. 
d. Adapt to be better able to perform its fundamental security tasks and to 
strengthen security right across the Euro-Atlantic area. 
e. Strengthen our national and collective capacities to protect our 
populations, territory and forces from any armed attack, including terrorist 
attack, directed from abroad. 
f. Working together with member nations and Partners to deal with the threat 
posed by possible use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including 
their possible use by terrorists, and the means of their delivery. 
g. Enhance our ability, through working on all possible options, to provide 
support, when requested, to national authorities for the protection of 
civilian populations against the effects of any terrorist attack, and are 
cooperating with our Partners in this field, taking into account the various 
proposals and initiatives put forward. 
h. Develop new and balanced capabilities within the Alliance, including 
strategic lift and modern strike capabilities, so that NATO can more 
effectively respond collectively to any threat of aggression against a 
member state. 
i. Launch the next round of NATO enlargement. 
j . Remain open to new members, and enhance security in the Euro-Atlantic 
area. 
k. Collective defense and the Alliance's full range of missions, a firm 
commitment to contribute to stability and security, especially in regions of 
crisis and conflict, and to be willing and able to assume the responsibilities 
of membership. 
1. Continuing to work with the aspirants to help them make sufficient 
progress to be invited to begin accession negotiations at Prague. 
m. Support Russia's right to protect her territorial integrity, and recognize her 
responsibility to protect all her citizens against terrorism and criminality. 
n. Develop new mechanisms and modalities that build on the Charter on a 
Distinctive Partnership and bring our relationship to a qualitatively new 
level. We expect to deepen and expand our relationship, including 
through intensified consultations and cooperation on political, economic 
and defense issues. 
o. A new, more substantive relationship with Partners, which intensifies our 
cooperation in responding to new security- challenges, including terrorism. 
p. In light of the changing security environment, the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace are adapting to remain 
valuable and effective. 
q. Upgrade the political and practical dimensions of our Mediterranean 
Dialogue, including by consulting with Mediterranean partners on security 
matters ,of common concern, including terrorism-related issues, as 
appropriate. '' •, 
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r. Achieving a close, transparent and coherent NATO-EU relationship. 
s. To make progress on all the various aspects of our relationship, noting the 
need to find solutions satisfactory to all Allies on the issue of participation 
by non-EU European Allies, 
t. A peaceful, stable, and democratic South-East Europe, and reaffirm our 
support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the countries in 
the region, 
u. Working together with our Partners in SFOR and KFOR and with other 
international institutions, we will continue to promote regional 
reconciliation and cooperation, protection of rights of members of all 
ethnic groups and minorities, confidence-building measures and a lasting 
solution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons, 
v. We remain actively engaged in the field of border security and smuggling 
interdiction operations and reaffirm the importance of a wider regional 
approach to these issues, 
w. Further support efforts towards security and stability in the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
x. Security by providing support for the EU and OSCE monitors through the 
presence of Task Force Fox. 
y. A self-sustaining peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in full accordance 
with the principles of the General Framework Agreement, 
z. Endorse the respective efforts of SFOR and the ICTY to detain and bring 
to trial persons indicted for war crimes, 
aa. Further developing the Alliance's relations with the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY), and expect swift implementation of the agreement that 
has been reached between Serbia and Montenegro in redefining their 
relationship, 
bb. Full and continued cooperation with ICTY, democratic reform and control 
of the military, as well as full and transparent implementation of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement, are essential to a deeper relationship with the 
Alliance, 
cc. Support for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue 
to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security 
objectives, 
dd. Adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet the threats posed by 
the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, adopting an 
appropriate mix of political and defense efforts, 
ee. Actively contribute to the development of agreements and measures in 
arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, and pursue further arms 
reductions, transparency and confidence and security building measures, 
ff. Contribute to the implementation of the conclusions of the 2000 Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and welcome the full 
discussion of issues at the Preparatory Conference for the 2005 Review 
Conference in April 2002. 
gg. Support ongoing efforts to achieve an International Code of Conduct 
against Ballistic Missile Proliferation before the end of 2002. ^__^ 
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hh. Work at NATO on theatre missile defense. 
Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of Force 
Explicit Performative: 
b. The member nations hereby assert in order to maintain stability and security for 
the Alliance, its member nations, and their citizens, the Alliance must commit to 
promote peaceful, stable, and democratic nations, including those countries in 
South-East Europe; continue to combat the threat of terrorism; continue to prevent 
the use of WMD, along with deterrence and defense; to carry out the full range of 
its missions and field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, 
sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives; continue 
to develop the relationships with Russia and the Ukraine; enhance cooperation 
s between the member nations and the EU; ensuring crisis are met with the most 
appropriate military response and effective crisis management is implemented; 
continue to maintenance out-of-area missions; and uphold current policies and 
treaties. 
c. The member nations hereby direct the following: 
a. Member countries to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO treaties 
and policies and to continue to cooperate with the international 
community; 
b. Encourage Russia to enhance its cooperation with NATO to facilitate our 
efforts to verify this claim as soon as possible. 
c. Urge Russia and Chechnya to cooperate in good faith to find a solution to 
the conflict; 
d. Encourage Croatia to continue to contribute to stability in the Balkans. 
e. Encourage Ukraine to implement the reforms required to achieve this 
objective and stand ready to continue to assist it in this regard; and 
f. Call on the local authorities in all out-of-area missions to take on greater 
responsibility for and ownership of the process of implementing policies 
and treatments. 
d. The member nations hereby commit to the following: 
a. Act on its core commitments to deter and defend against any threat of 
aggression against any NATO member state; 
b. Adapt to be better able to perform its fundamental security tasks and to 
strengthen security right across the Euro-Atlantic area; 
c. Strengthen national and collective capacities to protect our populations, 
territory and forces from any armed attack, including terrorist attack, 
directed from abroad; 
d. Work with member nations and Partners to deal with the threat posed by 
possible use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including their 
possible use by terrorists, and the means of their delivery; 
e. Develop new and balanced capabilities within the Alliance; 
f. Launch the next round of NATO enlargement; 
g. Remain open to new members, and enhance security in the Euro-Atlantic 
area; 
h. Build a new, more substantive relationship with Partners; 
i. Upgrade the political and practical dimensions of our Mediterranean 
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Dialogue; 
j . Promote regional reconciliation and cooperation, protection of rights of 
members of all ethnic groups and minorities, confidence-building 
measures and a lasting solution to the problem of refugees and displaced 
persons; 
k. Adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet the threats posed by 
the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, adopting an .' . . i. 
appropriate mix of political and defense efforts; 
1. To develop a peaceful, stable and democratic South-East Europe and the 
Balkans; and 
m. Continue to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet these 
challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts. 
Reflective Intentions: 
a. Assertion: 
a. The member nations believe that the Alliance needs to be able to maintain 
security and stability for its member nations and in out-of area-mission in 
order to meet the challenges of the global security environment. 
b. The member nations wants the Alliance to maintain stability and security 
for its member nations and in out-of-area missions by commit to promote 
peaceful, stable, and democratic nations, including those countries in 
South-East Europe; continue to combat the threat of terrorism; continue to 
prevent the use of WMD, along with deterrence and defense;, to carry out 
the full range of its missions and field forces that can move quickly to 
wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and 
achieve their objectives; continue to develop the relationships with Russia 
and the Ukraine; enhance cooperation between the member nations and 
the EU; ensuring crisis are met with the most appropriate military 
response and effective crisis management is implemented; continue to 
maintenance out-of-area missions; and uphold current policies and 
treaties. ' • ./' 
b. Directive: 
a. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over 
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for the member nations to ratify, 
accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies. 
i. The member nations want its members to ratify, accede and fully 
implement NATO treaties and policies because of NATO's 
command. 
b. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over 
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to encourage Russia to enhance 
its cooperation with NATO. 
i. The member nations want its members to encourage Russia to 
enhance its cooperation with NATO because of NATO's 
command. 
c. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over 
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to urge Russia and Chechnya to 
cooperate in good faith to find a solution to the conflict. ' 
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i. The member nations want its members to urge Russia and 
Chechnya to cooperate in good faith to find a solution to the 
conflict because of NATO's command. 
d. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over 
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to encourage Croatia to continue 
to contribute to stability in the Balkans. 
i. The member nations want its members to encourage Croatia to 
continue to contribute to stability in the Balkans because of 
NATO's command. 
e. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over 
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to encourage Ukraine to 
implement the reforms1 required to achieve this objective and stand ready 
to continue to assist it in this regard. 
i. The member nations want its members encourage Ukraine to 
implement the reforms required to achieve this objective and stand 
ready to continue to assist it in this regard because of NATO's 
command. 
f. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over 
the Alliance, constitutes Sufficient reason to call on the local authorities in 
all out-of-area missions to take on greater responsibility for and ownership 
of the process of implementing policies and treatments. 
i. The member nations want its members to call on the local 
authorities in all out-of-area missions to take on greater 
responsibility for and ownership of the process of implementing 
policies and treatments because of NATO's command, 
c. Commitment: 
a. The member nations believes its utterance obligates the Alliance to be able 
to maintain security and stability for its member nations and in out-of 
area-mission in order to meet the challenges of the global security 
environment on the condition that the member nations to act on its core 
commitments to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against 
any NATO member state; Adapt to be better able to perform its 
fundamental security tasks and to strengthen security right across the 
Euro-Atlantic area; strengthen national and collective capacities to protect 
our populations, territory and forces from any armed attack, including 
terrorist attack, directed from abroad; work with member nations and 
Partners to deal with the threat posed by possible use of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), including their possible use by terrorists, and the 
means of their delivery; develop new and balanced capabilities within the 
Alliance; launch the next round of NATO enlargement; remain open to 
new members, and enhance security in the Euro-Atlantic area; build a 
new, more substantive relationship with Partners; upgrade the political and 
practical dimensions of our Mediterranean Dialogue; promote regional 
reconciliation and cooperation, protection of rights of members of all 
ethnic groups and minorities, confidence-building measures and a lasting 
solution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons; adapt the 
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Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet the threats posed by the 
proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, adopting an 
appropriate mix of political and defense efforts; develop a peaceful, stable 
and democratic South-East Europe and the Balkans; and continue to adapt 
the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet these challenges, adopting 
an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts, 
b. The member nations want the Alliance nations to carry out the directives 
on the condition that the member nations will be able to maintain security 
and stability for its member nations and in out-of area-mission in order to 
meet the challenges of the global security environment 
b. NATO wants its member nations to believe (a) and (b). _ _ 
Implicatures: 
m. Assertion: 
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens. 
i. Quality: The membernations believe that its members along with 
other countries around the world and their citizens are a part of the 
same race - human, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs the members 
that they are fellow citizens, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant 
to its members, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to the Alliance. 
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral 
commitment to use. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing 
security through multilateral alliance commitment, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members it 
is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries. 
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political 
relationships. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security 
through political relationships, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations'assertion informs its members it 
is establishing political relationships, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries. 
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully. 




ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members 
conflicts can be resolved peacefully, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can 
be resolved peacefully, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries, 
e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its members will use force 
if necessary, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members 
will use force if necessary, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing its use of force 
is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries, 
g. Directive: 
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its members along 
with other countries in the global security and their citizens are a 
part of the same race-human, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs the member 
countries and other countries that they are fellow citizens, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant 
to its members and other countries in the global security 
environment, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its directive 
to its members and other countries in the global security 
environment. 
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral 
commitment to use. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing 
security through multilateral alliance commitment, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs its member 
countries and other countries it is establishing a multilateral 
alliance commitment, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries 
and other countries 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries and other countries in the global security 
environment. 
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political 
relationships. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security 
through political relationships. 
. ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member 
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countries and other countries it is establishing political 
relationships, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries 
and other countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries and other countries in the global security 
environment, 
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved 
peacefully, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member 
countries and other countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can 
be resolved peacefully, 
v. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries and other countries in the global security 
environment, 
n. Commitment: 
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its member countries 
along with other countries around the world and their citizens are a 
part of the same race - human, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs the 
member countries that they are fellow citizens, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant 
to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
commitment to its member countries. 
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral 
commitment to use. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing 
security through multilateral alliance commitment, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its 
member countries it is establishing a multilateral alliance 
commitment, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
commitment to its member countries. 
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political 
relationships. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security 
through political relationships, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its 
• member countries it is establishing political relationships. 
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iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries. 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
commitment to its member countries. 
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved 
peacefully, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its 
member countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can 
be resolved peacefully, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations clearly conveying its commitment 
to its member countries. 
e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its member countries will 
use force if necessary, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its 
member countries will use force if necessary, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing it will force is 
^ relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
commitment to its member countries. 
(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are sincere. 
(Implicature): The intentions' of the member nations are normative. 
Presuppositions: 
a. If the member nations are able to maintain security and stability for its member 
nations and in out-of area-mission, then the Alliance will be able to maintaining 
security and stability for its member nations and throughout the global security 
environment. 
b. If the member nations are not able to maintain security and stability for its 
member nations and in out-of area-mission, then the Alliance will not be able to 
maintaining security and stability for its member nations and throughout the 
global security environment. ' . 
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APPENDIX Q 
DIALOGICAL ANALYSIS FOR SPEECH ACT 8 
Dialogical Analysis for Speech Act 8 ' . 
Statement: Press Communique M-NAC-2 (2003) 152 held at NATO HQ Brussels 4 Dec 
2003 . 
Speech Act: Assertive, Commitment, and Directive 
b. The member nations hereby assert: 
a. The North Atlantic Alliance remains the basis of our collective defense 
and the essential transatlantic forum for security. Today, we took stock of 
NATO's ongoing transformation to meet 21st century threats and 
challenges to the security of our populations, territory and forces, from 
wherever they may come, and gave direction on work still to be done. 
b. We look forward to welcoming seven new members of the Alliance by the 
time of the Istanbul Summit, which will strengthen security for all in the 
Euro-Atlantic area. 
c. In Afghanistan, the Alliance now leads the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) under its UN mandate. 
d. Peace, stability and reconstruction in Iraq remain a high priority. 
e. The security environment in the strategically important region of the 
Balkans is stable but remains fragile. 
f. We want to see enduring stability and peace in the Balkans. 
g. Our missions in the Balkans continue to evolve. 
h. The improved security environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina will allow 
for further reduction of SFOR by next Spring, 
i. In Kosovo, KFOR's presence remains essential, 
j . Direct dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina on practical issues of 
mutual concern remains a key benchmark and an indispensable element of 
the international community's policy of Standards before Status. ; 
k. We recognize the progress made by Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia 
and Montenegro in their efforts to join Partnership for Peace (PfP), 
welcome substantive progress on defense reform. 
1. NATO and the European Union share common strategic interests, 
m. NATO-EU cooperation has made concrete progress and is developing in a 
' •- . ' constructive manner. 
n. NATO's Partnerships, which contribute greatly to security and stability 
across the Euro-Atlantic area, are of increasing value and importance. 
. o. Partnership for Peace has been an increasingly effective instrument for 
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cooperation in such areas as peace support operations and the fight against 
terrorism. 
p. Security in the Euro-Atlantic area is closely linked to security and stability 
in the Mediterranean. 
q. This initiative will genuinely improve cooperation in a number of fields, 
including on defense reform and interoperability, including through PfP-
like instruments, and open more Partnership activities to the 
Mediterranean Dialogue partners on a case by case basis. 
r. The NATO-Russia Council, in which NATO member states and Russia 
work together as equal partners in areas of common interest, continues to 
make valuable contributions to security throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. 
Our political dialogue has developed on key security issues, including 
Afghanistan and the Balkans. Our practical cooperation has reached a 
new level, including in military-to-military projects; and, through our 
focus on improving interoperability, we have also laid the groundwork for 
future military cooperation, including potentially in joint peacekeeping 
operations. 
s. We stress the importance of abiding by, fully implementing and 
strengthening existing international arms control and disarmament accords 
and multilateral non-proliferation and export control regimes. 
t. It is essential that efforts be intensified to complete the withdrawal in early 
2004. 
c. The member nations hereby direct to: 
a. We encourage all parties in Kosovo to work constructively to meet the 
agreed standards, and to support the efforts of the Special Representative 
of the UN Secretary General, Mr. Harri Holkeri. 
b. We encourage Belgrade and Pristina to pursue their dialogue in good faith. 
c. We encourage regional cooperation among the Balkan countries. 
d. We expect them to assume ownership of, and implement, pressing reforms 
and they must comply fully with their international obligations. 
e. We call on the Government and all political actors in the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia to continue to work toward full implementation of 
the Ohrid Agreement. 
f. We encourage Albania, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia to continue pursuing the reforms necessary to advance their 
candidacies for NATO membership. 
g. We encourage Ukraine to pursue all reforms necessary to its goal of full 
Euro-Atlantic integration, and we will keep under active review all 
possible options to support Ukraine in these efforts. 
h. We call on the Georgian authorities to hold free and fair elections, planned 
for January next year. '. • 
i. We urge swift resolution of the outstanding issues between Georgia and 
Russia and call upon the parties to resume negotiations at an appropriately 
senior level. 
d. The member nations hereby commit to: 
a. Preserve peace through its operations; spreading stability through its 
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partnerships; and reinforcing our community of shared values through the 
most robust round of enlargement in our history. 
b. Categorically reject and condemn terrorism in all its forms. 
c. Use all means at its disposal and to cooperate fully with other international 
organizations and with its Partners to fight terrorism. 
d. This operation demonstrates our readiness to deploy forces wherever the 
Alliance decides, to ensure our common security. 
e. Our aim is to assist in the emergence of a united, sovereign country, 
integrated into the international community, including by assisting the 
Afghan Transitional Authority in the maintenance of security and stability 
and in the electoral process according to the Bonn Process. 
f. Develop a comprehensive strategy for NATO's engagement in 
Afghanistan, in close consultation with other International Organizations 
and the Afghan Transitional Authority. 
g. Support Poland in its leadership of a multi-national division in Iraq. 
h. Adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1511 on Iraq and are 
committed to its full implementation in order to restore conditions of 
stability and security in the country, and return governing responsibilities 
and authorities to the people of Iraq, 
i. Support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the countries in 
theBalkans. 
j . Consult with their EU counterparts on Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 
accordance with agreed texts and procedures and within the framework of 
Berlin, 
k. Further advancement towards a process to determine Kosovo's future 
status, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1244. 
1. Committed to help the countries of the Balkans integrate fully into Euro-
Atlantic structures. , 
m. The current round of enlargement will not be the last and that NATO's 
door remains open, 
n. Continue to assist both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia in meeting 
established NATO conditions for PfP membership, 
o. Review and develop NATO's Balkans strategy, encompassing political 
aspects as well as operations, 
p. Enhancing cooperation between NATO and the EU. 
q. Examine whether and how selected Partnership activities might be opened, 
on a case by case basis, to other countries which might express an interest 
in such involvement, 
r. Consider ways to further enhance this relationship by generating, in 
consultation with all Mediterranean Dialogue partners options to develop a 
more ambitious and expanded framework for the Mediterranean Dialogue. 
s. Build on the progress between NATO and Russia, and to further 
enhancing the NATO-Russia relationship, 
t. Create stronger NATO-Ukraine relations under the Charter on a 
Distinctive Partnership. 
u. Closely following the development of events in Georgia.
 : • 
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v. Support the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia, 
w. Develop Partnership with Georgia through using the full range of 
Partnership instruments, 
x. Support for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue 
to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security 
objectives, including preventing the spread and use of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. 
y. Reinforce the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the"pre-eminent non-proliferation 
and disarmament mechanism, and ensuring the full compliance with it by 
all states party to the Treaty, 
z. Strengthen our common efforts to safeguard nuclear and radiological 
material, 
aa. Support the aims of the Proliferation Security Initiative to establish a more 
coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop 
shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to 
and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent 
with national legal authorities and relevant international law and 
frameworks, including the United Nations Security Council, 
bb. The protection of civilian populations, 
cc. The CFE Treaty as a cornerstone of European security, and reaffirm our 
attachment to the early entry into force of the Adapted Treaty, 
dd. Multilateralism through effective action and our shared commitment to: 
the transatlantic link; NATO's fundamental security tasks including 
collective defense; our shared democratic values; and the United Nations 
Charter. , 
ee. Implementation of measures to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the NATO Headquarters organization, including through modern 
management and financial systems, sound and transparent management of 
the new Headquarters project, and improvements to gender balance and 
diversity in the Alliance's International Staff. 
Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of Force 
Explicit Performative: 
b. The North Atlantic Alliance remains the basis of our collective defense and the 
essential transatlantic forum for security. Today, we took stock of NATO's 
ongoing transformation to meet. 21st century threats and challenges to the security 
of our populations, territory and forces, from wherever they may come, and gave 
direction on work still to be done thus the member nations needs to continue 
expand the Alliance and encourage new members to join; continue to combat 
terrorism; ensure peace, stability and reconstruction in Iraq, Afghanistan, the 
Balkans; continue to help to improve the security environment in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina; continue to prevent the use of WMD, along with deterrence and 
defense; to carry out the full range of its missions and field forces that can move 
quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations oyer distance and time, 
and achieve their objectives; continue to develop the relationships with Russia 
and the Ukraine; enhance cooperation between the member nations and the EU; 
ensuring crisis are met with the most appropriate military response and effective 
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crisis management is implemented; continue to maintenance out-of-area missions; 
and uphold current policies and treaties. 
e. The member nations hereby direct the following: 
n. Member countries to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO treaties 
and policies and to continue to cooperate with the international 
community; 
0. Encourage all parties in Kosovo to work constructively to meet theagreed 
standards; 
a. Encourage regional cooperation among the Balkan countries; 
b. Encourage Albania, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia to continue pursuing the reforms necessary to advance their 
candidacies for NATO membership. 
c. Encourage Ukraine to pursue all reforms necessary to its goal of full Euro-
Atlantic integration; and 
d. Urge swift resolution of the outstanding issues between Georgia and 
Russia and call upon the parties to resume negotiations at an appropriately 
senior level. 
f. The member nations hereby commit to the following: 
a. Preserve peace through its operations; spread stability through its 
partnerships; and reinforce our community of shared values through the 
most robust round of enlargement in our history. 
b. Use all means at its disposal and to cooperate fully with other international 
organizations and with its Partners to fight terrorism; 
c. Assist in the emergence of a united, sovereign country, integrated into the 
international community; 
d. Develop a comprehensive strategy for NATO's engagement in 
Afghanistan, in close consultation with other International Organizations 
and the Afghan Transitional Authority; 
e. Support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the countries in 
the Balkans and help those countries to integrate fully into Euro-Atlantic 
structures; 
f. Continue with the enlargement of NATO; 
g. Enhancing cooperation between NATO and the EU; 
h. Consider ways to further enhance relationships by generating a more 
ambitious and expanded framework; 
i. Build on the progress between NATO and Russia, and NATO and the 
Ukraine; 
j . Closely follow the development of events in Georgia and support the 
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia; 
k. Support farms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to 
play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives, 
including preventing the spread and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) and their means of delivery; 
1. Multilateralism through effective, action and our shared commitment to: 
the transatlantic link; and 
m. Implementation of measures to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of 
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the organization. ' ,' 
Reflective Intentions: 
d. Assertion: 
a. The member nations believe the Alliance is the basis of collective defense 
and the essential transatlantic forum for security and as such it needs to 
maintain security and stability for its member nations and Partners in order 
to meet the challenges of the global security environment. 
b. The member nations want the Alliance to maintain security and stability 
!
 for it member nations and Partners by taking stock of NATO's ongoing 
transformation to meet 21st century threats and challenges to the security 
of our populations, territory and forces, from wherever they may come, 
and gave direction on work still to be done thus the member nations needs 
to continue expand the Alliance and encourage new members to join; 
continue to combat terrorism; ensure peace, stability and reconstruction in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans; continue to help to improve the security 
environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina; continue to prevent the use of 
WMD, along with deterrence and defense; to carry out the full range of its 
missions and field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are 
needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their 
objectives; continue to develop the relationships with Russia and the 
Ukraine; enhance cooperation between the member nations and the EU; 
ensuring crisis are met with the most appropriate military response and 
effective crisis management is implemented; continue to maintenance out-
of-area missions; and uphold current policies and treaties. 
e. Directive: 
g. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over 
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for the member nations to ratify, 
accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies, 
i. The member nations wants its member to ratify, accede and fully 
implement NATO treaties and policies because of NATO's 
command, 
h. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over 
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to encourage all parties in 
Kosovo to work constructively to meet the agreed standards; 
i. The member nations want its members to encourage all parties in 
Kosovo to work constructively to meet the agreed standards 
j because of NATO's command. 
i. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over 
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to encourage regional 
cooperation among the Balkan countries; 
ii. The member nations want its members to encourage regional 
cooperation among the Balkan countries because of NATO's 
command. 
j . The member nations believes in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over 
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to encourage Albania, Croatia 
and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to continue pursuing the 
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reforms necessary to advance their candidacies for NATO membership, 
iii. The member nations want its members to encourage Albania, 
Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to 
continue pursuing the reforms necessary to advance their 
candidacies for NATO membership because of NATO's command, 
k. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over 
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to encourage the Ukraine to. 
pursue all reforms necessary to its goal of full Euro-Atlantic integration, 
iv. The member nations wants its members to encourage the Ukraine 
to pursue all reforms necessary to its goal of full Euro-Atlantic 
-v integration. 
1. The member nations believes in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over 
the Alliance constitutes sufficient reason to urge swift resolution of the 
outstanding issues between Georgia and Russia and call upon the parties 
to resume negotiations at an appropriately senior level. 
i. The member nations wants its members to urge swift resolution of 
the outstanding issues between Georgia and Russia and call upon 
the parties to resume negotiations at an appropriately senior level, 
f. Commitment: 
d. The member nations believes its utterance obligates the Alliance to be able 
to maintain security and stability for its member nations and in out-of 
area-mission in order to meet the challenges of the global security 
environment on the condition that the member nations strive to preserve 
peace through its operations; spread stability through its partnerships; and 
reinforce our community of shared values through the most robust round 
of enlargement in our history; use all means at its disposal and to 
cooperate fully with other international organizations and with its Partners 
to fight terrorism; assist in the emergence of a united, sovereign country, 
integrated into the international community; develop a comprehensive 
strategy for NATO's engagement in Afghanistan, in close consultation 
with other International Organizations and the Afghan Transitional 
Authority; support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the 
countries in the Balkans and help those countries to integrate fully into 
Euro-Atlantic structures; continue with the enlargement of NATO; 
enhancing cooperation between NATO and the EU; consider ways to 
further enhance relationships by generating a more ambitious and 
expanded framework; build on the progress between NATO and Russia, 
and NATO and the Ukraine; closely follow the development of events in 
Georgia and support the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of Georgia; support farms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will 
continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security 
objectives, including preventing the spread and use of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery; multilateralism through 
effective action and our shared commitment to: the transatlantic link; and 
implementation of measures to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of 
. the organization. . 
e. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the directives on the 
condition that the member nations will be able to maintain security and 
stability for its member nations and in out-of area-mission in order to meet 
the challenges of the global security environment 
f. The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and (b). , 
Implicatures: 
o. Assertion: 
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens. 
i. Quality: The member nations believe that its members along with 
other countries around the world and their citizens are a part of the 
same race - human, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs the members 
that they are fellow citizens, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant 
to its members, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to the Alliance. 
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral 
commitment to use. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing 
security through multilateral alliance commitment, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations'assertion informs its members it 
is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries. 
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political 
relationships. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security 
through political relationships, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members it 
is establishing political relationships, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries. 
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved 
peacefully, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations'assertion informs its members 
conflicts can be resolved peacefully, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can 
be resolved peacefully, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries. 
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e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its members will use force 
if necessary, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members 
will use force if necessary, 
in. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing its use of force 
is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries, 
h. Directive: 
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its members along 
with other countries in the global security and their citizens are a 
part of the same race - human, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs the member 
countries and other countries that they are fellow citizens. 
• iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant 
to its members and other countries in the global security 
environment, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its directive 
to its members and other countries in the global security 
environment. 
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral 
commitment to use. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing 
security through multilateral alliance commitment, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs its member 
countries and other countries it is establishing a multilateral 
alliance commitment, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries 
and other countries 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries and other countries in the global security 
environment. 
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political 
relationships. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security 
through political relationships, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member 
countries and other countries it is establishing political 
relationships, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries 
and other countries. 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
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to its member countries and other countries in the global security 
environment, 
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved 
peacefully, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member 
countries and other countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can 
be resolved peacefully, 
v. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion 
to its member countries and other countries in the global security 
environment, 
p. Commitment: 
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its member countries 
}
 along with other countries around the world and their citizens are a 
part of the same race - human, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs the 
member countries that they are fellow citizens, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant 
to its member countries. / 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
commitment to its member countries. 
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral 
commitment to use. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing 
security through multilateral alliance commitment, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its 
member countries it is establishing a multilateral alliance 
commitment, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
commitment to its member countries. 
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political 
relationships. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security 
through political relationships, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its 
member countries it is establishing political relationships, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security 
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
commitment to its member countries. 
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully. 
:
 i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved 
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peacefully, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its 
member countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can 
be resolved peacefully, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations clearly conveying its commitment 
to its member countries, 
e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary. 
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its member countries will 
use force if necessary, 
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its 
member countries will use force if necessary, 
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing it will force is 
relevant to its member countries, 
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its 
commitment to its member countries. 
(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are sincere. 
(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are normative.. ' 
Presuppositions: 
c. If the member nations are able to maintain security and stability for its member 
nations and in out-of area-missions, then the Alliance will be able to maintaining 
security and stability for its member nations and throughout the global security 
environment, 
a. If the member nations are not able to maintain security and stability for its 
member nations and in 6ut-of area-missions, then the Alliance will not be able to 
maintaining security and stability for its member nations and throughout the 
global security environment. / . 
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